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This thesis forms part of a practice-led research project that proposes, tests and evaluates 
group organising and decision-making processes suitable for both collaborative artistic 
practice and organisational structures within institutions of contemporary art. 
 
Starting from a critique of the algorithmic governance of online platforms—understood as 
algocracy—this thesis looks at the ways in which similar processes operate offline, arguing 
that the central logic of platforms—the platform-user relation—is also in operation in the 
institutions of contemporary art. This research aims to find alternatives to algocracy through 
a practice component consisting of a series of experiments with Team Syntegrity, the group 
discussion and decision-making protocol developed in the 1990s by British management 
cybernetician Stafford Beer.  
 
Identifying key processes through which algocratic power operates in the platform-user 
relations—opacity, visibility, predictability and categorisation—the thesis suggests that these 
experimental syntegrations allow for credible creative activity and persistent organisational 
forms. Such structures can harness the power of platforms while avoiding the 
authoritarianism of algocracy and the platform-user relation, instead enhancing the 
credibility, creativity and subjectivisation. Rather than replacing existing institutions, 
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The path this research has taken has a great deal to do with chance. The final essay in Donna 
Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs and Women (1991) lead to Terry Winograd and Fernando 
Flores’ Understanding Computers and Cognition (1987)1. This book introduced me to the 
concept of autopoiesis and the work of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. A search 
for Varela’s Principles of biological autonomy (1979) led to the basement of Aldham Roberts 
Library and the Stafford Beer Collection. The book was sadly missing but I was encouraged 
to look again at Beer’s preface to Maturana and Varela’s Autopiesis: The organisation of the 
living (1979). At the same time the artist Kate Genevieve, who was a regular member of the 
Reading and Thinging group run from FACT, suggested we initiate a meeting using Beer’s 
Team Syntegrity protocol. The geometry of Team Syntegrity, and the aesthetic of techno-
mysticism that was, at times, attached to it, appealed to me and related to ideas of 
conversations structured by algorithms, games and rituals that my practice had previously 
been researching.  
The institutional focus of this research stems from my own experience with collaborative art 
practice as part of the group LuckyPDF which, through its use and cultivation of online and 
offline social networks, hoped to secure autonomy from existing institutions but, as Nicola 
McCartney has written, can be seen as creating “a mirror product of the art institution” as 
much as an independent choice or survival mechanism (McCartney, 2018). My experience 
with LuckyPDF showed me that it is not possible to make a clean distinction between old and 
new institutional forms, and that established institutions are just as well, if not better, 
 
1 It was Flores who invited Stafford Beer to apply his Viable Systems Model to the Chilean Economy in the 
1970s, discussed in chaper 3. In the 1990 Winograd was a PhD supervisor of Larry Page, who would go on to 
found Google, discussed in chapter 2. 
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positioned to harness the power of network technology to promote, expand and entrench their 
dominance.  
Working alongside the Uses of Art Lab at the Liverpool School of Art and Design—and 
through it to L’internationale’s The Uses of Art: The Legacy of 1848 and 1989—allowed me 
to connect directly with a network of museums and contemporary art institutions who were 
actively working through ideas of how they could work with and alongside others in a way 
that preserved their autonomy. It also made clear to me that a critical approach is essential 
when terminology and methods from information and communication technology are being 
translated into institutional practice. Having an opportunity to contribute to L’internationale’s 
publication The Constituent Museum (Byrne et al., 2018) was an important output of this 
research project, alongside the other written and practice-based outcomes that accompany 
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Autopoiesis – the process of self-organisation by which a system is able to continually 
produce the component parts of itself in such a way that the relationship between those parts 
remains stable. Coined by Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana in 1972 and theorised with 
Francisco Varela in the essay Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living, autopoiesis is 
understood as being “necessary and sufficient to characterize the organization of living 
systems” (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.82) but was later applied by others, including 
Stafford Beer, to many types of systems. 
 
Identity – a system’s independence from its environment as defined either by an external 
observer or self-observation. For Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela identity is an 
emergent property of the autopoiesis of living systems while for Stafford Beer it is a 
necessary property of a viable system.  
 
INFOSET – a group of people united by a shared interpretation of information, which in a 
1973 essay Stafford Beer suggested as a replacement concept for social classes united by 
shared material interest. Infoset was later used the term from the group of people 
participating in Team Syntegrity. In a Beer’s design this number should ideally be 30 (Beer, 
1994a, p.10). 
 
Syntegration – the event or process of running the Team Syntegrity protocol. In this thesis it 
is used to mean the exercise of both the ‘orthodox’ method described by Stafford Beer and 
any experimental adaptation of those methods. 
 viii 
 
Systems 1–5 – hierarchically organised components of Stafford Beer’s Viable System 
Model. 
 
Team Syntegrity – the method or protocol for non-hierarchical discussion and decision 
making developed by Stafford Beer and published in Beyond Dispute (Beer, 1994a) that 
seeks to formalise the efficiency of informal discussion with the aim of producing shared 
interpretations of information, group cohesion and democratic agreement. 
 
Variety – the possible states of a system, or its complexity. In cybernetic theory, a 
management system must at least match the variety of the system it seeks to manage (Beer, 
1974, pp.10–11) 
 
Viable system – Stafford Beers term for any organisation that has the independent 
adaptability to ensure its own survival. This independence is what gives a system its identity 
(Beer, 1972, p.226). 
 
Viable System Model (VSM) – both a theory and ‘diagnostic tool’ of cybernetic 
management, Stafford Beer began work on it in the 1960s and it was first presented in his 
book Brain of the Firm (1972). Taking the human nervous system as its inspiration, the VSM 
formalised Beers ideas into a model that could be applied to organisation of any scale where 




Research aims and problem  
 
The institutions of contemporary art are, by definition, constantly changing: from the 
educational, socialising museums of modern art—exemplified by the Museum of Modern 
Art, New York (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992)—through more inclusive, but individualised, 
experiential art institutions of the late 20th and early 21st centuries—most notably Tate 
Modern, London (Rodney, 2015a)—to recent development in institutional practice that have 
seen a return to the centrality of education and a centring of democracy and autonomy, 
including the Van Abbemuseum, Eindhoven and MACBA, Barcelona (Bishop, 2014). Art 
institutions are subject to change from below, via the artworks and artists that they are 
required to accommodate, and from above, from the wider social, cultural and economic 
environment that they must exist within. One driver of change comes from technology, in 
particular the networked communication that has come to dominate how we experience 
culture, politics and society.  
 
Current approaches and responses to the impact of information and communication 
technology on the making and showing of contemporary art often adopt, intentionally or 
otherwise, logics of the platform (Proctor, 2010; Stack, 2013; Ropeik, 2016). While 
appearing like solutions to demands for institutions of contemporary art to be more inclusive, 
participatory and responsive to the communities that these institutions serve (Graham, 2018), 
through this thesis I will argue that platform models have a detrimental impact on equitable 
distributions of value and democratic distributions of power within institutions, reducing their 
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capacity for creativity and credible action, and as a result, their potential to produce 
subjectivity.  
Cybernetics—a product of the computer and the information age that began in the middle of 
the 20th century (Wiener, 1961, p.12)—remains relevant in a world increasingly saturated 
with information and mediated by computation. Stafford Beer’s theories and practices of 
cybernetic management continue to be influential with much recent attention paid to his 
Viable Systems Model (VSM), in particular its attempted implementation on the national 
level in Chile in the early (Medina, 2011; Srnicek and Williams, 2015; Morozov, 2019). 
However, less work has been done on Team Syntegrity, his augmentation to the VSM to 
allow for non-hierarchical decision-making within organisations. Team Syntegrity is a 
protocol for structuring a “perfect democracy” (Beer, 1994a, p.14) and can be seen as Beer’s 
attempt to offer a counter to the technocracy that he saw as emergent from the marriage of 
bureaucratic processes and information and computer technology, even in the best 
implementations of cybernetic management (Beer, 1974, p.41).  
As more and more of our behaviour becomes an interaction with technology, what in this 
thesis I will identify as algocracy comes to be the dominant mode of governance. Algocracy 
operates by structuring power imbalances between the platform and the user, and this thesis 
will identify the key mechanisms for this as being visibility and opacity, predictability and 
categorisation. While aspects of Beer’s Team Syntegrity can be thought of as platform-like—
or displaying platform logic—this thesis proposes that an institutional form based on Team 
Syntegrity is able to function as an alternative to algocracy by countering the authoritarian 
centralisation of the platform and instead working to produce a critical, creative and 
democratic subjectivity where representativeness and legitimacy emerge from the 
syntegration’s embedded characteristics through a process of self-organising. 
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The specific questions that this research aims to address are, therefore: 
how legitimacy, representativeness and credibility can emerge from a process that is 
not just discursive but also material and technical, while rejecting both bureaucratic and 
algocratic decision making; 
whether Team Syntegrity conforms to Beer’s own definition of a viable system and 
can therefore be the basis for a viable institutional form that that does not become subject to 
the logic of the platform; 
whether the Team Syntegrity protocol can be adapted and implemented in a way that 
is suitable for structuring institutions of contemporary art, enhancing creativity and freedom 
in a way that allows the emergence of both individual subjectivity and coherent group and 
institutional identity. 
Can platform-like art institutions support organisational forms of syntegration without 
reproducing authoritarian platform-user relations? How can we create institutional forms that 
provide agency to the artists and art-work, allowing the repurposing of existing systems 
without this being labelled as misuse and shut down or excluded? Can the lending of support 
by existing institutions be prevented from creating a creditor-debtor which transfer risk from 
the largest to the smallest actors?  
The answer, I suggest, lies in the fact that syntegration—proposed as a process of institutions 
building derived from Team Syntegrity—is organised such that it is able to generate its own 
legitimacy and transform this into credible action. The network that syntegration structures is 
one that distributes and shares risk, precisely the mechanism by which a platform increases 
its own credibility. Credibility, as the ability “make promises and to be believed” (Ascher, 
2016, p.4) is what Hannah Arendt sees as the basis for enduring connections: “the faculty to 
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promise and to keep promises in the face of the essential uncertainties of the future” (1961, 
p.164). Credibility is also, as Jodi Dean (2002) argues, necessary to the process of 
reconfiguring networks of relations. Employing syntegration as the basis for an institutional 
form allows for the legitimacy that emerges from the Team Syntegrity protocol to be 
transformed into credible action through artistic and institutional practice. The sharing, 
distribution and enhancement of credibility that syntegration structures should therefore be 
understood as a rebalancing of the power imbalance that the platform-user relation generates. 
The credibility that syntegration generates allows it to create relations with existing 
institutions where there is not simply a lending of support, but a sharing of power, one where 
it is not necessarily certain if that power will be given back. In my view the closed, self-
referential and identity-generating relations internal to syntegration allow more autonomous 
and less authoritarian relations with both other individuals and organisation in the external 
environment. It is their durability, their independent viability and their autopoietic nature that 
prevent their absorption into allopoietic—or exploitative—relations with other organisations 




This research makes its argument by bringing together a wide range of fields—art history, 
critical geography, history of science, museum and business studies—and as such draws on a 
wide range of literature. Stafford Beer’s own writing are obviously a huge influence on the 
practice elements (Beer, 1974, 1979a, 1985, 1994a; b, 1995) and the framework with which I 
evaluate the outcomes of that practice. In many ways Beer’s philosophy is adopted wholesale 
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by this project, though it takes seriously recent critical appraisals of his work (Pickering, 
2010; Medina, 2011; Morozov, 2019) and cybernetics more generally (Hayles, 1999). Eden 
Medina’s (2011) history of the implementation of the VSM at scale in Chile in the early 
1970s shows clearly the limits and dangers of creating, and insisting on, simple models of 
complex systems that, by definition, must exclude politics though, for Beer, politics must also 
conform to cybernetic laws (Medina, 2011, p.199). Medina’s conclusion, that Beer’s methods 
were far more suited to maintaining stability rather than undergirding change, is one that 
must be taken seriously if the work is to be recuperated and extended. If anything, the goal of 
this project is a more radical version of Beer—rejecting his insistence on the necessity of 
hierarchical elements within viable systems (Beer, 1985), something I argue he hints at in his 
final writings (Beer, 1993, 1994a)—that insists on the disruptive, rather than the stabilising, 
effects of decentralisation. 
The application of these experimental extensions of Beer’s ideas to collaborative art and 
institutional practice, and the central argument of the thesis—that it offers an alternative to 
the platform model of governance that is identified as nascent in institutions of contemporary 
art—relies on a another set of literature. Here I build on a number of recent doctoral works in 
related fields. Seph Rodney’s Museums, Discourse, and Visitors (2015b) describes a set of 
changes in the institutional imagining, relation to and management of visitors, focusing on 
Tate Modern. While Rodney’s description of the individualisation of the experience of the art 
museum does not directly identify it as a platform model, he does show how techniques of 
digital visitor management move offline, something which others have more explicitly 
argued causes institutions of contemporary to operate like digital platforms (Proctor, 2010; 
Stack, 2013; Wright, 2013). While others champion these transformations—though Steven 
Wright does so within strict limits—Rodney is the most critical of the way audience 
segmentation by marketing departments fragments the museum as a public institution, 
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preventing visitors from ever seeing themselves as a public. The effects of this are discussed 
in detail, drawing on the doctoral work of artist and researcher Emily Rosemond (2016, 
2017) and the writing of legal scholar Antoinette Rouvroy (Rouvroy and Berns, 2013; 
Rouvroy, 2016, 2018). Rosamond shows how methods of standardisation, inherent to the 
platform model, allows the management of user profiles rather than individuals, in a way she 
likens to a financial derivative. Algorithmic mediation and redirection of address prevents the 
kind of indirect address that Michal Warner (2005) has argued is key to the formation of 
publics and counter-publics. Rouvroy goes further to show how the rules of algorithmic 
governance need never be fixed but can still be applied to the individual without their consent 
of event them being aware of it. These derivative profiles, whether online or in the museum, 
prevent the kind of critical view of the self in relation to the group that Rouvroy argues is key 
to subject formation, while art historian Cadence Kinsey (2018) argues that the tension 
between the authentic and the archetype is key to how identity within platforms is formed. 
Much of the political thinking that informs my arguments comes from cultural and political 
theorist Jeremy Gilbert and his frequent collaborator Alex Williams (Fisher and Gilbert, 
2014; Gilbert, 2015; Williams and Gilbert, 2018). Williams’ doctoral thesis Complexity & 
Hegemony (2015a) argues that hegemony, in its sense as leadership, does not only operate at 
the level of language and social relations—as theorised by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe (Laclau, 2000; Mouffe, 2013a) and Scott Lash (2007)—but is embedded in the 
technical systems that structure contemporary society, guiding bottom-up self-organisation. 
In this way complex hegemony can be seen as a creative power-to as well as a coercive or 
representative power-over. For this reason, as Jodi Dean (2003) has argued, configuration of 
these technical system, whether they be communication networks or art institutions, is key to 
the exercise of power. This  research seeks to develop methods that can structure more 
equitable and less extractive relationships within groups and, drawing on Gilbert, connect 
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these alternatives “with those organisations and institutions which might be capable of 
enacting” these changes more widely (2015, p.210). Like Gilbert, this work draws on the 
associative, institutionalist theories of Hannah Arendt (1958, 1961) where freedom is 
understood as the capacity to act with others. This is presented as in explicit opposition to the 
sovereignty of the platform (Hu, 2015; Bratton, 2016; Easterling, 2016)—which Michele 
Feher (2015) argues is the institutional form neoliberalism—and a neoliberal culture which 
“works specifically to enhance our creative capacities while inhibiting any attempt to put 
them to work in a collective, political, democratic fashion” (Gilbert, 2015, p.212).  
 
Context, limits and reflection 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the broadness of this literature, there are many relevant 
contexts and fields that this thesis does not make direct connections to. Moreover, this thesis 
does not attempt to evaluate the outcome of the practice-based research in comparison to 
other art practices with similar methods or goals. This is despite the practice often being in 
direct and indirect dialogue with these expansive overlapping fields. The largest of these 
might be education in general and art education specifically, whether in the academy or the 
gallery. The PhD project sprung from Liverpool John Moores University’s partnership with 
L’internationale—the research partnership of MG+MSUM (Ljubljana), Museo Reina Sofía 
(Madrid), MACBA (Barcelona), M HKA (Antwerp), SALT (Istanbul & Ankara), Van 
Abbemuseum (Eindhoven)—and specifically it’s ‘Mediation Task Force’, a group of 
audience and education specialists who together developed what would become the The 
Constituent Museum (Byrne et al., 2018). My participation in this process, as well as in the 
‘constituencies’ edition of the Glossary of Common Knowledge held in Liverpool in 2016, 
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was a key foundation and framing for much of this project, despite it being rarely referenced 
directly. My own previous work in gallery education at Flat Time House, London (2009-
2015) working directly with students and graduates to support collaborative and self-led 
learning or supporting other artists—such as with Sarah Peirce’s Campus (2013), Jakob 
Jakobsen’s ANTIKNOW and Julika Gittner’s Common Enemies (2015)—in realising 
participatory projects also underpins my approach. Alternative educational models are 
therefore implicit in the approach to the practice component of this research, informed by 
discourses that felt especially urgent in the UK at that time (Steedman et al., 2012; Ivison and 
Vandeputte, 2013; Arts Against Cuts, 2015; Gordon-Nesbitt, 2015) and artists working with 
and through education models, including Adelita Husni-Bey’s Postcards from the Desert 
Island (2011), Fiona Whitton and Sean Dockray’s The Public School (2007), Ahmet Öğüt’s 
The Silent University (2012) and Ivana Momčilović’s PhD in One Night (2007) well as my 
own work with LuckyPDF on the School of Global Art (2012). Conditions, where part of this 
research was conducted, is part of this ongoing shift away from seeing the academy as the 
sole site of art education and the self-institutionalisation (and perhaps professionalisation) of 
what might previously have been more informal organisations. There is of course a longer 
history of artist-initiated educational and participatory practices, documented by Claire 
Bishop in Artificial Hells (2012). Her conclusion agrees with Gilbert’s, that contemporary 
‘volunteer’ participation is highly compatible with neoliberalism. Indeed it is the foundation 
of the platform model that forms an ever increasing component of the global economy. Like 
Gilbert, Bishop sees the necessity (and current absence—something that those working as 
part of L’internationale acknowledge and seek to address) of institutions that can transform 
artistic imagination into action in the world. The result, argues, is a pressure on artists “to 
bear the burden of devising new models of social and political organising” (2012, p.284). 
This may well be one motivators of this project, however it is not participation in general that 
 9 
 
this research is focused on, but artistic collaboration specifically. This comes out of my own 
experiences from 2008 until around 2014 as part of LuckyPDF, an artistic/curatorial group 
that operated through various layers of membership and participation to creative large 
collaborative artworks. This was a project of self-organisation and self-instituting that gave 
me a direct view of the limits of this model, especially when interacting with larger 
institutions, and specifically their education and marketing departments who were most 
interested in our event-based practice and large social media following. A techno-optimism—
even though it often insisted it was a critical or ironic one—accompanied post-internet art 
and led us to believe that new digital tools would make older institutional forms obsolete. 
While this might be at least partially true, this thesis argues that those tools are designed with 
embedded power-dynamics that redistribute power and value to the platform while shifting 
cost and risk to the user. As such, my interested in new models of organising is firstly about 
sustainable structures through which artists can make work together—collaboratively or in 
parallel—and at the point of interaction between self-organised artists and institutions, 
whether they be art museums or digital platforms.  
 
It is worth considering if fine art and its institutions are particularly ill-suited to collaborative 
practice, with many of the best examples of it pushing at the edges of or falling entirely 
outside of art, even if they are invited into the art museum. Higher profile examples would be 
Black Audio Film Collective and Karrabing Film Collective, both of which have received 
artworld recognition but which draw much more from the fields documentary and fiction 
filmmaking. Equally, Loraine Leeson and Peter Dunn’s Docklands Community Poster 
Project was primarily a political campaign—though “the entire history of art production [is 
brought] to bear on the collective endeavours” (Murphy, 2004 quoted in Leeson, 2009, p. 
156)—as was Arts Against Cuts, an organisation that I was peripherally involved in. My own 
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collaborative practice with LuckyPDF relied on the appropriation of formats from outside of 
fine art—most notably television but also film, fashion, advertising and education—in order 
to structure collaboration. For me, however, it was always the event of making television that 
was the focus, rather than the product. The adoption of mass media forms was just an excuse 
to get people together working on the same thing, and I was never very interesting in an 
audience beyond those collaborating. Outside of the context of LuckyPDF, my 2014 project 
Cinema6, in collaboration with curator John Bloomfield, brought the format of a community-
programmed cinema into the gallery, structuring collective viewing experiences that have 
largely been absent from modern and contemporary art and fulling ignoring that it took place 
in the context of a contemporary art gallery.  
 
There is another area that informs this research but directly addressed in the thesis, 
decentralised network technology. Both the cryptographic blockchain and federated social 
networks present themselves as alternatives to the domination of the platform (Mansoux and 
Abbing, 2020). As well as their many evangelists, there have been already been thoughtful 
and considered responses to how these technologies might be useful to artists (Catlow et al., 
2017) and those seeking to make institutional change might use these technologies (DuPont, 
2014; Terranova, 2014; Brekke, 2016, 2020; O’Dwyer, 2017). While Jaya Klara Brekke’s 
centring of the question of which organisational functions we delegate to the algorithm is a 
central question for Beer’s cybernetics, I have been very mindful of Quinn DuPont’s 
argument that even the most sophisticated decentralised algorithmic systems can “devolve 
into traditional models of sociality—using existing strong ties to negotiate and influence, 
argue and disagree—all with nary a line of code in sight” (DuPont, 2017, p.158). The 
argument of this thesis is precisely that we need to develop better systems of negotiating, 
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arguing and disagreeing before we can decide what is delegated to the algorithm or the 
political configuration of our networks and protocols.  
 
My use of Stafford Beer’s Team Syntegrity protocol is then—in exactly the same way as 
television was for LuckyPDF—an appropriated format with which to structure collaboration, 
and my own interest remains in the process and experience of the participants, rather than the 
outcomes. The goal of my work however, in this research and elsewhere, aligns with Beer’s: 




While Team Syntegrity has been assessed as successful in achieving its stated aims of 
decision making amongst groups (Beer, 1994a; Bechler and Sakalis, 2017), this thesis 
proposes that it is capable of successfully structuring collaborative artistic practice as well as 
non-hierarchical decision-making and that it therefore has the potential to be the basis for a 
viable institutional form. The research operates through a series of artistic projects and 
events, which test a number of different adaptations of Beer’s Team Syntegrity protocol—or 
syntegrations—in different art institutional contexts. This allows the research to draw 
conclusions not just about syntegration’s validity as the basis of institutional organisation, but 
also about its capacity to generate autonomy within existing institutions, as well as outside of 
and parallel to them. The methods used, which by their nature involve collaborative 
experimentation, seek to discover how individual and group aims and identity and emerge 





Considering the Team Syntegrity protocol as an algorithm, the methodology draws on Robert 
Kitchin’s (2014) suggestions for approaches to researching algorithms. These include the 
examination and deconstruction of “pseudo-code and/or source code”, as is presented in or 
can be derived from Beer’s publication of the protocol in Beyond Dispute: The Invention of 
Team Syntegrity (1994a). This was the necessary first step taken when developing the 
experiments in this project however, as detailed in section 4.3.1, this examination and 
deconstruction was undertaken collaboratively as part of the experiment through a process 
collaborative learning. Kitchin’s second approach is reflexively producing code, the auto-
ethnographic examination of the translation of action into algorithms in order to “tease out 
the various practices, interactions and politics of creating algorithms” (Kitchin, 2014, p.18). 
This approach was taken throughout chapters 4 and 5 when considering the adaptation of 
Beer’s protocol to specific situations and its augmentation in response to suggestions made 
by collaborators during experimentation.  
 
Due to the incomplete nature of Beer’s description of the Team Syntegrity process, an 
element of reverse engineering, Kitchin’s third approach, was required, especially when 
looking at the commercial syntegration examined in section 4.2. For this research, however, 
the most important method that Kitchin details is unpacking the full socio-technical 
assemblage of algorithms, noting that algorithms always operate in interaction with 
“infrastructure/hardware, code platforms, data, and interfaces” on the one hand and “forms of 
knowledge, legalities, governmentalities, institutions, marketplace, finance” on the other 
(Kitchin, 2014, p.21). For this reason, the first chapter of this thesis is a discussion of the 
causes, processes and consequences of the adoption of platform models by institutions of 
contemporary art, while the second chapter looks at the operation of algocracy within online 
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platforms. The extensive precursor to the discussion of the Team Syntegrity protocol and the 
experiments with it is necessary because studying algorythms “without considering their 
wider assemblage […] risks fetizishing the algorithm and code at the expense of the rest of 
the assemblage” (Kitchin, 2014, p.21). 
 
While Kitchin’s approaches are key to consideration of how my experimental syntegrations 
relate to and differ from Beer’s Team Syntegrity protocol, and how they interact with the 
techno-social assemblage of institutions of contemporary art, this research primarily follows 
a practice-based methodology and the experiments are employed as artistic practice within 
institutional contexts, and must therefore be understood and implemented differently. While 
Kitchin notes “the difficulties of detaching oneself and gaining critical distance to be able to 
give clear insight into what is unfolding” in auto-ethnography, and that it “excludes any non-
representational, unconscious acts from analysis”, R. Lyle Skains considers subjectivity less 
of an issue in practice-based research and, indeed, that practice-based research is impossible 
without subjective self-observation and reflection (Skains, 2018, p.88). The key, for Sullivan, 
is to “maintain and monitor a creative and critical perspective so as to be able to document 
and defend the trustworthiness of interpretations made” (Sullivan, 2006, p.29). 
 
 
Importantly, that the outcomes of the research are, primarily, artworks—the ‘work in the 
world’ or the experimental protocols that Kitchin describes—alongside the knowledge gained 
from reflection on the those outcomes and the process that produced them. Practice-based 
research requires both “creative action and critical reflection” (Sullivan, 2006, p.28) and 
nether is privileged in this research. As Sullivan argues, practice-based research is a 
“transformative act” with others and that “the outcome is not merely to help explain things in 
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causal or relational terms, but to fully understand them in a way that helps us act on that 
knowledge” (2006, p.22). He further see the artworks that result from practice-based research 
as ‘institutional artifacts’ which “exhibit properties that are primarily objective” and can 
therefore give “access to insights that can be intuitive, mindful, and discoverable” (2006, 
p.27). 
 
As artworks, the experimental syntegrations that this thesis reflects on, interprets and draws 
its conclusions from were carried out during opportunities afforded to me by my own artistic 
practice through invitations to work with existing groups or form new ones, through the 
initiation of new projects or the contribution to ongoing ones. For this reason, each 
experiment is different in structure, ambition and duration, from a one-day public workshop 
to a four-month teaching project. By adapting the methods of Beer’s Team Syntegrity to real-
world artistic opportunities—working within and alongside different types of contemporary 
art institutions—the research is able to offer insight into the efficacy of the practice in 




The question of ethics in artistic research is contentious. Artistic research poses challenges 
for the understanding of ethics within an academic context, and very different expectations 
are placed on artists working inside and outside of the academy (Bolt et al., 2017). The 
College Art Association’s Artist Code of Ethics emphasises artist’s freedom to “challenge, 
criticize, and transgress” social standards and that artists “must be ethically free to ignore 
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limits established by legal authorities” (College Art Association (CAA), 2011) while Lucille 
Holmes suggests that “artistic freedom of expression entails the right not only to express 
opinions without interference, but also the right to employ unethical methods with artistic 
participants” (Holmes, 2020, p.642). Ethics frameworks and notions of informed consent 
developed biomedical research not necessarily transfer over to other fields (Jansen et al., 
2017). Beyond this, ethical frameworks for creative and performing arts are often 
undifferentiated from those applying to research in social sciences or humanities, such as 
philosophy, history and literature (Gurzawska and Benčin, 2015). These often place primary 
importance on anonymity when collecting data from human participants (Holmes, 2020, 
p.637) in a way that is not just unsuitable for artistic research, but may directly conflict with 
art’s ethical responsibilities to properly assign credit and authorship to participants even 
when—as is discussed in section 1.3.4 of this thesis—this may be impossible.  
 
The mechanisms of privacy and authorship are key questions that this project seeks to 
address and, as will be discussed, syntegration is a powerful tool for producing informed, 
collective consent in regards to questions of what becomes public and what remains private. 
Initiating a process of collaborative making and learning, where neither the outcomes or the 
specifics of the process are predetermined, means informed consent is not possible prior to 
the process and to pretend it is would be unethical. This being the case, each experiment was 
conducted with participants responding to an open call which made clear the nature, basis and 
aim of the process. Each of the experiments also took place inside its own institutional 
context, with their own ethical frameworks already in place prior to any actions initiated by 
myself. These leads to some peculiarities, for example the full audio recording of the Reading 
and Thinging session—which in my personal view makes too much of the process visible, 
but which was standard practice for this group and was consented to by participants as 
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such—or the necessity of providing grades to those participating in How to build a platform 
as part of their studies. 
 
As such, this project presents only the public outcomes of these experiments which are the 
result of the processes and which have been made public by the participants themselves and 
participants are only identified where they are also identified in those public outcomes. The 
analysis is therefore, as discussed in the methodology, based on my own self-observation and 





This research starts from the position that the democratic institutions are the basis of a 
democratic society and follows Jeremy Gilbert’s call for “a deepening and extending of 
democratic relations” in all aspects of society. The project aims to be a contribution to the 
development of what in his view this requires: “both more concrete ideas about what such 
institutions might look like and also conceptual resources with which to solve some of the 
problems which an idea such as ‘participatory democracy’ necessarily raises” (Gilbert, 2015, 
p.161). The interdisciplinary subject of this research makes a contribution to three distinct 
fields that I bring together in the theoretical discussion and practical experimentation: critical 
studies of technology, cybernetic management and institutional practice in the field of 
contemporary art. Ideas and approaches from all three areas are brought to bear on each 




Firstly, it presents the platform-user relation as central to the operation of power within 
networked society, detailing the mechanisms by which it operates and drawing on cybernetics 
to show that it is an authoritarian relation in which the purpose of the components it supports 
are subordinated to the purpose of the platform itself.  
 
Secondly, it shows that syntegrations, derived from Beer’s Team Syntegrity protocol, are 
capable of satisfying the requirements for viability because of the way embedded 
characteristics allow identity to emerge from the network of relations that self-organise 
around it. Rather than operating through a platform-user relation, syntegrations resist 
authoritarianism by distributing leadership, cultivating the subjectivities that the platform-
user relation proscribes.  
 
Finally, the research shows that, when implemented within institutions of contemporary art, 
syntegration has the capacity to structure not only discursive relations, but also collaborative 
artistic practice. This allows self-instituting, with democratic subjectivities and autonomous 
purpose able to flow upwards to the institutional identities that emerge from the syntegration 
process. Conceptual tools from the study of technology have allowed a more critical 
understanding of syntegration as a tool for subject formation which, when combined with 
creative practice, offers a new institutional model, one that is able to fulfil institutional desire 
for greater democracy while avoiding the unequal power relation that a platform model 
constructs. 
 
If, as argued, the politics of platforms result from their specific configuration of a network of 
relations, then an alternative configuration should allow for a different kind of politics. The 
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experiments with syntegration as collective creative actions within existing network and 
institutional contexts also allow this research to make propositions about the suitability of the 
institutions of contemporary art for the type of practices described. Syntegration, as a simple 
and transparent framework for collaboration, does not prescribe specific relations but, as this 
thesis will argue, structures a process of learning how to be democratic together. This 
research proposes that this method of learning allows for the formation of a democratic 
subject, aligning with the role given to contemporary art institutions as site of, traditionally, 
socialisation and subject formation and, in more recent models, the cultivation of 
individuality. The platform models adopted by contemporary art institutions, even when 
intending to provide these outcomes, are structured in such a way as to constrain and prevent 
the types of creativity and subjectivisation they aim to promote and facilitate. This research 
therefore proposes that only pressures to change that comes from below—from the making of 
art and the development of small-scale institutions which larger ones must adapt themselves 
to—has the capacity to achieve open, democratic and creative institutional forms that 




Chapter 1 places the operation of the platform in context. First, it places networked 
communication in the context of questions of what a public is and how it is formed. Second, 
it explores how the platform-user relation and the financialisaton of sharing operates within 




Chapter 2 focuses on algocracy, rule by algorithms, which underpins the platform-user 
relation. It will be argued that algorithmic meditation of our interactions with technical 
systems has meant that algocracy has come to replace both bureaucracy and democracy as the 
dominant institutional order. The desire for predictability that algocracy displays necessarily 
impacts human freedom and creativity, understood as the ability to do the unexpected, while 
the impossibility of liberal discourse within the platform means that new methods for 
producing legitimacy, representativeness and credibility are required, necessitating a common 
environment.  
Chapter 3 examines the theory and practice of Stafford Beer’s cybernetic management, 
arguing that Team Syntegrity can itself be understood to conform to his definition of a viable 
system, rather than just a component part of it as he proposed. It does this by following 
Laurence Rassel’s propositions about the separation of role and function whilst also utilising 
a closer examination of the influence of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s concept 
of autopoiesis.  
Chapter 4 then details both the experiments conducted as part of this research, contrasting it 
to a recent full-scale ‘orthadox’ Team Syntegrity event, analyised through accounts of its 
participants and organisers. My four experimental syntegrations will then be used to draw 
lessons about how, in what context and with what modifications syntegration is able to 
structure not just discussion but also artistic collaboration.  
A concluding, fifth chapter makes a series of comparisons between the theory of Team 
Syntegrity and the experimental syntegrations carried out as part of this research, contrasting 
them to the platform logic and algocratic platform-user relation. Addressing each of the 
identified properties and mechanisms of platforms and algocracy—opacity and visibility, 
predictability and categorisation—it will show that while, in some respects, syntegration 
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produces a platform-like organisational structure, the network of relations that it structures 
prevents the authoritarian, algocratic nature of the platform-user relation. Instead, it self-
organises around the protocol’s embedded characteristics to produce a bottom-up mechanism 
for determining the system’s purpose and non-financialised relations of sharing, allowing the 
emergence of creativity, credibility and subjectivisation.  
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Chapter 1 — Platforms 
 
Platform is a ubiquitous term for the way we interact with a wide variety of technologies, 
whether that be an operating system or a social network (Gillespie, 2017). Increasingly it is 
also used to describe and understand a much wider variety of social structures and institutions 
(Gerbaudo, 2019) to the extent that Michel Feher has suggested that the platform is the 
institutional form of contemporary government (Feher, 2015).  
 
The first chapter of this thesis will define the platform by detailing its unique characteristics, 
arguing that the platform arises from the interaction of two related technological concepts, 
infrastructure and protocol but that in addition the platform displays properties of 
sovereignty. It then argues that the primary type of relation within the platform is one of 
sharing which defines the relationship between platform and user.  
 
Following this, the chapter will then take a broader, more historically situated look at the 
changing notions of public and private following the work of Hannah Arendt. It will then 
take a detailed account of the function of publicity, particularly online, through the work of 
Jodi Dean, arguing that networked publics are best understood through the practice of 
hegemony, but that the understanding of this developed by Erensto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe requires a more materialist basis when applied to the platform.  
 
Finally, it will use this elaborated understanding of platforms and publics to examine the 
contemporary art institution, showing how the transition from the modern to the 






1.1 — Platforms, sovereignty and sharing 
The first section of this chapter argues that the platform is the ubiquitous form of organisation 
and governance in contemporary society. Drawing on the existing literature it defines the key 
characteristics of the platform. Firstly, it makes the connection between platforms and the 
ideas of infrastructure and protocol. The concept of homeostasis is used to show that what 
Alex Willians terms ‘platform logic’ relies on both negative and positive feedback, allowing 
platforms to regulate and capture the unexpected in a way that the fixed nature of 
infrastructure and protocol cannot. Benjamin Bratton’s (2016) discussion of the figure of the 
User will be used to describe what I will call the platform-user relation. Drawing on Michel 
Feher to show that this relation is based on sharing, the platform-user relation will be argued 
to be part of a process of the financialisation of society in which individuals seek to increase 
their personal value, reputation or credibility. As value is based on the evaluation of others—
subjective rather than objective—it requires what Paolo Virno (2004), following Hannah 
Arendt, calls ‘publicly organised space’.  
 
1.1.1 — Platforms, protocols and infrastructure 
 
The work of architect and urbanist Keller Easterling looks at the physical infrastructure of 
contemporary global communication, focusing on how it manifests in physical space and the 
built environment, for example, how the paths of high-speed data cables encourages, and are 
encouraged by, the siting of ‘digital villages’ or enterprise zones that exacerbate uneven 
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development and information access (Easterling, 2016, p.126). Easterling sees infrastructure 
not only as physical, but also comprised of rules and standards that govern how technology is 
used, as well as the narratives that make sense of it. She encourages an understanding of 
infrastructures based on what they do rather than what they claim to do. Arguing for the 
importance of analysing infrastructure’s ‘disposition’—“the character or propensity of an 
organization that results from all its activity” (2016, p.21) as well as “the relationships 
between things or the repertoires they enact” (2016, p.4)—she sees infrastructure as a series 
of ‘active forms’ that have an informational component, making some things possible and 
others impossible. It is in the informational component of infrastructure that she sees a way to 
assess their inherent, if undeclared, nature, which “manifests, not in text or code, but in 
activity” (2016, p.86). Easterling’s argument is close to that of Stafford Beer’s claim—central 
to his Viable System Model discussed in Chapter 3—that “the purpose of a system is what it 
does” (Beer, 1985, p.99). Linking these ideas to Deleuze and Guatari’s concepts of the 
diagram, Easterling suggests that infrastructure, conceived in this way, can be viewed as a 
platform. When infrastructure is seen as neither an object nor a plan, but a set of instructions 
for the interplay between parts, it can be used to shape activities and relationships over time 
(Easterling, 2016, pp.80–84).  
 
These rules and instructions are what Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker refer to as 
protocol. An attempt to understand the politics of networks at the ‘microtechnical’ level, they 
define protocol as “conventional rules and standards that govern relationships within 
networks” allowing the physical infrastructure of a network to function (Galloway and 
Thacker, 2004, p.8). Though emerging from a specific technological field, they show how 
protocol is applicable in a social, economic and legal setting (2004, pp.13–14) and beyond 
this to the biological, with protocol operating whenever a system is conceived as an 
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information network (2004, p.20). For Thacker, protocol is the answer to the question of 
“where the power has gone” (Thacker, 2004, p.xix) within the non-hierarchical network, with 
Galloway describing it as a “management style” or “principal of organisation” which displays 
“neither on the central control of the sovereign nor on the decentralized control of the prison” 
(2004, p.3) making a link to Giles Deleuze’s essay Postscript on the Societies of Control 
(1992). Deleuze has suggested that contemporary society is not based on discipline and 
punishment, administered by institutions in specific times and places—as theorised by 
Michel Foucault (2012)—but one based on a more defuse, but prevalent, system of control 
which operates through what he terms ‘modulation’. While Deleuze connected sovereignty to 
simple machines and discipline to the steam age, “control societies function with a third 
generation of machines, with information technology and computers.” (Galloway, 2004, 
p.22)  
While Galloway and Thacker’s thinking on protocols is helpful in understanding the way 
infrastructure comes to act as a mechanism of control or governance, it is in the complex 
constructions of hardware and software, the physical and social structures described by 
Easterling, through which the platform emerges as the site of control.  
 
Building on the conception of the protological, Alex Williams links Deleuze’s concept of 
modulation back to the homeostatic self-regulation of cybernetics described by Norbert 
Wiener (Wiener, 2007). Exemplified by William Ross Ashby’s homeostat—an electronic 
device that, through feedback loops, could bring itself to a state of equilibrium (Pickering, 
2010, p.104)—cyberneticians proposed homeostasis as “the tendency of complex systems to 
run towards an equilibrial state” (Beer, 1995, p.426). Viewed as a cybernetic system, control 
society operates through decentralised feedback mechanisms that can regulate without the 
need to exercise direct authority. For Shoshana Zuboff, rather than simply automating 
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bureaucracy, in the way that mechanical devices such as a clocking-in machine did, 
computational, algorithmic mediation operates differently because it “simultaneously 
generates information” (2015, p.76). This change between ‘dumb’ and ‘smart’ automation 
has the effect of providing a new kind of transparency to a previously opaque processes, such 
that “events, objects, processes, and people become visible, knowable, and shareable in a new 
way” (2015, p.77). While this aligns with the suggestion made in Deleuze’s conception of the 
role of the computer in control society, Zuboff’s work on computer mediation predates 
Deleuze’s. She argues that the nature of authority and power is altered by ‘smart machines’, 
leading to “internal commitment and motivation replace obedience as the primary bond 
between the individual and the task” (Zuboff, 1988, p.291).  
 
For Williams it is not only restraint or negative feedback through which control societies 
exercises their power, but also their ability to enable, while still modulating or regulating, 
unforeseen action using positive feedback. Such feedback loops lead to greater complexity 
because they are both non-linear (with changes in output not proportional to changes in input) 
and irreversible. The name Williams gives this mechanism that both restricts and enables, is 
the ‘platform’, defined by its complementary qualities of being open and closed, composed of 
“the necessary and the contingent” (2015b, p.12). This is not a simple opposition of form and 
content, with the platform providing the former and the user-generated content the later—as 
with social media—but rather a question of behaviour and use. Like Easterling’s description 
of infrastructure as “spacial software” (2016, p.81), a platform’s design may make certain 
uses more or less likely but ‘correct’ use is not necessarily predefined. A platform’s 
flexibility, however, means it can adapt to amplify, as well as curtail, new behaviours as they 
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emerge2. Williams describes platforms as consisting of core, relatively stable elements that 
enable and support a much wider variety of other components. If the new uses, behaviours 
and components that emerge are reliant on a platform’s core, it puts the platform in a very 
powerful position, leading to what philosopher of complexity William C. Wimsatt calls 
generative entrenchment—a “feature of a structure [...] that has many other things depending 
on it because it has played a role in generating them” (Wimsatt, 2007 quoted in Williams 
2015, p. 14) and, as a result, a tendency towards monopolisation (Srnicek, 2017).  
 
While generative entrenchment and modulation are key features of platforms, I would argue 
that alone they are not sufficient to distinguish a platform from protocol or infrastructure. 
Both protocols and infrastructures modulate behaviour—making certain things more or less 
likely without the need for enforcement—and can entrench themselves through use, making 
them increasingly difficult or costly to break away from. A platform’s modularity allows it to 
combine features of both protocol and infrastructure. Protocol’s key feature—its openness 
and decentralisation—does not allow for the re-enclosure that a platform does, while fixed 
infrastructure alone does not have the flexibility to modulate emerging behaviour. Platforms 
are able to operate through both centralising and decentralising actions, flattening some 
things and hierachising others, opening and closing themselves at the same time.  
 
Writing at the beginning of the century3, Galloway still sees a dynamic of conflict between 
centralised hierarchy and the protocological network (Galloway, 2004, p.244). Easterling’s 
more recent work emphasises that the modulating effect of infrastructure must be 
indeterminate in order to be practical, managing a disposition over time (Easterling, 2016, 
 
2 A good example of this being the twitter #hashtag, which was first introduced by users before being adopted as 
part of the platform’s design (Parker, 2011). 
3 Galloway’s Protocol was published the same year as Facebook launched and an O’Reilly Media conference 
popularised the term ‘Web 2.0’. 
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p.91). It is through the flexibility of the protocol that infrastructure becomes a platform. 
Based upon open protocols, platforms utilise the potential of this openness, while at the same 
time, like infrastructure, are able to assert centralised and centralising power.  
 
 
1.1.2 — Sovereignty and the Stack 
 
While Williams sees the modularity and modulation of the platform as evidence that they are 
expressions of the control society, the next part of this section will move beyond this, to 
explore ideas introduced by Tung-Hui Hu, Easterling and Benjamin Bratton that, rather than 
simply being mechanisms of modulatory control, platforms open the way for the re-
emergence of sovereignty.  
 
Platform sovereignty emerges at the point where the platform comes into contact, or even 
conflict, with the state. While Hu sees ‘data sovereignty’ in the fact that networked 
technology places us within the same technical, political and economic systems that states 
use to enact violence (Hu, 2015, p.xvii)—for example the data-driven drone strike kill lists 
(Currier, 2015)—Easterling’s concept of Extrastatecraft is precisely the reappearance of non-
state sovereignty—albeit in a “bifurcated” or “hypocritical” form (Easterling, 2016, p.49)—in 
special economic zones. For Bratton, an overlapping of sovereignties increasingly occurs as 
states become more machine-like (infrastructural and protocological) and machines become 
more state-like. The domain in which they then meet is what he calls the Stack. The model of 
the stack comes from computer science, describing how different ‘layers’ of computer 
architecture, from the semiconducting silicon to binary computation to the graphics on 
screen, function together while only interacting with the layer immediately above or below 
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them. Rather than simply being a representation of how technology works, the Stack is a 
model of complex systems: technical, environmental, social and, in operation, combinations 
of all three (2016, p.11). While Bratton is clear that the Stack is a metaphor, he sees it as not 
simply helpful as a descriptor but rather as a design principle (2016, p.53), a model or 
diagram with which to not only to understand complex systems, but also one upon which 
they are constructed (2016, p.4). 
 
Bratton places more emphasis than the authors already discussed on the role of the user, the 
topmost layer of his Stack, the history and applications of which will be discussed in detail 
later in this chapter. The key feature of the User-Platform relation that he describes—and the 
one that is most important for the arguments that this chapter and the rest of this project 
makes—is how it constructs and distributes value. The ‘higher-order’ organising that a 
platform performs increases the value of the information it organises. This produces a surplus 
when the value of the result is greater than the cost of collecting and organising disorganised 
(or less organised) information. Bratton sees this surplus as being divided between the 
platform and the user, but that the platform is in the position to acquire the greatest share of 
the surplus (Bratton, 2016, p.154). Platforms are incentivised to provide just enough value to 
the user—or prohibitive penalties for disengaging—that they will continue to use and, at the 
same time, maximising the types of information it can organise. Unlike price information in a 
market, the organisation in a platform is centralised and the visibility of the information is 
under the platform’s control. For Zuboff (2015) this visibility creates a break with the 
classical conception of the market as unknowable in its entirety from any single point and 
therefore necessarily independent from bureaucratic governance. Information that was once 
seen as inherently decentralised in the market is now recentralised in the platform, and can 
therefore be controlled in different ways, allowing the visible hand of management and 
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invisible hand of the market to work together. Platforms are able to blur market and non-
market information—essentially price and reputation (Morozov, 2019)—in a way that 
negates the anti-authoritarian qualities of markets that their advocates such as Friedrich 
Hayek ascribe them (Davies, 2014, p.18). This understanding of the mixing of market and 
bureaucratic mechanisms and the distribution of the resulting surplus provides a much fuller 
account of the rise and dominance of platforms than either the cybernetic logics of generative 
entrenchment and their monopolistic tendencies (Srnicek, 2017) or the protocological 
adaptability that Galloway proposes. This sharing of surplus value is, in my view, key to 
understanding platform logic from both the user and the platform’s perspective. As the next 
section will discuss, the sharing that the platform facilitates allows it to operate beyond 
information and computer networks in the institutions that comprise society.  
 
 
1.1.3 — Sharing and financialisation 
 
A far more detailed and historically situated account of sharing is offered by Michel Feher. 
He shows that it is not a simple cost-benefit calculation—the incentive of a share of surplus 
and entrenchment based on cost of change—that ties users to platforms. The logic of sharing 
upon which platforms operate is, he argues, part of an new and significantly different self-
conception of people and their conduct. Key to Feher’s concept of sharing as the governing 
logic of the platform—put forward in his essay on self-appreciation (2009) and expanded in 
his lecture series The Age of Appreciation (2013-2015)—is that rather than trading, which 
seeks profit, sharing seeks credit (Feher, 2013). In this situation, value is not something to be 
realised in the present, but to be held in potential in the future. As Maurizio Lazzarato argues 
“finance is a promise of future wealth and, consequently, incommensurable with actual 
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wealth” (2012, p.46). Feher argues that the logic of sharing manifests as the financialisation 
of ‘human capital’, going a step beyond the economic subject as proposed by neoliberal 
economists such as Gary S. Becker that is, in my view, still present in the indebted subject 
described by Lazzarato in the Making of Indebted Man (2012). While human capital ‘invests’ 
in the self with the expectation of future profit—for example through education—Feher’s 
contemporary economic subject seeks an increase, or appreciation, in the value of the self—
what he calls ‘self-esteem’ or reputation.  
 
For Feher, this financialisation is achieved by sharing in a number of ways. We share more in 
the sense that more aspects of ourselves are made available to be evaluated by others. 
Additionally, as human capital, we are not owners but investors in ourselves and as such 
share ourselves with other investors (2009, p.34). Feher shows that neoliberal subjects can be 
governed, or made to govern themselves, by providing “models of self-valuation that modify 
their priorities and inflect their strategic choices” (Feher, 2009, p.28)—precisely the 
protcological modulation already described—but goes on to show that this self-valuation is 
dependent on sharing because the evaluation must occur in public and is therefore dependent 
on what Paolo Virno (2004), following Hannah Arendt, has called ‘publicly organised space’. 
Feher (2015) argues that the imperative of neoliberal governments, or rather governance, is 
the facilitation of sharing, and the institutional form of neoliberalism is the publicly organised 
space of the platform.  
 
Sharing then, as a mode of interaction that allows for evaluation, can be seen as central to 
platform logic as it is the mechanism that allows the platform to modulate its users through 
the models of self-valuation and reputation within the system. It is a prerequisite of the 
higher-order organising from which the platform derives its surplus value, providing the 
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blurred boundaries of openness and closedness that allows platform sovereignty to capture 
and exclude as necessary. Sharing and its finacialisation is, therefore, the prevailing mode of 
economic relation within platforms and platform-like structures. Understanding how they 
operate beyond information networks requires a deeper engagement with publicly organised 
space to see how the platform’s organisation, outcomes and effects differ from previous 
conceptions of public space and the public. To do this, the second section of this chapter will 
take a more detailed look at Arendt’s conception of the public, linking and contrasting it to a 
number of approaches to publics and their politics. 
 
1.2 — The Public and the Private 
 
This second section of the chapter looks at how notions of the public originated and how they 
have been affected by recent technological developments. Following Hannah Arendt (1958), 
it will be shown that the modern social sphere blurs the boundaries of public and private. 
Jurgen Habermas’ concept of the Public Sphere, key to how many thinkers understand the 
relationship of the individual to society, is not applicable to networked communication 
because, as Jodi Dean (2002) argues, it cannot be both inclusive and consensual as an ideal 
Habermasian public sphere requires. While Nancy Fraser (1990) and Michael Warner (2005) 
advance the political potential of counterpublics for allowing pluralism within the public 
sphere, Dean argues that the dynamic of networked publics is best understood through Ernsto 
Laclau and Chantelle Mouffe’s ideas of antagonistic groups struggling for hegemony which, 
for Dean, centre around the configuration of the network itself. 
I will argue that Dean’s application of hegemony to the formal and material aspects of 
networked communication suggests that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemonic discourse 
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is not adequate to describe contemporary publics which should not be understood as 
organising themselves through discourse alone. Instead, I will argue that technical systems 
now perform many of the functions ascribed to discourse, legitimation of judgements, 
identification, subjectivisation and even believing. While Scott Lash (2007) describes this 
technical power as ‘post-hegemonic’, my argument will follow Alex William’s (2015a) in 
seeing it as a form of complex hegemony, taking into account all kinds of relations, not 
merely discursive ones, and emphasising hegemony as a form of leadership. This argument 
will be supplemented by the ideas of Arendt for whom the public realm is based on 
institutions that require continuous acts of leadership with others. Her understanding of this 
type of leadership as freedom, based in the creative power to, opposed to the power over of 
sovereignty, will be used to show an alternative to the platform sovereignty, described in 
section 1.1.2, that is necessary for the new institutional form this thesis proposes to be 
successful.  
 
1.2.1 — The social and the intimate 
 
Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition describes how the ancient Greek opposition of 
political activity—mediated by speech—to the ‘natural’ relationships of family life and 
despotic government—based on violence—defines the distinction between public and private 
realms (Arendt, 1958, pp.24–28). These ancient separations become blurred with the 
emergence of the modern social sphere “which is neither public nor private, strictly 
speaking” (Arendt, 1958, p.8) and specifically the nation state, conceived of and politically 
organised as though it were a single family. Jürgen Habermas’s concept of the Public 
Sphere—conceived as an open and inclusive space in which reason is used to establish and 
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legitimate norms by rational, self-interested individuals (Dean, 2003, p.96)—operates at the 
scale of the nation, with citizenship the criteria for participation. Nancy Fraser describes the 
public sphere as “the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs” through 
“discursive interaction” (1990, p.57), while Chantel Mouffe makes clear that Habermas’s 
public sphere does not allow for a clear separation between public and private (2000, p.91)—
acting to bridge private rights and collective formation (2000, p. 85)—and is thus social, 
rather than properly public in Arendt’s sense.  
Habermas’s conception of an ‘ideal discourse’—open, impartial and equitable—allows 
rational judgments to gain legitimacy, with rational argument always leading to “reasonable 
outcomes” (Mouffe, 2000, p.88). However, because correct judgments need to be fully 
informed, Jodi Dean shows how members of the public are compelled to reveal their private 
selves to public scrutiny. What was previously private becomes of interest and consequence 
in the public sphere, subject to “the law of reputation” where action becomes “subject to the 
praise and blame of one’s fellow citizens” (Dean, 2002, p.25). Though the private realm of 
the family is outside the commodification—though “profoundly caught up in the 
requirements of the market” (Habermas, 1989, p.55)—for Habermas it strives for 
“transparency” (Dean, 2002, p.32), orientating itself towards an audience in order to allow 
the rational judgement of the public to act as a moral judgment of the private realm. Whereas 
the ancient public realm was the space to cultivate and express individuality through action, 
modern thinkers such as Rousseau saw the public as demanding conformity with deviation 
from society’s norms and rules is considered “asocial or abnormal” (Arendt, 1958, pp.41–2). 
While public comes to mean social, the private becomes reduced to the intimate. For Arendt 
the “modern discovery of intimacy seems a flight from the whole outer world into the inner 
subjectivity of the individual” (1958, p.69). To be private is to be disconnected from others, 





1.2.2 — Publics and Counterpublics 
 
Publicity is the mechanism by which things come to public attention and which, for Arendt, 
allow us to construct a shared reality (1958, p.52). Jodi Dean goes further to propose 
publicity as the “organizing element of democratic politics” as well as the “governing 
concept of the information age” (Dean, 2002, p.15). For Dean however, publicity is always in 
relation to its inverse, the secret. Dean shows the public sphere as arising from a public 
critical of absolutist governments, protected by their “sovereign privilege of secrecy” (2002, 
p.17), with publicity providing “a way to counter, to rationalize, arbitrary sovereign power by 
subjecting it to the scrutiny of reason” (2002, p. 28). Publicity drives the movement towards 
an ideal, unitary public that can have a single opinion and single interest. This idealised 
public requires and demands a constant “active knowing” (Dean, 2002, p.18)—a gaze from 
which nothing can escape—that aims to reveal and scrutinise secrets. Dean points out 
however, that the secret, as “form, not content […] can never fully or finally be revealed” 
(2002, p.42). While Habermas admits that the public sphere can be manipulated by public 
relations—consumer as opposed to critical publicity (Dean, 2002, p.38)—his proscription is 
more transparency to allow for more rational debate and a disavowal of the ‘secret politics’ of 
interest groups (Habermas, 1989, p.201). Dean connects this to the drive towards surveillance 
found in the platform architecture of networked communication (2002, p. 46) but it can also 
be found in the ideology of Wikileaks which demands a forced publicity—or ‘black 
transparency’ (Metahaven, 2015, p.25)—in the name of democracy. Dean argues that this 
desire for more publicity and wider circulation has been answered by networked 
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communication but that, far from allowing for the emergence of an ideal public, networks 
reveal more clearly the fiction that the public sphere has always relied on, that it’s possible to 
determine a single social interest. 
The deliberative democracy that Habermas promotes advances to all citizens the capacity to 
rationally discuss and come to consensus on how to act in the public interest, seeking to 
expand the bourgeois public sphere that emerged in the 18th century with the aim of reaching 
consensus, rather than compromise, between conflicting parties (Mouffe 2000, p. 82). Nancy 
Fraser (1990) criticises Habermas’s insistence that a singular public sphere is the ideal arena 
for democratic discourse and that deliberation’s goal should be to produce a unitary public 
with united interests. Against Habermas’s assertion that the fracturing of the public sphere 
has led to a degradation of democracy, Fraser argues that in a stratified society “parity of 
participation” is not possible and that a single public sphere will exacerbate existing social 
inequality (Fraser, 1990, p.66). The public sphere was never open or accessible to anyone 
who could “justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under 
question” (Mouffe, 2000, p.87), as it claimed, a claim upon which its legitimacy rested 
(Fraser 1990, p. 63). Fraser argues that excluded groups have repeatedly found it 
advantageous to create what she calls subaltern counterpublics that “stand in a contestatory 
relationship to dominant publics” (1990, p.70) and “permit them to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (1990, p.67). One important area 
where this happens is in the boundary between public and private, or rather what private 
matters are deemed publicly relevant. Fraser argues that the privacy of the domestic sphere 
has been used to remove issues like domestic labour and spousal violence from public debate 
and contestation (1990, p. 73). The second-wave feminist movement of the second half of the 
20th century acted as a subaltern counterpublic because it contested what was previously 
“exempt from contestation” (1990, p.67), thus altering what was part of public discourse, the 
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public’s understanding of itself.  
Michel Warner’s influential Publics and Counterpublics (2005), which takes up Fraser’s idea 
that multiple publics can and do exist in opposition to the totalising public sphere described 
by Habermas, contends that, rather than publics generating contesting discourses, it is 
discourses that generate publics. For Warner, publics come into existence by virtue of being 
addressed (2002, p.50) and a public is created when it recognises itself as being addressed by 
a discourse or, more broadly, a text. A public must be imagined by a discourse before it can 
come together through recognising itself as the intended audience of that discourse (2002, p. 
51). To put this another way, a public must be represented in discourse, and recognise itself 
in that representation. Warner builds on ideas contained in Habermas (1989, p. 20-2) and 
expanded in detail in Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991) about the centrality 
of newspapers in producing a modern public and national identity, but goes further than both 
by describing how this happens on multiple scales, not just at that of the nation. Warner 
conceives of publics as ‘self-organising’ around the discourse that it recognises as being 
addressed to it. This means that the addressee is not known in advance, so discourse must be 
both personal and impersonal, as though addressed to a stranger. Recognition as being the 
stranger addressed is therefore subjectivising—what Louis Althusers would call interpellating 
(Althusser, 1971)—because it produces an understanding of ourselves in relation to others. 
Counterpublic discourse is, for Warner, creative rather than persuasive (2002, p.82), 
operating as a world-making project that must imagine new forms of stranger-sociality and 
attempt to realise this new world by putting its discourse into circulation (2002, p. 87).  
For Warner, publics lack “any institutional being” (2002, p.61) and this is a fundamental 
feature of their independence. I would argue, however, that institutions and publics are not so 
easily separated. Warner acknowledges that a public only ‘seems’ to be self-organising 
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around discourse and in fact “requires preexisting forms and channels of circulation” (2002, 
p. 75) but argues that publics “cease to exist when attention is no longer predicated” (2002, 
p.61). For Arendt, institutions are the product of continuous action and their “conservation is 
achieved by the same means that brought them into being” (Arendt, 1961, p.153) which is 
continued action. Although Arendt would not class attention as action, I would argue that 
networked communication removes the boundary between action and attention, blurring the 
boundaries between attention-based publics and action-based institutions. Warner’s 
counterpublics are, I would argue, not separable from their infrastructural supports. In my 
view it is beneficial to understand the structure around which publics organise themselves as 
institutions and that, rather than being independent from them, there is an inter-dependence 
between the institutional form around which a public organises and the action and attention 
of that public which maintains the institution. Understanding how material conditions and 
institutional forms impact on discourse is, therefore, important and requires a supplemented 
understanding of the public and the public sphere, especially within the specific institutional 
forms of networks and platforms.  
 
Jodi Dean shows that while technically non-hierarchical at the level of protocol, networked 
communication does not eliminate the barriers to inclusion that prevent equal participation in 
the public, namely that what and who is considered ‘reasonable’ is determined by existing 
power structures built on gender, race and social class (2003, p.104). Further, the abundance 
of voices and opinions means that the public sphere’s goal of reaching reasoned consensus 
necessitates a filtering of information by institutional and, as will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, algorithmic forces. Here Dean identifies one of the key ways in which platforms 
exercise power. While the internet has allowed more and more people to “speak ‘in one’s 
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own voice’” (Fraser, 1990, p.69), Joe Veix (2016) has shown that the filtering that online 
platforms employ hide the ‘weird’ from view, preventing the circulation that would allow 
them to become part of a discourse. In Dean’s view neither the secret counterpublics which 
lose their transformative potential on contact with the social public sphere—described by 
Warner (2005)—nor the counterpublics acting to allow equitable participation of previously 
excluded voices—put forward by Fraser (1990)—are able to interact is a way that leads to 
consensus. Instead, she draws on ideas developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to 
show that the internet remains antagonistic and operates as a site of struggle for hegemony 
over the configuration of the network itself. 
 
Dean’s argument is that publicity in the information age no longer serves the function it was 
given by Jeremy Bentham, as a relation of trust between a knowing elite and a believing 
majority, but rather its opposite (Dean, 2002, p.19). With ever more access to information, 
everyone can be an expert but “the more information we have, the less we think we have” 
(2002, p.43). The public knows, even though we know that we don’t know everything. Face 
with a disbelieving public, it is technologies of publicity that take on the role of believing. As 
Dean states: “satellites, the Internet, and surveillance cameras” do the believing for us (2002, 
p.44). In the absence of a credible public sphere, the belief that the technologies of 
communication must maintain is in the existence of a public. In network communication, it is 
the platforms that have to believe, to hold everything together, to imagine a public that we 
know doesn’t exist. This is, I would argue, the role that Bratton ascribes to global cloud 
computing: “computation, which otherwise might be defined differently, comes to refer to 
‘algorithms holding systems of information together.’” (Bratton, 2016, p.55). Information, as 
the basis of the rational judgement of the public, is not revealed by public debate but rather 
constructed by algorithmic computation. While the computational construction of norms will 
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be discussed in Chapter 2, and alternatives to this described in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
following section will look in more detail at the exercise of power within platforms through 
the configuration of institutions as a component of hegemony—combinations of 
infrastructure, protocol and discourse—emphasising leadership. 
1.2.3 — Institutions and complex hegemony 
 
Dean’s application of hegemony to the material configuration of networks—not just the 
discourses that exist within it—begins to suggest that the post-structuralist ideas of Laclau 
and Mouffe—as well as Warner and Fraser—are not adequate to describe contemporary 
publics or the politics of networks and platforms. A public or publics can no longer be 
understood as recognising and organising themselves through discourse alone. Instead, 
technical systems now perform many of the functions ascribed to discourse, legitimating 
judgement but also identification, subjectivisation and belief. Laclau and Mouffe’s expanded 
definition of discourse as meaning given to things—objects as well as ideas—through their 
relations or articulation (Laclau, 1990, p.100) allows them to generalise the concept of 
hegemony as the power to produce meaning through the making of relations of difference 
and equivalence (Williams, 2015a, pp.113–5). Alex Williams, however, argues that “a social 
ontology of discourse, operating on language-like relations of difference and equivalence” 
that Laclau and Mouffe advance “becomes increasingly incoherent the further the object of 
analysis moves from ideology towards the material, the scientific, the technological, or the 
infrastructural” (Williams, 2015a, p.8). The increasing influence of non-language based and 
non-discursive forms of power, namely technology, means that theories of discursivity have 
“failed to preserve the full complexity of the social” (Williams, 2015a, p.9). While Scott Lash 
has argued that social and technological developments have led to an operation of power that 
is post-hegemonic (Lash, 2007), the shifting forms of contemporary power that he identifies 
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does not lead Williams to abandon hegemony as a conceptual tool. Instead, Williams updates 
the concept to make it relevant to contemporary complex systems. Taking up the sense of 
hegemony as leadership—important in earlier deployments of the term by Antonio Gramsci 
(Williams, 2015a, p.89)—he proposes that it operates as “guided self-organisation” 
(Williams, 2015a, p.9). For Williams, Lash misrepresents hegemony as purely a power-over, 
rather that it’s leadership dimension that makes it a power-to (2015a, p.128). He argues that 
“hegemonic effects are still readily observable in our present moment” (Williams, 2015a, 
p.133) and therefore it is necessary to update the concept of hegemony to include ontological 
as well as epistemological or discursive relations. He does this by showing how hegemony 
can be embedded into complex systems (Williams and Gilbert, 2018), an internal guiding 
force rather than an external one. This development of the concept of hegemony, which he 
calls complex hegemony, enables elements of both coercion and consent, epistemological and 
ontological power and internal and external organisation that he sees as necessary to 
understanding the contemporary operation of power within a platform networked society.  
 
Williams helpfully describes self-organisation as “organisation of a self” (2015a, p.24), 
making the connection between complex systems and identity. Hegemony is understood as 
the guidance of self-organisation and can be seen to effect the production of identity and 
subjectivity. The guided self-organisation of complex hegemony is apparent in the self-
organising identities that Warner describes, which assemble themselves around a text that is 
indirectly addressed to them. Williams is clear, however, that complex hegemony also effects 
“processes and entities which are non-discursive”—outside of language and language like-
relations of equivalence and difference—“including the economic and the technical 
infrastructure” (2015a, p.125). This is therefore closer to the insights from Bratton and Dean, 
that technology and computation, and more importantly a belief in them, are a key site of the 
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struggle for hegemony and the exercise of power. In understanding this, it is important to 
follow Dean’s insistence that bringing non-linguistic relations into ideas of hegemony is not 
simply another way of bringing ‘sameness and equality’ to a wide range of things, but follow 
Williams in recognising the “specific local logics of organisation” (2015a, p.226), finding 
ways to “communicating with, rather than simply overriding” them (2015a, p.126). For Dean, 
this means that the network becomes the ideal, yet empty, ‘zero institution’, a concept she 
takes from Lévi-Strauss, which “enables myriad conflicting constituencies to understand 
themselves as part of the same global structure” (2002, p.167). As such, its structure, function 
and role are contested and, unlike the public sphere, it is the site of conflict and antagonism 
rather than consensus. While this is also the case for Mouffe’s account of institutions, or at 
least their potential, which calls for a “critique of institutions” in order to turn them into “the 
terrain of contestation” (2013b, p.66) and provide “spaces for antagonistic confrontation” 
(2013b, p.69), for her this remains at the level of discourse, with critique functioning to 
“makes visible what the dominant consensus tends to obscure” and give “a voice to all those 
who are silenced within the framework of the existing hegemony” (Mouffe, 2007, pp.4–5). 
Dean, however, sees this conflict centring around the configuration of the network itself, the 
infrastructures and protocols, aiming towards hegemony and the credibility of claims rather 
than rational agreement. For Dean, the World Wide Web has come to symbolise 
“institutionality as such”—the very possibility of social institutions—so that “conflict over 
configuring the Web is at the same time a conflict over the configuration of the world of 
unity and difference” (2002, p.168). 
 
In Dean’s view, the politics of the network should prioritise duration and credibility over 
inclusiveness and rationality that legitimate the public sphere (2002, p.172). Here she is in 
agreement with Arendt for whom the common requires permanence, or at least a sense of 
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intergenerationality, shared not just with those we live with but those who have lived and will 
live before and after us. True political action, in Arendt’s eyes, should seek to affect the 
common world in perpetuity, and in doing so, create a true public, rather than merely social, 
realm (1958, p.55). While modularity and scalability of platforms offer the promise of 
“organising without organisations” (Tufekci, 2017, p.xiii), Zeynep Tufecki argues that this is 
at the expense of building the power or ‘acting capacity’ of those that it organises (Tufekci, 
2017, p.269). For Arendt, politics has always been reliant on enduring connections, deriving 
from “the faculty to promise and to keep promises” (1961, p.164). Constituting a public space 
is a continuous act of leadership with others to create and maintain a space of freedom, that is 
a space where the will or desire to act can be aligned with the ability or power to act, with the 
goal of the political being “to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom as 
virtuosity can appear” (1961, p.153). Importantly, Arendt does not see freedom as aligned 
with sovereignty. While freedom is mutually constitutive—reliant on being free with other 
free individuals—sovereignty is always exclusive, curtailing the freedoms of others and, 
because it is ultimately reliant upon violence, essentially non-political. In this way, Arendt’s 
concept of leadership as associative should be understood as very different from the 
dissociative, exclusionary hegemony of Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe, 2013a, p.231). What is 
important for Arendt, again drawing on Ancient Greece, is that the archè or authority of the 
act is not expressed in the leadership of others but rather leading with them, enlisting the help 
of peers in order to carry through what had been started. For this reason, Étienne Balibar 
suggests Arendt finds “‘an-archy’ at the very heart of archè itself” (Balibar, 2007). 
Bringing together the work of Dean and Williams allows an understanding of the politics of 
platforms as leadership of the configuration of networks at the material and discursive, 
infrastructural and proctological levels. The understanding of leadership that I take from 
Arendt shifts the concept of hegemony, which Dean argues is key to understanding the 
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publics produced by networks, and Williams shows to still be in effect, further from Laclau 
and Mouffe’s emphasis on inclusion in and exclusion from discourse. The operation of 
hegemony within platforms is both internal and external. Contestation over the configuration 
of networks is necessary not just because it is where epistemological, power-over lies, but 
because it is this configuration that guides self-organisation at lower levels, the ontological 
power-to. If the building of a public, common world is at least as reliant on the configuration 
of institutions and their continuous maintenance as it is on the discourses that circulate and 
with which people identify, then the politics of platforms and institutions should be 
approached on their material, that is infrastructural and proctological level, as much as what 
is said and done within and upon them. An institutional form that can reject or resist the 
platform’s centralisation of power and value requires the embedding of these qualities at the 
infrastructural and proctological level around which an institution can self-organise. The next 
section will look more precisely at the institutions of contemporary art, showing their 
development towards a platform model and what this means for the politics of their 
operation, with dynamics of sovereign exclusion and free leadership both evident.  
 
1.3 — Museums as platforms 
 
The final section of this first chapter takes the arguments about the dominance and effects of 
platforms and applies them to the institutions of contemporary art. The museum is presented 
as having a central position in the development of the public sphere and the modern citizen. 
As Rosalind Kraus (1990) argues, the contemporary museum is less interested in 
representation and instead aims at intensity of experience, where the spaces of the museum 
itself come to dominate the interaction between artwork and viewer. This domination can be 
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seen as a form of sovereignty (Groys, 2013) that constrains the type of actions and 
experiences that can emerge within them. Drawing on Seph Rodney’s (2015b) analysis of 
Tate Galleries, this section will argue that the ‘new museum’ of the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries seeks to cultivate individuals through personal experience, rather than a public 
through collective ones.  
 
While there are many examples of contemporary museums adopting practices and 
terminology from network and communication technology, I will argue that the platform-user 
relationship is evident in how institutions of contemporary art view themselves and their 
relationship to their audience. Central to this is the argument made by Steven Wright (2013) 
that it is the visitors, as users, that are the source of the museum’s value. I will argue that 
Wright’s conception of usership always necessitates sharing and that, as Olia Lialina (2012) 
argues of Web 2.0, the power imbalance between user and platform becomes hidden. 
Usership, rather than being opposed to ownership, is better understood as a simulation of it 
that leaves underlying power untouched.  
 
Kuba Szreder’s (2013) understanding of the reputational economy and how gatekeeping 
power functions will be connected to Ivan Ascher’s (2016) account of financial credit to 
show how reputation accrues upwards in institutions. I will argue that Wright’s call for 
‘remunerated use’ is insufficient if it leaves the financialised sharing of the platform-user 
relation unchallenged and that questions of ownership are more, not less, important within 
financialised, reputational and platform economies.  
 
This section concludes that the institution of contemporary art remains an important site of 
political action because of its ongoing role in the representation and production of the public. 
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This final section will argue that it is through institutions that artists can challenge and 
reconfigure networks of relations, key to contemporary platform politics and, as a result, 
challenge the imbalances in the way that the financialised logic of sharing distributes value 
and ownership.  
 
1.3.1 — The Modern Museum and its transformation 
 
Much has been written about the development and transformation of the public art museum 
from private, “princely collections” in the 17th and 18th centuries (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992; 
Bennett, 1995; Duncan, 1995). For Stacy Douglas, the public museum served to “displaying 
the transparency of the new democratic order” in order to validate the new modern state 
(Douglas, 2015, p.7). Museums were a central component of the bourgeois public sphere, 
acting as space in which these new subjects could come together and, through discussion, see 
themselves represented (Sheikh, 2006). Here we see the form of publicity described by 
Arendt and Dean in action. The opening of collections to a public had the explicit function of 
universalising an order that was both scientific and moral while also instantiating a shared 
reality. The public museum was a space where the working class could learn how to act in 
public, thereby moulding the public into the bourgeoisie’s image of itself (Douglas, 2015, 
p.11). In order to claim their power as ‘the people’, citizens were required to conduct 
themselves in a way that conformed to how the people were ‘meant’ to be (Douglas, 2015, 
p.8). For this reason, many—including Douglas Crimp (1980) and Tony Bennet (1988)—
have seen museums as examples of the disciplinary institutions discussed in section 1.1.1.  
 
Critiques of the museum have been made in much the same way as those of the public 
sphere, namely that its claims to universality and accessibility are in fact a mechanism of 
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social discipline. In much the same way as Dean describes publicity and the secret, Douglas 
shows that the museum's desire to be universally representative means that it must always 
reform itself in order to be more open and more inclusive. For Douglas this drive is 
“structurally insatiable” and ultimately impossible to fulfil (2015, p.12). Douglas, in a 
similar way to Beth Lord (2006), has highlighted the museum's potential to make explicit this 
process of representation and recognition in forming the boundaries of a community. Their 
ability to be self-critical enables museums to constantly question the basis upon which claims 
of representation are made. Here, however, a similar critique to the one made by Dean of the 
internet is useful. Reflexive self-criticism is, and always has been, an essential part of the 
transparency. However, total transparency is unachievable and will never lead to true or 
complete representation. The credibility of an institution is based in the belief of the 
legitimacy of its representation of a public, while the institutional structures and 
infrastructures function to create that public in the image of its representation. 
 
The modern museum has, however, undergone a series of changes in how it tries to represent 
the public through art and, importantly, how it imagines its relation to its visitors. Rosalind 
Krauss describes the shift from a modern museum that presents (or represents) art history to a 
“late capitalist’ or postmodern one that aims to produce an intensity of experience. For 
Krauss, the way museums have adapted to deal with minimalism in key. In The Cultural 
Logic of the Late Capitalist Museum (1990) she shows that minimalism’s relationship 
between plan and object, allowing works to be remade or duplicated without affecting their 
status as original, has altered what the preservation and care of artworks entails. More 
broadly, in Peter Osborne’s (2013) definition of contemporary art as post-conceptual in its 
acceptance of the impossibility of dispensing with the art object completely, we can see how 
contemporary art is marked by its uncoupling from materiality, both in terms of being 
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“object-based and medium-specific” (Osborne 2013, p. 56). Krauss draws on Robert Morris’ 
claim that, instead of a basis in relations within the work, minimalism functions aesthetically 
in relation to the things around them, namely space, light and the vision of the viewer. 
Minimalisms insert the viewer into the work of art such that the work exists at the “interface 
between the work and its beholder” (1990, p. 8), as does the subjectivity of the viewer. 
However, Krauss argues that this co-constitution of work and viewer need only be “pushed a 
little further” to produce the “utterly fragmented, postmodern subject of contemporary mass 
culture” (1990, p. 12). The subject that minimalism sought to involve in the work through 
‘lived bodily experience’ has been replaced by a dispersed postmodern subject while the 
works—Krauss uses as her example the illusionary works of James Turrell—function to do 
the viewer’s perceiving for them. The experience happens not in the relation between the 
work and viewer but is external to both, determined by the situation that both are in, with the 
“spaces themselves increasingly emerge as the focus of the experience” (1990, p. 14).  
 
Krauss is clear that this emphasis on intensity of experience, while latent in minimalism and 
other forms of contemporary art, is amplified by contemporary art institutions as they adapt 
to deal with the challenge that contemporary, post-conceptual art makes to the traditions of 
museum culture. Although the development of ‘new art history’—which disrupted a narrative 
of linear artistic development with post-stucturalist, Marxist and psychoanalytic 
approaches—was slow to reach the museum of modern art (Duncan, 1995, p.103) by the 
1990s, new kinds of museums developed—often linked to the construction of new museum 
buildings—which attempted to “blur disciplinary boundaries” and “promote interpretation 
according to a wide and inclusive scope of reference” (Message, 2006, p.604). Seph Rodney 
draws on the work of Max Ross, who identifies the qualities of the new museum as including 
“institutional reflexivity, increased accessibility […] more acceptance of pop culture […] and 
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a more ‘democratic climate’” (Rodney, 2015b, p.45). Rodney’s work, focused on Tate 
Modern, details the shift in how the museum visit is conceptualized, becoming a "visitor-
oriented, personalized encounter” (Rodney, 2015a) with museums encouraging visitor 
participation, collaboration, and production of museum displays (Rodney, 2015b, p.12).  
 
For Rodney, it is the museum’s movement away from and educational relationship with the 
visitor through the transmission of knowledge, to one where the museum produces 
experience for the visitor’s consumption—meeting their perceived individual needs—that 
differentiates the new museum from the old which was orientated to the perceived needs of a 
unified public citizenry (Rodney 2015a, p. 220). As a result, the professional role for 
identifying these needs is not the curator but the marketer. Following policy shifts in the UK 
led by the New Labour government of the late 1990s towards ‘access and inclusion’ 
audiences became ‘segmented’ by ‘desires’ with ‘products’ developed to satisfy each 
segment (Rodney, 2015a). This is one of the ways in which—as Helen Kaplinsky points 
out—“Victorian ideals” remain embedded in the contemporary museum through the way they 
classify and segregate bodies as well as, or instead of, objects (Kaplinsky, 2017, p.261). 
While there is a clear similarity between Rodney and Krauss’ accounts of the experience of 
audience or visitor in the new Museum, Rodney’s description of how the visitor is imagined 
in relation to the museum—based in Museum studies—excludes both artworks and artists as 
active players in what the museum experience is. Krauss’ argument emphasises the way 
museums adapted their approaches to the display of artworks, and their conception of the 
artwork’s viewer, in response to the anti-object nature of minimalism and post-conceptual 
practices, while Kaplinski sees a path where the criticisms of museums—as instruments of a 
disciplinary society—affected change, first of all in the work artists were making, and then in 
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the way museums adapted to show this work (2017, p. 266). By adopting a post-modern 
approach to the modern museum, artists drew out the relational potential that always existed 
in the museum and its collections, the ability to make connections and meanings against or in 
spite of the dominant narratives, temporalities and identities that the museum tries to present 
and impart. It is the embrace of the relational qualities of the art object within the context of 
the art institution that Kaplinski sees as the precedent for the collaboratively constructed 
meaning between the museum and its visitor. While a museum’s visitor always had agency, it 
is only recently that this capacity has been purposefully amplified by the museum itself 
(Rodney 2015a, p. 228). However, in large institutions such as Tate Modern, this 
collaboration is mediated by marketing, where the visitor “hand-in-hand with the museum 
marketer creates an experience of customized meaning” (Rodney, 2015b, p.224).  
 
The new museum can been understood as the product of its adaptation to pressures from both 
above and below; from criticisms of the modern museum, cultural policies that promote 
inclusion—as well as value for money (Rodney, 2015b, p.109)—and artistic practices that 
rejected their autonomy from their viewer and questioned the art institutions separation from 
the world. The fragmentation of the museum visitor—the emphasis on individual experience, 
the valuing of difference and the promotion of meaning created relationally with viewers—
leads to the question of how the museum, its audience and its collection, are able to maintain 
any coherent identity at all. For Rodney, it is the branding that is able to hold this 
heterogeneous whole together, connecting Tate’s out of focus logo to the brands ability to 
“hold in abeyance, that is without resolution, the complex, overlapping conceptions” of the 
museum (2015b, p.228). However, while branding is one of the tools that new museums use 
to hold their fragmented identity together, I will argue in the next section that they can be 




1.3.2 — The platformisation of the museum 
 
The ubiquity of the term platform in business and technology makes it inevitable that the 
term will have been applied to cultural institutions. While in some cases it is a specific 
reference to a museum’s online activities, there is a tendency for making digital and online 
strategies applicable to the museum as a whole. Some see the museum as ‘platform-like’ 
purely by being a “distributor of content” (Proctor, 2010, p.35) while former Head of Digital 
Transformation at Tate, John Stack, has written, “If the museum of the future is a platform 
where ideas and meanings are generated and exchanged, digital technologies will likely be 
key to enabling this” (Stack, 2013). Rodney argues that “the virtual platform encourages a 
kind of solipsistic experience in that it eschews the intellectual intervention of the curator” 
(2015b, p.224) which then becomes the model for the visitor- or user-led experience in the 
museum. The ease at which the relational qualities of the new museum can be expressed in 
the language digital and networked technologies is telling, where the notion of a platform 
museum has also been used in the sense of a business platform, the museum acting as an 
infrastructure upon which other enterprise activities can base themselves, for example, 
Museum Hack, a private ‘alternative’ gallery tour business that operates in museums across 
five cities in the United States (Ropeik, 2016).  
 
In order to argue that the contemporary museum is best understood as a platform, I will return 
to the properties of platforms detailed in section 1.1. The standardisation that Bratton sees as 
key to making platforms predictable to their users is precisely how branding operates in 
Rodney’s analysis, with all Tate branded venues, exhibition and products associated with the 
reputation and identity of the whole organisation as an “innovative and fun exploration” 
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(Rodney, 2015a). Modularity is apparent in the “menu of options” (Zolberg, 1994) that can 
be chosen, a la carte, by visitors. These aspects of standardisation and modularity are perhaps 
most apparent in the ARTIST ROOMS, a Tate branded suite of touring exhibitions that travel 
around the UK, bringing a standardised Tate experience to an ever increasing number of 
regional venues (Tate, 2018). While museums remain largely bureaucratic—in Bratton’s 
sense that they have their desired outcomes are predefined, set largely by state cultural 
policy—these outcomes, though framed in terms of democracy and accessibility, are not 
markedly different from those that motivate other platforms, namely openness and inclusivity 
leading to an expanded user base. This can be seen in in examples such as FACT’s 2015 
exhibition Follow, which presented artworks that dealt critically with questions online hyper-
visibility and digital micro-celebrity (Follow, 2021) but which was itself operating within 
logics of maximising visibility and audience reach. Arts Council England’s (ACE) Example 
Digital Policy state “we will use digital channels to understand our current and potential 
audiences better, engage them in conversations and incorporate their feedback into our work. 
We will be agile and respond quickly to what our audiences are saying” (Arts Council 
England, 2016). While this guide—created by ACE/BBC collaboration The Space and digital 
consultancy MTM—may start from the desire to increase the reach of culture, it does this 
through standard practices from commercial digital platforms of user profiling and data 
collection, with the ultimate aim of achieving “better value from [ACE’s] public investment 
in arts and culture” (Arts Council England, 2016).  
 
The expansion and globalisation of museum brands (Rodney, 2015b, p.158) is arguably an 
example of generative entrenchment or the tendency towards monopoly. The Louver’s 
opening of a branch in Abu Dhabi should be seen in the same light as the branch of New 
York University while the expansion of art fair brands like Art Basel and Frieze to ever more 
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locations is an example of the platform’s capacity to accrue value though openness and 
maintain it through closure and exclusion, while externalising risk. Another instantiation of 
generative entrenchment, however, would be the way institutions increasingly draw on their 
own history and archives as a generator of their value. Between 2008 and 2017 the ICA, 
London, held eight exhibitions that presented or recreated its own exhibition history while in 
2016 the Serpentine Galleries re-exhibited a Marc Camille Chaimowicz’s originally shown 
there in 1972. It is, however, the platform-user relation that is most relevant to this project 
and specifically the way value is generated and captured from user interaction with the 
platform. Nancy Proctor, former Head of New Media Initiatives at the Smithsonian American 
Art Museum, sees the rise of platform museum practices in crowdsourcing and user 
generated content initially as online only augments to physical exhibitions, and then 
increasingly as parts of displays and interpretation (Proctor, 2010). The examples she gives 
include Tate Britain’s How We Are Now help in 2007 and Click! A Crowd-Curated 
Exhibition at the Brooklyn Museum in 2008. More recent examples would be the events 
programme around Manchester Art Gallery’s Get Together to Get Things Done in 2019. The 
idea of the museum user has been present in new museum discourse since its inception 
(Rodney 2015a, p. 66) but the notation of users have gained more currency with the ubiquity 
of the internet and web platforms. Steven Wright, in Towards a Lexicon for Usership (2013), 
argues that museums have adopted a Web 2.0 model, but have not fully acknowledged this. 
His centring of the user and ‘usership’ within the museum intends to push this trend further in 
order to radically transform how museums operate, seeing its potential as being inhibited by 
museums’ physical and conceptual architecture which are built for spectatorship (2013, p.39). 
By positioning usership against spectatorship, as well as against the expertise of the curator, 
Wright’s arguments align with many that have already been proposed by new museology and 
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its realisation in the new museums, with their quite explicit adoption of models from 
networked and digital technology.  
 
 
1.3.3 — The Museum’s Users 
 
Wright’s conception of the user is close to the one described by Olia Lialina in her essay 
Turing Complete User (2012). Lialina argues that with the development of Web 2.0 the user 
and its counterpart, the computer, become hidden. The computer dematerialises into the 
Cloud and the user becomes, simply, You. By rendering the computer invisible, the power 
imbalance between the user of a system and its developer also becomes hidden. However, 
Lialina complicates the simple ‘program or be programmed’ dichotomy by arguing that a 
user, with “enough time and respect”, can find a way to achieve a goal4 (Lialina, 2012). The 
rather 1.0 user she describes is able to repurpose, work around and fill in gaps in a way that 
was far more common before computer networks became cloud platforms, echoing Wright’s 
assertion that use by non-experts is inevitably misuse. Wright’s somewhat accelerationist 
approach argues that there is a radical potential in the prospect of remunerated use. Wright 
very succinctly makes the point upon which platform capitalism is premised, that “usership in 
fact generates value rather than consuming it” (2013, p. 40) and asks “how long will 
communities of use sit by as their user-generated content value, rather than being 
remunerated, is expropriated and privatised?”5 (2013, p.66) This conception of value 
generation does not, however, fully take into account the nature of the ‘platform surplus’ that 
 
4 This ideas—like the essay’s title—references the universal Turing machine that can “can solve any logical task 
given enough time and memory” (Lialina, 2012). 
5 Here we see similarities of the calls for ‘Wages for Facebook’ made variously by Alex Andrews (2012) and 
Laurel Ptak (2014). 
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Bratton describes. Value in platforms is generated by higher level organisation of 
information. Individual use does not add value—or usefulness—unless it is organised into 
valuable, useful relations with others, precisely the role that the platform provides.  
 
It is in advancing usership against ownership, however, that Wright sees the idea having the 
most effect. Wright asserts that “Capitalism is still grappling for a durable model of 
accumulation for the twenty-first century” (2013, p.45) but, as has been argued already, the 
platform is precisely the form that allows the capture of value generated by the connection 
and organisation of information. Value in the platform is generated from use, where the 
ownership—whether it is ownership of data or of the properties listed on Airbnb—is not 
relevant. Mckenzie Wark argues that as ownership of the means of production—specifically 
the production of information—become democratised, ownership of the means of circulation 
and abstraction—by a new ‘vectoralist’ class—becomes increasingly important (2004, p.29). 
In a financialised economy, ownership is less important than circulation—for example in the 
‘short selling’ of borrowed assets with the aim of buying them back at a lower price before 
they’re due for return (Levine, 2017)—and this is as true in the museum as it is in the stock 
market. Krauss notes the transformation of the collection from “cultural patrimony to assets” 
value is “only truly realized when they are put into circulation” (Krauss, 1990, pp.4–5). 
Rodney’s analysis of Tate’s promotion of individual and individualised visits—as well as 
their use for adding value to Tate’s sponsors—as reliant on forms of privatisation of the 
publicly owned collection (2015b, pp.225–6).  
 
It is important to note that the figure of the user—“the locus and agent of surplus-value 
extraction” (Wright, 2013, p.45)—has, since its inception, been a mechanism of control. In 
his Prehistory of the Cloud, Tung-Hui Hu argues that the subjectivity of the user is based 
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upon an economic relation. Tracing it to its origins in the time-sharing systems of mainframe 
computers in the mid-twentieth century, Hu reminds us that the user is created precisely to 
monitor, keep track of and, ultimately, bill the individual for their individual use (Hu, 2015, 
p.39). To be a user requires a ‘username’ that makes you uniquely identifiable to the system 
and ensures the user’s identity is synonymous with their usage (2015, p.46). It also shifts 
responsibility for use—particularly their use of time—onto the identified individual user. The 
cloud that Hu historicises is premised on ‘virtualisation’, a slight-of-hand trick that allows 
you to feel as if you're using your own private storage or software when you are in fact 
sharing it with innumerable others (2015, p.61). The username, and the password, creates a 
false sense of both privacy and privatisation in a very similar way that the individuated 
museum user is encouraged to feel they can have unique, personal and private experiences in 
the public space of the museum. Contra to Wright, I would suggest that usership is not 
opposed to ownership but rather, like with cloud computing, a simulation of it, one that 
leaves the underlying ownership of the platform or institution untouched. While this is a 
useful insight in understanding the platform-user relationship between contemporary art 
institutions and their visitors, the next section will argue that it is even more relevant to the 
relationship between the institution and a different class of user, the artist. 
 
 
1.3.4 — Reputation and Sovereignty or Learning to Share 
 
While discussions of the museum user have so far focused on the visitor, ideas of Boris 
Groys and Kuba Szreder open up these ideas with respect to cultural producers, that is artists 
and curators. In his essay Entering the Flow: Museum between Archive and Gesamtkunstwerk 
(2013) Groys explores how networked communication and the digital image have affected 
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the way that the museum functions in terms of public and private space and of sovereignty. 
He describes a shift from the static, or atemporal, modernist artwork that keeps its viewer 
external and preserves the sovereignty of their gaze to the installation, event or project that 
must be entered into. His arguments that the expansion of the artist’s sovereignty to include 
the artwork’s context removes power from the viewer is very similar to Kraus’s description 
of how the installation work of James Turrell does the viewer’s perceiving for them. Even in 
the case that this sovereignty is used to create a democratic platform—one that allows or 
requires participation or use—the author holds the authority to “install any political order” 
(Groys, 2016, p.85) with the ability to impose or suspend laws, close as well as open and 
exclude as well as include, necessitating the privatisation of what was, symbolically at least, 
the public space of the museum. Groys stresses that the installation and projects can be led by 
curators as well as artists and suggests that, in the contemporary museums, the curatorial 
project has superseded the exhibitions and collections as the museum’s focus (2013, p.6), 
describing a platform-like museum that has become “a stage for changing curatorial projects, 
guided tours, screenings, lectures, performances, etc.” (2016, p.6). All these events are 
subject to documentation and a form of standardisation that can make them ready for the 
internet and the archive. The museum’s role is to assemble these documents in a way that 
Groys likens to a blog, organised as a document of its own history, a “chain of events staged 
by the museum itself” (2016, p.7).  
 
Kuba Szreder also sees the project as the contemporary form of artistic activity, but 
highlights the problems with the way authorship function within reputational economies. 
Szreder’s framing of reputational economies, which draws on Luc Boltanski and Eve 
Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism (2007), describes how recognition is ascribed to 
individuals for collective or collaborative works, or for works that draw on a creative or 
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intellectual commons. Szreder makes the case that “what we do when we publish”—or more 
generally publicise—is that we “authorize” but emphasises the “structural injustice of 
reputational economies”, drawing attention to the invisible pool of professionally trained but 
unacknowledged contributors that “hovers below the threshold of authorial attribution and 
remuneration” (2013, p.39). Drawing on Yann Moulier Boutang’s concept of pollination, he 
shows how in an information economy—or ‘cognitive capitalism’—“ideas and symbols have 
to be carried, exchanged, reworked, undone, redone, spoken over, and discussed” (2013, 
p.41) before they can take on a public or published form that can be authorised but that the 
“Loose networks of cooperators and their labor of pollination are simply not accounted for” 
(2013, p.48). Szreder describes a network that “provides access to accumulated opportunities 
and stored resources” and that access and use of this network grants “power to change reality 
without even ‘owning’ anything”. Here we have a very similar idea to Wright’s notion that a 
thing is made more valuable through its use. Wright asserts that Boutang’s “economy of 
pollination and contribution” is an economy of usership (Wright 2013, p. 28) while for 
Szreder “property issues are of secondary importance in projective polity” but that “getting a 
grasp on a product is much less important than capturing socially produced values ‘on the 
move.’” (2013, p.41) As such, he aligns with Groys’ assertion, that with continuous 
documentation a final product is never required (2013, p.11) and with Wark’s description of 
the vectoral class discussed above. As he says: “Projects are always collective undertakings, 
but their teams often dissolve afterward” (Szreder, 2013, p.43). Like Groys’ description of 
the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk, projects “bind together agents, institutions, things, spaces, 
pools of resources, channels of distributions, and audiences” temporarily before they 
disassemble and reconfigure themselves (2013, p.42). While Pascal Gielen (2013) criticises 
the temporariness of project thinking that he identifies in the shift from museum to biennale 
as the site of contemporary art, Szreder’s argument is that while project working necessitates 
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cooperation, limited access to these networks creates competition, and “gatekeepers are able 
to extract their toll” (2013, p.46). How exactly this access is limited is, I think, of great 
importance. Szreder states that a central position within this network allows individuals to 
more easily take, or be given, credit for collective work (2013, pp.45–6). While this is no 
doubt true, centrality is a measure of how well directly and indirectly connected a node is in a 
flat network (Borgatti, 2005). What a stack-model like Bratton’s can add to our 
understanding is that some kinds of links can only move up or down layers, not between 
network nodes. The system is not as flat as Gielen perceives, or the institutions like to 
imagine themselves to be. A reputational network is not only defined by “professional 
profile” but also by functionality. Conceiving a reputational economy as simply a flat 
network, I would argue, makes the structural injustices less, rather than more visible.  
 
The role, and the subjectivity, of the user is one that gives that platform great power to 
control access. While the user is a generic, non-stratified identity, just as in a computer 
network different users are afforded different privileges. Thus, a museum’s artist user has a 
different kind of access to a curator, visitor or patron user. Furthermore, user privilege is not 
simply granted by type, but individually; different artists will have different types of access. 
A “cultural producer”—though this can be seen as equally true of ‘cultural consumers’—
“needs to be recognized and is ranked according to his own individual reputation” (Szreder, 
2013, p.45). In network management, user privileges are granted by a systems administrator. 
Similarly, with the network that Szreder describes, access can never be taken but is only ever 
given. The question, then, is how the value of a project’s results, in terms of authorship and 
credit, are stored and put to use. The argument I will make, following Groys, is that it is the 
document and its assembly into a blog-like chain of events that is best able to capture, and 
hold on to, value within a network. The increased prevalence and profile of events 
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programming in contemporary art institutions is undoubtedly linked to the drive to reach a 
wider and more segmented audience discussed in the previous section. It also allows them to 
increase the number of artist—as well as writers, musicians, DJs, filmmakers and activists—
who they associate themselves with. Programming like fig. 2 at the ICA, London in 2015— 
which presented one artist’s project a week for 50 weeks—or the Serpentine Galleries’ 
Marathons—which ran from 2006–2018—allow institutions to connect themselves to an 
increasing number or artists with very low institutional investment while the mixing of high-
profile artists with those less known or establish allows the institution to minimise its risk 
while positioning itself to take credit for future success by those it has promoted. Importantly, 
the institution is not simply operating as neutral infrastructure and it is not the resources they 
can offer to projects—whether they be physical space, financial or administrative—that 
makes the institution a platform. Rather, it is the ability to chain events and projects, thus 
bringing them into higher order organisation, that defines institutions as platforms and allows 
them to capture the platform surplus. While other types of actors can also make these 
chains—indeed cultural producers are “obliged to build their own reputations” (Szreder, 
2013, p.44)—museums are in the best position to do this precisely because they are the most 
stable and the most credible. Their longevity allows them to continually make connections to 
and within their own history and archives, recirculating and putting them to use to maximise 
their value. Further to this, the financialisation of credibility allows institutions to lend 
credibility to others while increasing their own credibility, precisely because they operate at a 
scale that allows them to spread risk in a way that an individual or project cannot.  
 





In the language of credit we can say that Szreder’s ‘authorization’ has a dual role, lending 
credibility to something while at the same time taking credit for it. Here, it is useful to turn to 
Ivan Ascher’s (2016) description of how credit and credibility works in the broader financial 
economy. Ascher’s account describes the relationship between those who seek credit and 
those who are able to offer it. The credibility, or reputation, of a credit seeker lies in their 
ability “make promises and to be believed” (2016, p.4). Those who give credit, the lenders, 
exchange something in the present for a claim on, or promise of, the future value of the 
borrower (2016, p.16). The innovation that Ascher sees in modern, financialised capitalism is 
that, by being able to measure risk—“calculate the probability that the promise will be kept” 
(2016, p.15)—and sufficiently spread that risk, a lender can mitigate risk to themselves. For 
this reason a lender becomes more credible, even as they lend more to higher risk borrowers, 
because their own credibility is based on their ability to manage that risk. The analogous 
working of a reputational economy is, I believe, clear. The scale at which you operate and the 
number and diversity of projects you are able to participate in allows you to mitigate risk and 
maintain credibility even when there are losses and failures. The individual, or non-
institutional actor, has a limited capacity and is therefore less able to spread the risk they take 
on by joining a project and more likely to lose credibility when things go wrong. Institutions, 
therefore, produce the structural inequalities in a reputational economy in two ways. They are 
the best positioned in the network or stack to take credit for success while at the same time 
being most able to absorb the costs of failure without an effect on their own credibility. 
Institutions can take on more risks—and indeed a well-managed, diversified ‘portfolio’ 
should include some high risk investments (Ascher, 2016, p.11)—because failures can be 
offset by successes elsewhere. Szreder’s call is to “reinvent and revolutionize” (2013, p.50) 
the existing apparatuses that “produce and reproduce social conceptions that define artwork, 
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author, public, act of reception, or intellectual property” (2013, p.40) in ways which promote 
“expanded models of authorization, the appreciation of the structural role of invisible labor in 
the arts-based economies” (2013, p.50). Here he is very close to Wright’s more direct 
demand that value is redistributed “within the community that produced it” (Wright, 2013, 
p.40). I would argue, however, that there is a problem with the idea that structural inequalities 
can be addressed by more equitable distribution of values even if, as Wright suggests, the 
remuneration is not financial. First of all, it requires that all types of use, contribution and 
pollination can be measured and evaluated as equivalent. As Szreder makes clear: “Only 
communicating openly and announcing ideas in public, in front of a peer group, secures 
recognition”, precisely the argument made by Arendt about the necessity of politically 
organised space. Necessarilly this must exclude private use, allowing only the pseudo-privacy 
of the ever-monitored user. The billing that Hu shows to be at the heart of the platform-user 
relationship—even when the bill is travelling the other way—still requires users to be 
uniquely identifiable to the system. Anonymous use is therefore also excluded from this 
system. Rather than being empowering, remuneration within a platform-user relation gives 
that platform an even greater capacity to modulate its users behaviour, whether you are an 
artist, an Uber driver or an Airbnb host. 
 
It is not simply the case that museums resemble online platforms because they are both 
subject to the same forces of financialisation. Rather, it is that platform structures appear 
where financialisation does because platforms are the model of government of financialised 
relationships. The platform is the institutional form, the publicly organised space, that allows 
sharing, evaluation, and the granting and rescinding of privileges necessary for capturing the 
value generated by higher-order organisation. This first chapter surveyed the existing 
literature to build a definition of platforms as resulting from the flexible interplay of 
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infrastructure and protocol technologies, emphasising their reliance on inducing sharing from 
their users, allowing the higher-level organisation of information from which they can extract 
value. This material emphasis augments more discursive understandings of how publics, of 
different types as sizes, form around structures that I suggest should be understood as 
institutions in Arendt’s sense.  
 
The platform is a specific intuitional form resulting from its embedded properties and the 
types of public and discourses that organise around it, with technology supporting belief in 
the publics that they help to organise. Tensions exists between the different ways of 
understanding the operation of hegemonic power within the platform: sovereignty, based on 
the power to set boundaries and make exclusions and complex hegemony, emphasising 
leadership. Discussion of the politics and mechanisms of boundary setting and leadership 
with others will be developed in the following chapters. While both sovereignty and complex 
hegemony are at play in platforms as we observe them—with boundaries used to capture 
value generated by self-organising, but still directed, relationships—it is the latter that offers 
the potential to promote freedom by structuring the anarchy of self-organising identified by 
Arendt. Key to this is, I would argue, is the temporality of relationships, the recognition that 
boundaries exist in time as well as space. While both the temporary project and durable 
relationship rely on the credibility of promises, the temporal bounding of the project allows 
value to be authorised, individualised and privatised. For this reason, I believe it is necessary 
to reject platform-user relation, which is at heart a mechanism of privatisation, and look for 
other institutional forms which embed different qualities around which institutions and 
individuals can self-organise.  
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Chapter 2 — Algocracy 
 
While the platform is an organisational structure, algorithms are the logic through which 
technical systems interact with the world and, as a result, mediate relations between people. 
The term algocracy was coined by A. Aneesh (1999) and has since been adopted and 
developed by other writers (Danaher, 2016; Rosamond, 2016; O’Dwyer, 2017), alongside the 
more general term ‘algorithmic governance’, to describe “the use of software, code and data 
repositories to govern effectively” (O’Dwyer, 2017, p.1). Algocracy is related to but different 
from markets and bureaucracies, with John Danaher (2016) describing how bureaucracies 
operate by rules, markets by price, and algocracy by algorithms.  
 
Having argued in the previous chapter that the contemporary art institution is best understood 
as a platform—asserting sovereignty and promoting financialised sharing—this chapter will 
first examine algocracy as the underlying logic upon which the platform operates,, closely 
considering the way it manifests itself within AirBnb, Google, Facebook, YouTube and 
OkCupid; platforms for short-term property rental, search—or more broadly information 
management—social, video, and dating. Each of these platforms and their implementations 
of algocracy will be used to show the ways in which power operates in the platform-user 
relationship. Analysis of the mechanism by which platforms constrain and promote certain 
human actions will be used to suggest necessary properties for alternative institutional forms 
that are appropriate to an institution of contemporary art. Through a discussion of opacity, 
visibility, predictability, address and categorisation I will suggest ways that the power 
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dynamics and their effects might be resisted, or countered, by a different institutional form, 
emphasising the promotion of credibility, creativity, and subjectivisation.  
 
The final part of this chapter takes a more detailed look at the subject of the user through the 
work of Antoinette Rouvroy (2011; Rouvroy and Berns, 2013) and the specific ways that the 
subjectivity of platform users is produced and constrained by algocracy in an a-normative 
manner, arguing that the user profile shapes human behaviour in a way that removes the 
possibility of subject formation and makes the case for an institutional form that creates a 
common environment not mediated by algorithmic logic and outside of the platform-user 
relation. 
 
2.1 — Regimes of algocracy 
 
Algocracy might best be thought of as governance by prediction, or governance via rendering 
of the world more predictable. The algorithmic governance of platforms operates through 
what I will call government-by-simulation which mediates the platform-user relation in a way 
that controls visibility and identification such that they are non-representative. At the same 
time, the opacity of algorithmic decision-making means that, unlike in the public sphere, 
legitimation is not the result of a discursive or hegemonic process, but based on results and 
effects. The value that platforms derive from the predictability of user behaviour means that 
algorithmic governance works to reduce freedom and creativity, or the capacity to do the 
unexpected. Algorithmic mediation of communication between users via the platform means 
that the indirect address that Warner sees as key to creating counterpublics, and the 
subjectivisation that this produces, becomes impossible. Opacity, visibility, predictability, 
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address and categorisation are employed in specific ways to ensure the centralised and 
centralising organisation of power and value within the platforms. By identifying how these 
mechanisms work it becomes possible to identify organisational forms that prevent their 
operation and therefore resist platform logic. An alternative to an algocratic platform model 
of an institution, and especially an institution of contemporary art, should function in such a 
way as to promote credibility, creativity, and subjectivisation, finding an alternative process 
of legitimation. Examples of algocratic systems in action will be used to detail these effects 
which, in Chapter 4, will be used to test the Team Syntegrity protocol and the syntegration 
experiments that form the practice-based component of this research.  
 
2.1.1 — Simulations 
 
Algorithms are able to make predictions by modelling future behaviour based on knowledge 
of past interactions but, as I will argue, the predictive power of algocracy goes beyond simple 
modelling, operating by what following A. Aneesh (2009) I call government-by-simulation, 
encouraging desirable, pre-modelled, behaviours that eliminate the possibility of certain 
outcomes. While protocol can be seen as the translation or embedding of formal rules into 
technical systems, algorithms are active in mechanisms of evaluation, “testing outcomes, not 
managing process” (O’Reilly, 2011). The algocratic regime of the platform combines 
protocol and infrastructure with cybernetic feedback loops, with evaluated outcomes used to 
alter the functioning of the system. This is what Aneesh means when he says 
“Programmability means governability” (1999, p.12), cybernetic feedback allowing “ever-




There are important implications of Aneesh’s proposal of the programmability of 
governance—or governance-by-simulation—specifically in the way that his conception of the 
simulation relates to a more traditionally cybernetic concept of the model. By the 1970s, 
Stafford Beer had already seen the need to create self-modifying software to model and 
manage the complexity of contemporary society (Beer, 1995). For Beer, however, the model 
is separate from the system that it represents. This specifically allows for experimentation 
with the model that will not affect the system itself, with conclusions drawn from 
manipulation of the model then applied to that system (Beer, 1995, pp.87–8). Aneesh, 
however, draws his understanding of simulation from Jean Baudrillard, to argue that 
simulations “do not necessarily follow real organizations; rather, they precede them” 
(Aneesh, 1999, p.11). This is what Scott Lash means when he says that algorithms can act as 
“generative rules… virtuals that generate a whole variety of actuals” (Lash, 2007, p.71).  
Following Baudrillard further than Aneesh, we can see how simulation does not simply 
precede reality—the active metaphor of the diagram described by Benjamin Bratton in 
section 1.1.2—but rather replaces it. The simulation of algocracy is not separate from the 
system it governs, rather the reality of the system is inside its simulation, with the alterations 
in the ‘virtual’ of the simulation producing direct effects in the ‘actual’ of the system itself, 
immediately, in real time, and without the opportunity to critically reflect or object. This 
curtailing of the unpredictable and removal of the possibility of criticality through opaque 
decision-making puts algocracy in direct conflict with what I will identify in this chapter as 
the necessary characteristics for an alternative institutional form to the platform, suitable for 




2.1.2 — Transparency and Opacity 
 
The opacity of algocracy means not just that decisions are made out of sight, without 
knowledge or consent, but where the reasoning behind those decisions is potentially 
incomprehensible to humans with decisions that are non-interpretable. John Danaher 
describes how “algorithm-based systems structure and constrain the opportunities for human 
participation in, and comprehension of, public decision-making” (2016, p.246). An example 
of this can be seen in AirBnb’s Smart Pricing feature, “a Machine Learning (ML) model to 
guide daily prices” (Bray, 2016) that uses a number of market, market-like, and non-market 
systems to suggest the prices at which the platform’s host users should set for their short-term 
rental properties.  
 
While AirBnb, as with many platforms, might like to present itself as a marketplace, or rather 
“information society service” (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2019), simply 
connecting different kinds of users and charging a fee, there are many ways in which AirBnb 
uses algorithmic simulation to constrain user interaction. Factors that feed AirBnb’s Smart 
Pricing algorithms include market-like mechanisms, such as neighbourhood averages—with 
neighbourhoods automatically, algorithmically generated—but also non-market methods, 
using image analysis algorithms to evaluate a property’s quality and potential desirability 
(Yee and Ifrach, 2015). While AirBnb presents Smart Pricing as a way of making pricing 
quicker and easier for its host-users, it is also a mechanism by which the platform can exert 
greater control over prices than would be possible with a purely market mechanism. While 
the initial implementation of AirBnb’s Smart Pricing operated as a what Danaher would call 
a ‘human in-the-loop’—where the algorithm merely made suggestions to a user by giving 
feedback on the probability of a property being booked at a specific price—the current 
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implementation is ‘human-on-the-loop’, allowing users to simply accept or reject a single 
price which the algorithm suggests will guarantee a booking, rendering the basis of this price 
opaque (Danaher, 2016, pp.247–8). 
 
A platform such as AirBnb can only have this kind of algocratic power within a marketplace 
because the computer mediation of all interaction on the platform renders everything 
transparent to the platform. Individual users do not have access to this information except as 
mediated by the algorithm. Multiple inputs, feedbacks and processing methods make the 
algorithmic decision making opaque, as it is not necessarily possible to give a definite answer 
as to why the image analysis algorithms have returned the value that they have. As Lash 
(2007) has pointed out, algorithmic rules are not encountered in the same way as those of 
law. Constant flows of new information mean the algorithm itself is subject to modulation, 
adaptive and therefore much harder to confront or resist than a fixed, bureaucratic rule. We 
do not need to know the rules in order to comply with them and “rules may be machine-
readable but they are not legible to human subjects” (O’Dwyer, 2017, p.7). If opacity is a key 
mechanism by which platforms shift power to themselves and away from their users, then 
alternatives to algocracy must ensure that the transparency that mediation by smart machines 
makes possible is not the preserve of the platform. Algocratic opacity does not primary 
operate at the level of data but rather at that of the algorithmic decision making. The capacity 
to make decision-making transparent, and therefore contestable, is key to redistributing 
power away from the platform and is therefore necessary for an alternative institutional 
model. 
 
As is seen with the Smart Pricing algorithm, it is not simply market price information that is 
rendered transparent to platforms, and therefore open to algocratic control. Zuboff’s analysis 
 69 
 
of Google—through a close reading of statements made by its Chief Economist Hal Varian—
focuses on the way it collects non-market data and renders it as the ‘raw material’ for what 
she terms ‘surveillance capitalism’ (2015). Through analysis and aggregation, the small data 
of individual user interactions with Google’s platforms can be turned into Big Data, with 
nothing “too trivial or ephemeral for this harvesting” (2015, p.79). This is a key aspect of the 
formal indifference that Google exhibits when it gathers data. All data can be “signals of 
subjectivities” that “travel a hidden path to aggregation and decontextualization” (2015, 
p.79). Algorithmic analysis and aggregation allows this to be transformed into assets which 
can then be invested with “surveillance capital” through the sale, by auction, of user attention 
to advertisers through Google’s AdWords system (2015, p.79). Any behaviour can become 
valuable if it can be used to better predict future behaviour. The fact that this data is collected 
largely “without dialogue or consent” (2015, p.79)—with consent assumed by or necessary 
for any interaction (Rouvroy and Poullet, 2009)—leads to an unequal power relation between 
platform and user. Privacy, which Zuboff sees as the right to decide what remains secret, is 
not eroded but rather redistributed with the “unilateral redistribution of rights” towards 
platforms and away from users resembling “the social relations of a pre-modern absolutist 
authority” (2015, p.83) and “the installation of a new kind of sovereign power” (2015, p.86). 
Lacking authority legitimated by consent, “authority is supplanted by technique” (2015, p.81) 
with legitimation achieved by effects or results.  
 
The closed-loop of algocratic legitimation, where results are evaluated by the system itself, 
excludes the possibility of reflection or critique. As Antoinette Rouvroy states, algorithms 
“appear evaluated increasingly according to criteria of flexibility, speed and relevance, and 
decreasingly according to criteria of truth, objectivity, and justice” (Rouvroy, 2011, p.127). 
For Rachel O’Dwyer, algorithms exempt us from the burden of creating an “epistemic 
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community”—the process of appointing and monitoring experts—“or anything resembling 
processes of interpretation and evaluation” (O’Dwyer, 2017, p.4). Interpretation and 
evaluation, decisions about meaning and value, are instead delegated to algorithms. With the 
reasons behind decision-making opaque, and therefore not able to be deemed legitimate or 
otherwise, the efficacy of outcomes is the sole measure for legitimacy of the system. For this 
reason, O’Dwyer describes algocracy as “the total succession of this aggregative model of 
democracy” (O’Dwyer, 2017, p.5). With aggregative democracy, the common good is not 
decided discursively or deliberatively, as in public sphere theory, but is simply taken to be the 
“aggregation of individual preferences and interests” (O’Dwyer, 2017, p.5). This aggregation 
allows for consensus to be reached without the need for hegemony, in the sense that nothing 
is excluded. All positions, preferences and interests are incorporated as inputs into a system 
that interprets and evaluates each of them in order to produce a single, indisputable answer to 
the question of what is best. This economic or financial decision-making becomes 
‘derivative’6—based upon but finally separate from its underlying sources and causes—and 
not necessarily reversible once inputs have been processed and an output reached. 
Algocracy’s authority is drawn from its incontestability with its opacity serving to legitimate 
its objectivity and independence. 
 
Transparency and opacity are both techniques selectively used by algocracy to redistribute 
rights away from users and towards this platform. It is therefore important not to see 
transparency as a defence against or a solution for the algocracy’s opacity. Indeed, as was 
suggested in Chapter 1, the call for transparency is too often a pretext to demand every 
increased sharing. Instead, I would argue that the question is one of consent, or rather how 
 
6 A Google search rankings, for example, is an opaque repackaging of multiple, interacting indicators of 
relevance, produced for individual users at the moment the search is made (Shirky, 2009) 
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decision over transparency and opacity are legitimated. Algorithms can be viewed as 
autocratic, making an incontestable decision, democratic, in the aggregative sense, or 
plutocratic in the way that it reinforces elite power at the same time as obscuring it.  
 
Danaher disputes the legitimacy of purely statistical, aggregative decision-making and argues 
that legitimate procedures must allow for human participation in and comprehension of those 
decision-making procedures (2016, p.254). He sees the ‘threat of algocracy’ as being that 
trust in and the legitimacy of decisions will be eroded if they cannot be adequately 
explainable and understandable. However, taking an individualist approach with its insistence 
on human autonomy (2016, p.264), his suggestion that human participation in algorithmic 
decision-making will likely require some kind of human ‘enhancement’ such that the 
individual is able to rationally understand what is currently beyond human comprehension. 
This, I would argue, is precisely the misuse of technology to increase rather than reduce 
complexity that Stafford Beer decried in the 1970s (Beer, 1974, p.26). Rather than this 
approach—by which only by coming less human can we hope to understand the non-human 
reasoning with which algocracy governs us—I would argue for the necessity to move towards 
an approach that is more human in the way it makes decisions while at the same time, 
following Rouvroy and Berns (2013), rejects the possibility or an individual response.  
 
A non-individual, human the response must be institutional, in Hannah Arendt’s sense of 
being a collective endeavour and a political community (Balibar, 2007, p.733). Rather than 
simply bureaucratic or procedural, in the case of discursive democracy, or algocartic but with 
greater human control, I would contend that an alternative institutional form needs the 
capacity to create epistemic communities, precisely by not delegating the processes of 
interpretation and evaluation to algorithms. While epistemic communities can give decisions 
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legitimacy, I would argue that it is only when combined with the institutional power to act on 
them that these decisions also become credible in the sense discussed in Chapter 1, the 
capacity to make promises and be believed. Moreover, this capacity to decide and to act must 
be embedded into the structures around which the institution organises itself, rather than 
applied to them through legal, bureaucratic or technical processes.  
 
 
2.1.3 — Visibility and recognition 
 
While the capacity for platforms to make incontestable, opaque decisions about transparency 
and opacity are an important mechanism by which they redistribute rights and centralise 
power, decisions over visibility can also be used to influence the behaviour of the user. 
Zuboff’s ideas about the redistribution of rights, and her suggestion that platforms can affect 
‘behaviour modification’, are in agreement with those who adopt Deleuze’s idea about the 
transition from discipline to control. Taina Bucher (2012), however, sees Foucault’s 
description of discipline as remaining useful in understanding how platforms regulate user 
behaviour through reward and punishment, primarily in the form of visibility. Bucher 
discusses the redistribution of rights within the platform-user relation but reverses Zuboff’s 
line of enquiry by focusing on the right to visibility—that is “to be recognised as a subject 
with a voice”—and the “conditions through which visibility is constructed by algorithms” 
(2012, p.1165). Studying Facebook’s role in framing, gatekeeping and agenda setting, Bucher 
describes a move that is apparent across all Web 2.0 platforms, away from unfiltered and 
unsorted feeds and streams, to algorithmically organised or ‘curated’ access to information 
(Oremus, 2017; Wright, 2018). For Bucher, visibility is the reward for using the platform in a 
way that Facebook wants (2012, p.1169) with “some forms of participation are more valuable 
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than others” (2012, p.1175), for example the location data generated by ‘checking in’ or 
tagging people in photos to enrich the platform’s social graph7. While Bucher suggests that 
Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithm makes visibility ‘unstable’, ‘scarce’ and therefore sought-
after (2012, pp.1171–2), users can only be invisible to each other, never to the algorithm. The 
‘threat of invisibility’ is real in the way it operates as a modulator of behaviour but it is 
dependent, first of all, on total visibility that comes from entering the platform’s architecture. 
Making oneself more visible to the algorithm is likely to be rewarded with visibility to other 
users, but this is always at the platform’s discretion, with direct relations between behaviour 
and visibility opaque and liable to change (Bucher, 2012, p.1176). In this way, platforms can 
be understood as creating what Tarleton Gillespie calls ‘calculated publics’ (2014, p.188). 
The power of the platform to ‘recognise’ subjects, and to give them voice within a calculated 
public, is key to how algocracy disrupts the public sphere as well as to counterpublic theories 
of how representation functions. 
 
Representation within a platform is a two-stage process of recognition. Firstly, as Bucher 
says, the platform must recognise the user but secondly, the user must recognise themselves 
in how the platform represents them. As was discussed in Chapter 1, recognition of itself in a 
representation is key to how publics and counterpublics form. Bucher suggests that the user 
profile functions as a prison cell in a panoptical system of surveillance, creating a fixed point 
at which standardised, interchangeable individuals can be observed (2012, p.1171). The 
algorithm can then create a ‘semi-public space’ by allowing partial visibility among specific 
users and content based on assumptions about their relevance (Bucher, 2012, p.1168). The 
process of recognition, representation and then self-recognition among users is entirely 
 
7 Facebook itself is able to frame this in a particular way, making claims of the “positive benefits between well-
being and active engagement on Facebook” (Ginsberg and Burke, 2017), by which they mean posting more 
information about yourself, rather than just passive consumption of existing content. 
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controlled by the platform, in Facebook’s case through power over of users’ transparency to 
the platform, opaque decision making about groupings and control over visibility within these 
semi-publics. An alternative institutional form that prevents this kind of centralised and 
opaque algorithmic decision making must, I would argue, ensure a process where visibility is 
neither a reward or punishment. It must also ensure that decisions about who is visible to 
whom are based on representations that we are given a choice to accept or reject. Recognition 
of oneself in a representation and, importantly, recognition of not being represented are key 
to how change to systems of representation in liberal institutions is meant to operate 
(Douglas, 2015, p.6). While, as argued in Chapter 1, belief in that validity of a representation 
and the possibility of them being valid is held at the institutional level, the institution’s self-
critical reflection of its representations must be something that those recognised, or 
misrecognised, can participate in; a process that the algocacy of the platform denies. The 
pressures put on human behaviour by algocracy’s control over visibility within platforms is 
also something that must be addressed in an alternative institutional model. Full transparency 
is not the answer because, as I have argured, demands for transparency do not address 
Zuboff’s concerns about privacy as the right to decide what is share. Nor do they address the 
fact that even fully transparent technical systems may remain opaque to non-experts—and 
indeed even the designers of those systems themselves—or Beer’s concerns about the 
quantity of information that is comprehensible to people. What I would argue is required is a 
structure where actions are not evaluated against expectations—which works to the detriment 
of creativity—but instead individual subjectivisation through unexpected and unpredictable 





2.1.4 — Archetypes and predictability 
 
While visibility within platforms can be used as a reward or punishment to encourage and 
discourage certain behaviours, platforms are not necessarily interested in controlling the 
specific actions of their users. Instead, a specific user’s actions are less important than how 
predictable they are and how closely they conform to an expected behaviour of an individual 
or group profile. In this section I wish to argue that, because of the way they encourage user 
behaviour to conform to expectations about the profile they are assigned, algorithmic 
processes alter behaviour and desire in ways that create tendencies towards polarisation and 
extremism. Zeynep Tufekci’s analysis of YouTube shows that its recommended algorithms 
tend to suggest increasingly extreme or inflammatory content—“Videos about vegetarianism 
led to videos about veganism. Videos about jogging led to videos about running 
ultramarathons” (Tufekci, 2018)—with evidence suggesting YouTube is influential in far-
right radicalisation (Evans, 2018; Roose, 2019). YouTube’s algorithmically curated ‘up next’ 
suggestions are another example of the power that algorithms have over visibility and opacity 
within networks.  
 
YouTube’s algorithms employ what their designers call ‘unsupervised learning’ that detects 
patterns and relationships between videos that would not be apparent to the human designers 
(Newton, 2017). This means that user preferences are not the result of their own filter 
bubbles—with users choosing material that aligns with or reinforces their existing views 
preferences8—but rather algorithmic prompts to take specific paths through a diverse media 
 
8 Criticisms about the potential effects of these algorithmically produced ‘filter bubbles’ are well known 
(Pariser, 2012; Hooton, 2016) though there is evidence to suggest that, at least in the case in political discourse, 
this is not as true as might be popularly be believed (Bruns and Highfield, 2016; Dubois and Blank, 2018; Guess 
et al., 2018). 
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ecology which aim to make the site ‘sticky’, recommending “videos that keep users staying 
to watch still more” (Nicas, 2018). However, rather than extreme content simply being more 
engaging, I want to suggest that extremes are important for understanding how the platform 
relates to the individual. Cadence Kinsey’s discussion of the role of the architype in online 
identity is particularly helpful here. While Kinsey looks specifically at the concept of 
authenticity in the relation of online to offline identity—arguing that there is trend towards 
“re-synchronisation” of online and offline practices in constructing identity (Kinsey, 2018, 
p.27)—she suggests that, within platforms, authenticity is evaluated by a conformity to pre-
existing archetypes. While authenticity is “commonly understood as an intensification of the 
individual” and “the archetype could be seen as an eradication of it”, for her the defining 
condition of identity formation within social media is the tension between the two (2018, 
p.34). As Rob Kitchin describes, content and users are treated in a similar manner by 
platforms, as both are being “atomised, quantified, computed” (Kitchin, 2014, p.9). Kinsey 
sees a structure in social media where content, and the user associated with that content, is 
evaluated as authentic “according to its alignment with […] pre-existing ideals” (2018, p.29) 
leading to a “regressive, and indeed aggressive, system of rewarding such normative [self] 
representations” (2018, p.31). While for Kinsey these pressures are social, rewarded with the 
likes and comments of one’s peers, I want to argue that it is not possible to separate these 
social rewards from the algorithmically-rewarded visibility that Bucher describes with 
Facebook, especially given that user interactions are the primary way that Facebook’s 
algorithm evaluates ‘relevance’ and assigns visibility to content (Bucher, 2012, p.1174).  
 
Rewarding archetypal or predictable behaviour and self-representation is, by definition, a 
disincentivisation of unpredictable, unexpected and creative action. Authenticity, if it does 
allow for creativity, requires it to remain within certain parameters and the platform’s ability 
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to regulate it. Even if, as per William’s suggestion discussed in section 1.1.1, regulation can 
be either positive reinforcement or negative curtailment, beyond the platforms capacity to 
regulate creativity it is, as Lialina shows, labelled misuse and excluded. Equally, as was 
discussed in section 1.3.3, creativity should not be understood as the attribute of an individual 
but understood as the result of interactions. While early network optimists  saw networked 
information and computer technology having the capacity to increase creativity through its 
multiplication of unexpected interactions (Apprich et al., 2020), the platform-user model, like 
the art institutions described by Szreder (2013), require this creativity to be ultimately 
individualised and privatised, even as the value of that creativity is accrued to the platform 
itself. An alternative to both online platforms and platform-like institutions of contemporary 
art would therefore function to promote unexpected and unpredictable interactions that are 
neither fully transparent nor subject to modulation by a centralised system. Key to this, I will 
argue in the next sections, is that people have the opportunity to address each other directly, 
without algorithmic mediation, and that norms or categories emerge from individuals and 
groups themselves, rather than being externally imposed. 
 
 
2.1.5 — Address 
 
Returning to Bucher’s definition of visibility within the platform as being ‘recognized as a 
subject with a voice’, it is important to see how this ‘voice’ functions within platforms and 
algocracy. Using Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of addressivity, Emily Rosamond argues that, 
within platforms, communication between users is “more than” their address from one to 
another (Rosamond, 2017, p.2). Just as we have seen imbalances of transparency, opacity and 
visibility within the platform-user relationship, Rosamond argues that there is an imbalance 
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of addressivity. While the data that users submit are addressed to other users, they are 
witnessed by an algorithm that is not the imagined addressee. Rosamond described how user 
profiles on dating platform OkCupid are created following prompts and templates, making 
certain types of user responses more likely than others while making it easier for the platform 
to transform user inputs into data that can be algorithmically processed, “manage users’ 
particularity” and “making it aggregate easily”. Connections are then made by the algorithm 
“from algorithmically analysed personality to personality” (Rosamond, 2017, p.4). 
OkCupid’s address to its users encourages them to share more about themselves, not just so 
that they might be more effectively analysed by the algorithm, but also so that they might 
better understand themselves. For Rosamond, the platform “often blurs the distinction 
between sociological and surveillance-capitalist paradigms for data analysis”, (2017, p.5), 
drawing on the “pleasure in seeing how one fits in (or otherwise) to norms” (2017, p.6) and 
“address themselves to the data-set, in order to be ‘analysed’ and thus rendered more self-
conscious” (2017, p.8). Rosamond argues that the specificity of addressivity within 
platforms—where the algorithmic witness views users in aggregate rather than in particular—
means that the voice of the user is neither as particular to them nor as independent from the 
witness as literary characters are for Bukhtin. Instead, they are handled as derivatives. Here, 
following Randy Martin, Rosamond shows how the financial logic of “qualities, traits and 
risks” becoming “packaged, bundled and managed” appears in the social sphere (2017, p.8). 
The result is that instead of an individualised voicing—in the sense of the speech act which 
can have an effect of the world—communication on the platform allows only for a 
financialised, aggregated sharing.  
 
To understand the importance of considering address in testing institutional forms that could 
offer an alternative to the platform, it is important to make a distinction here between the 
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indirect address to an audience that Michael Warner describes—as detailed in section 1.2.2—
and the way addressivity operates on the platform. Through algorithmic analysis and 
aggregation, the platform is able to redirect address away from its original audience—for 
example the potential partner already imagined and indirectly addressed by the user in their 
dating profile—towards advertisers who are able to purchase targeting to aggregated 
subgroups of users. Equally, as Rosamond shows, the platform is also able to direct investors 
within the platform who look to the platform’s potential for future market control9. The 
indirect address of the user on the platform does not only, or even primarily, work to 
interpolate or individuate the recipient who recognises themselves in the address. Instead, it 
impacts on how the speaker is categorised by the platform, dictating who this address is able 
to reach, as well as what messages, from advertisers as well as other users, will be addressed 
to them. Through mechanisms of opacity and visibility, prediction and address, the platform 
redistributes powers, rights and capabilities that were previously understood as human to 
itself, operating through automated action intentionally beyond the direct control and 
contestation. What I wish to argue is that the most important of these rights when it comes to 
the process of subjectivisation, the right of the individual to identify with or against a group, 
is further removed from the person through the algocratic regime of categorisation. 
 
 
2.1.6 — Categories and norms 
 
 
9 As Rosamond shows “Match Group Inc. has broken out as a stand-alone public company (known on 
NASDAQ as MTCH), which owns “OkCupid, Tinder, and 45 other dating brands” (Flynn 2016), including 
Match.com and PlentyOfFish” (Rosamond, 2017, p.7) 
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Rewarding normative user behaviour and self-representation within the platform is 
significantly different from the type of normativity that disciplinary institutions of the 
bourgeois public sphere encouraged and enforced. Under algocracy, normative categories are 
not fixed but flexible, further altering how identity is conceived, recognised and represented. 
John Cheney-Lippold describes how through algorithms “commonalities between data can be 
parsed and patterns within data then identified and labelled” (2011, p.168) allowing for new 
ways of representing the world, or rather data about the world, forming the basis for the 
production of new value. For him, the most important place where the impact of this can be 
seen is in how identity is conceived of and produced. Identity under algocracy should not so 
much be considered the property of an individual but rather the label given to an identified 
group. It cannot be attached to any “essential” quality but is instead a categorisation of 
behaviour as it appears in or as data (2011, p.168). If we apply Kinsey’s insight about 
archetypes we can see how authenticity and the archetype interact. To be authentically female 
is to display behaviour that conforms to the female archetype as defined by the algorithm’s 
categories. What is key for Cheney-Lippold—where he goes beyond Kinsey’s description of 
archetypes and where I argue we see another key feature of algocracy—is the construction of 
what he calls cybernetic categorisation: feedback loops which allow the “continual 
interaction with, and modification of, the categories through which biopolitics works” 
(Cheney-Lippold, 2011, p.173).  
 
Archetypes become unfixed, because what counts as archetypal behaviour is continuously 
reassessed based on the typical behaviour—or usage—of users who have been classified as a 
particular type. For Cheney-Lippold, this form of biopolitical control is ‘soft’ because it does 
depend on static or pre-defined ‘hard’ categories, but rather on probability or “statistical 
belief” (2011, p.178), with ‘soft biopower’ operating as a “variable indirect processes of 
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regulation” (2011, pp.172–3). Here we have a form of control not based on self-regulation 
due to panoptic surveillance, nor on a ‘code-as-law’ protocological curtailing of what actions 
are possible, but rather what could be called active representation, “something that tells us 
who we are, what we want, and who we should be” (2011, p.177).  
 
Hard biopolitical categories like race and gender become soft categories, for example 
Facebook’s “ethnic affinity” (Ortutay, 2018). These soft categories are tautological. Female 
behaviour is the behaviour of those classed as female and people are classed as female 
because the display female behaviour10. If a user’s behaviour alters, the algorithm is 
“programmed to interpret a mis-categorization and reassign a category of identity based on 
that user’s newly observed behaviour” (2011, p.176). This is possible because of the 
transparency of behaviour within platforms and the speed at which the modulation of 
categories can occur, which can be understood as “real time” (Viana, 2016). For Cheney-
Lippold, algocratic categorisation is a new addition to the way biopolitical categories and 
behavioural norms are defined, “it is also through data and statistical analysis that 
conceptions of gender change – not just through discourse” (2011, p.175)” as is the case in 
theories of the public sphere and counterpublics. Categorisation is then another mechanism of 
producing unequal power relations between platform and user. While the unfixed, non-
essentialist categories of algocracy might suggest a liberatory potential over the hard, 
disciplining categories of bureaucracies, the user is not able to categorise themselves by 
choosing to identify with or even by aligning their behaviour with pre-existing, stable 
categories. Categorisation is always an algorithmic decision that, because of the imbalances 
in transparency and visibility, is rendered incontestable by the categorised subject. While the 
 
10 In another example, the statistical analysis showing that the dating profiles of white women are more likely to 
include the words ‘love to be outside’ and ‘campfire’ can be reverse to show that is a profile contains the word 
‘campfire’ the user is more likely to be a white woman (Rosamond, 2017, p.4) 
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algorithm is affected by user behaviour, there is no possibility of active engagement. Any 
resistance to typical or archetypical behaviour becomes data that serves to improve the 
algorithm, making you and others more easier to categorise.  
 
Better categorisation is, however, a means rather than an end. The key aim of these mutable, 
soft categories is not merely description or labelling but, as has been discussed, prediction. 
Active representation—seen in Chaney-Lippold’s soft biopower—and the platform 
architecture that rewards conformity to existing categories—as described in different ways by 
Zuboff, Bucher and Kinsey—combine to cause the extremism that Tufekci terms 
radicalisation. This tendency occurs because platforms aim to use protocol, algorithms and 
cybernetic feedback to render the world more predictable. It is not simply the case of making 
better predictions through the use of data, rather, it is making a world that better conforms its 
simulation, using “complex algorithmic models of possible future risks in order to tame 
chance” (Aneesh, 1999, p.15). This is what Zuboff means when she describes ‘behaviour’ as 
the commodification of ‘reality’ analogous to ‘labour’ as the commodification of ‘life’ (2015, 
p.85). To commodify reality as behaviour requires not just that this behaviour is visible but 
that it’s risks are manageable. While extremes might initially seem more risky, they are in 
fact more predictable when understood as a hyper-conformity to an archetype. To repeat 
Zuboff’s point, it is the results and effects, not actions and causes, that are valuable to the 
platform.  
 
The flexibility of soft-biopolitics that Chaney-Lippold describes represents an important, and 
potentially liberating, break with the hard categories of discipline that arose concurrently with 
the public sphere and its institutions, including the museum. Calculated publics based on 
behaviour are, however, a commodification of reality. While an institutional form that is able 
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to organise around flexible, or active, representation would go some way to addressing the 
“Victorian ideals” of categorisation (Kaplinsky, 2017) and “segmentation” of audiences 
(Rodney, 2015a) discussed in Chapter 1.3.1, algocracy means that these categories are still 
externally and opaquely applied. Furthermore, there are limits to the flexibility of soft 
biopolitics. Rouvroy has made more explicit the fact that this capturing of reality cannot be 
neutral or without bias (2011, p.121). Algorithms in fact have the tendency to replicate, and 
even amplify norms and normative processes, while at the same time obscuring their 
existence (Rouvroy and Berns, 2013, p.IIV). A new institutional form should, I would argue, 
facilitate active representation, but it must arise through a process of self-organisation that 
allows subjectification. While this is a process described by Warner’s ideas of counterpublics 
discussed in Chapter 1, which self-organise around discourse, the indirect address that this 
requires is also subject to algorithmic intervention that prevents this from happening. An 
alternative institutional form must allow for unmediated indirect address but this must be 
possible at the level of network configuration, described in section 1.2.3, not just at the level 
of discourse. This, as will be argued in the next section, necessitates going beyond the 
flexibility of soft biopower and instead looking at how subjectification can result from a 
process of individuation in relation to a common environment.  
 
2.2 — Algocratic subjects 
 
For Emily Rosamond, the user is never the human subject that it purports to represent. 
Rather, it is always a “dialogical relations between the platform and the profile” that says 
more about that relation “than it does about a presumed stable or closed off identity of its 
subject” (2017, p.4). The final section of this chapter builds upon the arguments already put 
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forward for the operation and subsequent imbalances of power in the platform-user 
relationship through the work of Antoinette Rouvroy on a-normative modes of social 
representation and control (Rouvroy, 2011; Rouvroy and Berns, 2013; Rouvroy and Stiegler, 
2016). This aims to better understand how the power of platforms constrains human action, 
looking again at the figure of the user and the process by which they are formed, in order to 
suggest alternative types of subjects and relations to institutions beyond the platform-user 
model. Rouvroy’s question: “Can we govern ourselves without norms without dissolving 
ourselves in fluxes?” is key to the thinking about the process of subject formation that is 
necessary for an institutional form that provides an alternative to platforms and algocracy. I 
will argue that the user profile is best understood as the environment—which Rouvroy sees 
as the object of governance, rather than the subject—with implication for how Arendt’s 
concept of action can operate in algocracy. This profile, or environment, acts on us without 
us being able to act on it, with the consequent curtailing of creativity and subject formation 
that has already been discussed. It is not just an awareness of the self but an ability to change 
the situation and, moreover, the ability to think via the possibility of that change which 
allows individuals the capacity to act not as predicted. In this section, I will argue not only 
that an environment must be alterable to allow subjectification but that, instead of an 
environment being reduced to the user profile of an individual, the environments that a new 
institutional form creates must become common in a way that allows for the emergence of 
group identity.  
 
 
2.2.1 — Data selves 
 
Antoinette Rouvroy’s work with Thomas Berns has explored in detail how algocracy governs 
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through an a-normatively model of “social reality”. For Rouvroy and Berns the way in which 
statistics are employed by algocracy is no longer to make comparisons to averages or norms. 
Data is collected and stored indiscriminately, “devoid of any prediction about specific end 
uses” (2013, p.VI). Instead, as Chaney-Lippold also argues, the self-learning nature of the 
systems mean that norms appear “to emerge directly from reality itself” (2013, p.VII) with 
data claiming to exist as reality ‘captured’. Instead of being compared to norms, singular 
cases (individuals or behaviours) are evaluated against an unfixed set of relations with 
disparities and differences algorithmically integrated into a coordinated system. While 
measurements are ‘individualised’, for Rouvroy this “has nothing to do with taking the 
singularity of persons into account” (Rouvroy, 2018). The measurements of differences 
between multiple data points, rather than between individuals and norms, means that 
“algorithmic governmentality thus focuses not on individuals, on subject, but on relations” 
(Rouvroy and Berns, 2013, p.V). By measuring and acting on relations, the social reality that 
emerges is not necessarily reducible to its parts. Relations and their properties, while real, are 
‘transindividual’ and not always assignable to the individuals or subjects to whom they relate. 
The impersonal nature of much of this information, cleansed of context and meaning and not 
belonging to anyone in particular, allows it to be collected without consent (2013, p.VI). This 
is also the basis of its claim to objectivity, being separated entirely from subjects each 
individual data point, whatever the source, is only ever itself, ‘what happened’ or indeed 
‘what is happening’ (2013, p.VII). The supposed neutrality of the automated system—what 
Rosamond (2017) would call an algorithmic witness—grants it exclusive rights to decide 
truth. Under this regime, what is present or visible, in real-time, is real “belonging to the 




Devoid of context, and therefore meaning, the facticity of data renders it incontestable, free 
of intention, motivation or subjectivity (Rouvroy and Berns, 2013, p.VI–VII) which for 
O’Dwyer (2017) puts it “beyond dispute”. What is not apparent in the present is not just 
ignored but removed “from the physical model of the universe” (Terranova, 2004, p.67). The 
function of visibility under algocracy goes beyond what was described in section 2.1.3. It is 
not simply that things which are visible to the platform are only selectively revealed to its 
users but that anything that is not shared with the platform no longer functionally exists. This 
deconextualised factual reality is, however, re-inscribed with meaning through a process of 
correlation, the re-connecting of data so that patterns emerge. This is an automated process, 
able to occur largely or entirely without human oversite or control, without the need for a 
hypothesis—or proposition about the world—before the data is given sense, creating a 
“collapse of states between the raw data and the database and the production of knowledge 
where critique might occur” (O’Dwyer, 2017, p.4). The objective correlations that the system 
identifies are not able to suggest the reason that these relationships exist—the ‘why?—and 
instead causes are deemed unnecessary, too subjective, not apparent in the data and therefore 
not factual11.  
 
Algocracy’s avoidance of the individual affects the way subjectivity is formed because it is 
always external to the individual. This prevents a critical view of the self that Rouvroy and 
Berns (2013) see as key to subject formation, with the meaning produced by algocracy 
always objective, disallowing the possibility of subjective meaning to emerge. For Rouvroy 
the avoidance of danger has replaced remediation, which would require an understanding of 
cause, while the individual subject has been replaced by a profile constructed out of relations 
 
11 The identification by American intelligence services of Al Jazeera journalist Ahmad Muaffaq Zaidan as a 
member of both Al Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood via his phone metadata positions the objective truth of 
correlations above the too subjective reason that could identify his profession as explanation for his contact with 
members of proscribed organisations (Currier et al., 2015). 
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and correlations. While the individual is avoided in this new statistical regime, what Rouvroy 
term a ‘statistical double’ emerges. This profile or ‘data self’ arises “from statistically 
predictive correlations between impersonal behavioural variables automatically detected in 
the mass of available data” (Rouvroy, 2018, p.99). Despite being separate from the 
individual, actions upon this double will affect the behaviour of the subject. It is a profile that 
is ‘applied’ to individuals in order to make their behaviour more predictable by revealing 
“preferences, intentions and propensities” that would otherwise not be evident (Rouvroy and 
Berns, 2013, p.VIII). For Rouvroy and Berns, algorithmic governmentality regulates not by 
ensuring individuals conform to a desirable norm but simply by making behaviour is 
predictable through ensuring that “everyone is truly themselves”. Indeed, “prediction and 
avoidance of danger have replaced the identification and remediation to its causes”, 
(Rouvroy, 2011, p.126), the danger being that the individual acts outwith the boundaries of 
their predicted behaviour. I would argue that the subjective meaning-making that algocracy 
denies is one of the key things that an alternative institutional form needs to preserve and 
promote. This process of subjectivisation and subjective meaning-making, as the next section 
proposes, requires the development of institutional forms that create fungible environments 
that are not individualised but are instead common. 
 
 
2.2.2 — Environmental collapse 
 
By acting on relations and connections, rather the individual, algocracy operates by 
exercising control not upon the individual directly but on the environment (Rouvroy and 
Berns, 2013, p.IX). This action on, and therefore through, the environment (2013, p.XVII) 
has the effect of constraining what behaviours are likely and possible, making “certain forms 
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of marginality ever less probable” by being able to “pre-emptively affect possible 
behaviours” (2013, p.X). It is important to note, however, that the environment is 
personalised to each user (Rouvroy, 2011, p.132). This personalisation is a form of ‘hyper-
segmentation’ that looks to channel a user’s more-or-less predictable desires towards the 
system’s desired outcomes. The separation of the individual from their environment will be 
discussed through the work on biologist Humberto Maturana in Chapter 3, but here it might 
be helpful to equate—more explicitly than Rouvroy and Berns themselves do—the 
environment that the individual inhabits and the statistical double of their profile. The profile 
is the means by which the system decides what information is made visible to the individual 
and what future connections and relations are likely to be established (Rouvroy, 2011, p.132). 
Both environment and profile are adaptive in response to behaviour and use as well as the 
behaviour of others with whom the profile is algorithmically correlated. The profile generates 
the environment and is refined by interactions with that environment. This continuous 
feedback or mutual refinement aims to bring the two closer together with the aim of 
providing the environment you want before you ask for it (Wakabayashi and Barr, 2015). 
However, it also promotes action without formulating desire (Rouvroy and Berns, 2013, 
p.XIII) with the environment in becoming simply a reflection of the profiles anticipated 
action. The individual becomes less and less relevant as the profile/environment provide 
fewer and fewer opportunities to act beyond expected behaviours. This is the basis for what 
Rouvroy calls ‘digital behaviourism’, the idea that you can “govern behaviours without 
directly worrying about individuals, and simply governing based on a statistical expression of 
reality that might replace reality itself” (Rouvroy and Berns, 2013, pp.XXIV–XXV). The 
collapse of profile and environment eliminates creativity in order to maximise predictability 
but, in reducing the environment to the level of the individual, this collapse has consequences 
for how the subjectivity of individuals is able to develop and their capacity to make meaning 
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out of their interactions with their environment.  
 
Statistical doubles or user profiles are fundamental to the way we are governed within 
platforms yet we have no influence or control over them. Rouvroy and Berns say that we 
have no “relationship” with them (2013, p.XVII) but I wish to argue that it would be better to 
say that there is an unbalanced relation. The profile, or environment, acts on us while our 
ability to act on it are never direct but always mediated by the algorithm. The act of being 
able to change is key to what Diann Bauer (2018) describes as sapience, not just an 
awareness of the self, but an ability to change the situation and, moreover, the ability to think 
via the possibility of that change. While the system acts on us to become more like our 
profile12 Rouvroy and Berns stress the importance of seeing the discrepancy between 
ourselves and our representations in data. This they locate in what Rouvroy, drawing on 
Arendt, calls spontaneity, the capacity to act not as predicted (Rouvroy, 2011, p.133) which, 
as I have argued, should also be understood as creativity. The scale of the data collection and 
processing power available to algocracy is such that it “presents the possibility of a 
seemingly perfectly “democratic” normativity” (2013, p.IX) which is to say, aggregative, 
non-exclusionary and non-restricting of the individual to any predefined classes or categories. 
Here I wish to connect Rouvroy and Berns’ thinking to that of Kinsey. The statistical double, 
or the user profile, acts as the personalised architype to which the subject strives to become. 
In reality, however:  
 
“The information systems embedded in ambient intelligent systems are not intended 
to observe the unique complexity of each human being, but to sort individuals in a 
 
12 Rouvroy and Berns liken this process to the Christian, confessional subject which “refines” rather than 
“produces” the self through “dialogue with oneself, aided by political, spiritual or technical mediation” rather 
than the modern legal subject governed by discourse and norms (Rouvroy and Berns, 2013, pp.XVII–XVIII). 
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variety of heterogeneous categories for the purpose of predicting their willingness or 
need to buy specified commodities, their risks to fill claims with health and disability 
insurances, the danger they represent for themselves or for others, or other 
propensities that marketers, insurers, law enforcement officials and many others may 
find useful to have.” (Rouvroy, 2011, p.128). 
 
Thus, while they might be highly personalised, the profiles can never quite approach uniquely 
individual archetypes. The process of “becoming one’s own profile” (2013, p.X) is not a 
process of producing a self, even if it is far more accommodating, or even demanding, of 
difference than the statistical averages and norms of previous forms of governance. For this 
reason, the statistical double acts to “hinders any subjectification process” (2013, p.V). That 
this happens opaquely, outside the view and comprehension of humans, and therefore outside 
of discourse, creates a depoliticised democracy (O’Dwyer, 2017, p.5) where nothing needs be 
contested because decisions are placed beyond human grasp. For Rouvoy and Berns, 
algocracy “seeks not to govern reality, but to govern on the basis of reality” (2013, p.XX). 
 
While the current “focus on contingency and risk minimisation has shadowed most other 
political goals” (Rouvroy, 2011, p.136), Rouvroy leaves open the possibility that the same 
types of processes may enhance our capacities for utopian virtual or statistical selves that we 
can move towards if we don’t systemically preclude them.  
 
“Virtuality, or our virtual dimension, has to do with the capacity we have to suspend 
any definition of ourselves, our capacity to ‘think of ourselves beyond ourselves’ in a 
cultivation of ecstasies or self-transcendence, self-overcoming or self-




The result, or indeed the purpose, of preventing critical reflection, and therefore subject 
formation, is a separation of the subject of governance, the individual, from the object of 
governance which Rouvroy and Berns identify as the relation or environment (2013, pp.XX–
XXI). These are not simply the relations between things, but the relations that pre-exist a 
connection, types of relations that make connection possible. Here they follow Gilbert 
Simondon in making relations primary (Terranova, 2004). Rouvroy and Berns draw on 
Simondon to describe how communication happens between preindividuals, with the act of 
communication causing individuation to take place in a similar manner to the process 
described by Michael Warner in Chapter 1, though not limited to indirect address. 
Importantly for Simondon’s conception of individuation, the individual will differ from the 
potential that pre-existed it (Terranova, 2004, pp.67–8). Algocracy, therefore, can be 
understood as the limiting of the possibility for a subject to arise differently to how it was 
predicted. Algocracy seeks to avert a crisis, being the moment where a decision must be 
made, by maintaining relations that are undisturbed by the process of subject formation.  
 
While there is potential in the liberation from predefined categories that algocracy’s soft-
biopolitics allows, there is not liberty in the sense of being able to project oneself differently. 
For individuation to happen a common, rather than individualised, environment is required, 
which Rouvroy and Berns understands as “that place of co-appearance where beings are 
addressed and talk about themselves to one another, with all their dissymmetries and 
‘disparateness’” (2013, p.XXVIII). Here then we have public space but it is not one that 
seeks consensus. Rather the “common requires and presupposes non-coincidence because it 
is from there that processes of individuation occur when that is what compels us to address 
one another.” Under algocracy the environment is exactly what is not allowed to be common 
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(2013, p.XXVIII), instead the environment collapses into an individual user profile while all 
possibility of connection is controlled by the platform. Here it is useful to return to Arendt 
description of the common world as the world of things produced by humans but not 
privately owned and which “as a table is located between those who sit around it […] relates 
and separates men at the same time” (1958, p.52). This common world is an environment 
made up of material, human things, including the infrastructure and protocols that make up a 
platform or an institution. The sharing of a common environment, and the connections and 
separations that it provokes, is what allows and requires individuation and subjectivisation. In 
the individualised, privatised world, the environment collapsed into a user profile does not 
allow subjectivisation because all connection and separation is performed by the algorithm 
through a regime of visibility and opacity, prediction and categorisation. A new institutional 
form must therefore ensure that environments are common. In the following chapters I will 
analysis the cybernetic forms and models that were developed by Stafford Beer, suggesting 
and testing the ways that they might form the basis for an institutional form that resists 
algocracy’s methods of control and the platform’s centralisation of power. These models, I 
suggest, allow for common environments and flexible, contestable and rejectable 









Chapter 3 — Syntegration in theory 
 
Team Syntegrity, Stafford Beer’s protocol for problem solving and decision making within 
groups, was the culmination of multi-decade experimentation with and theorising of non-
hierarchical organisations. It grew out of his experiences designing and implementing his 
Viable System Model, a cybernetic management tool he saw as being applicable to all types 
of self-organising and self-sustaining systems. This chapter will start by looking at Beer’s 
work on viable systems, showing how his encounters with Chilean biologist Humberto 
Maturana’s theory of autopoiesis, whilst working to implement cybernetic management in 
Chile in the early 1970s, spurred a development in his cybernetic thinking and a deeper 
engagement with the problems of non-hierarchical management, anti-authoritarianism and 
human freedom. It will argue that Maturana’s ideas have implications for how we understand 
identity and self-identification in individuals and organisations and that the identity of a 
group arises from its autopoietic self-organisation in relation to its environment. This, I 
propose, is precisely the process required in the building of a viable institutional form that 
can utilise the flexibility of platforms without a regime of algocracy. It will be argued that 
Team Syntegrity—like algocracy—functions as government-by-simulation but that it does so 
in a way that counters the authoritarian nature of the platform, allowing it to form the basis of 
a new institutional form. 
 
3.1 — Viable Systems 
 
For Beer, cybernetics was the science that could understand, control and design complex 
systems which are not fully knowable or predictable. His approach focused on what a system 
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does in its interaction with the outside world rather than how it works internally. Beer sought 
to design systems that were able to stabilise themselves, which he termed viable systems. He 
attempted to convert his cybernetic approach to management and his early experiments in 
biological computing13 into a formal system he called the Viable System Model (VSM) 
(Pickering, 2010, pp.243–244). This research was begun in the 1960s and was first presented 
in the book Brain of the Firm (Beer, 1972). Taking the human nervous system as its 
inspiration, the VSM formalised Beers ideas into a model that could be applied to all scales 
of organisation (Medina, 2011, p.35).  
 
3.1.1 — The VSM 
Beer’s development of the VSM through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s built on the self-
regulation of the Ashby’s homeostat, discussed in section 1.1.1, to produce rules that apply to 
all viable systems whether they be biological, organisation or societal. For Beer, however, 
viable systems must also be dynamic within physiological limits. This is most clearly seen in 
a living organism, where viability must achieve a stability that is neither static, dead, nor 
destructive; where it stops being a coherent entity. Beer saw society in the second half of the 
20th century as becoming increasingly complex. “The elements of our society ever more 
richly interact: the more this happens […] the more complex does society come” (Beer, 1995, 
p.221). He viewed this increased interaction and its resulting complexity as driven by 
communication and data-processing technology but also the result of a demand for freedom 










Figure 1. A rough sketch of the model of any viable system, Beer (1985, p.3). Note that the system is 
recursive, with the model reproduced at a smallmer scale within System 1. 
 
As Beer stated in 1973, “increased freedom (including new opportunities) proliferates variety 
to a point where our respected institutions cannot any longer cope with it” (Beer, 1974, p.17). 
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For him, society had “outgrown the dynamic regulatory capacities of its own hallowed 
structures” (Beer, 1995, p.222) or, as Evgeny Morozov has commented, “the old ways of 
minimizing [complexity]—religious edicts prescribing strict codes of individual behaviour, 
for example—no longer worked”. In Morozov’s view, “Beer dedicated his life to deploying 
the tools of cybernetics to make both market and non-market institutions more responsive to 
the demands of growing social complexity” (Morozov, 2019). The dynamic nature of the 
interactions between a system and its regulation are important. An accelerated rate of change 
means that traditional institutional structures are not able to return to a stable, or relaxed, state 
before the next stabilising adaptation needs to be made (Beer, 1974, p.11, 1995, p.427). As a 
result, they are not able to recognise what stability looks like and instead operate under a 
constant state of crisis that leads to ever increasing instability. A viable institutional form 
which can offer an alternative to the platform must therefore possess characteristics of 
dynamism and flexibility in a similar way to the platform and algocracy as discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2. It must also, however, direct these capacities to stabilisation which, as I 
will argue in the following sections, is dependent on self-organisation and self-recognition. 
 
3.1.2 — Self-organisation 
 
Beer’s understanding of a stable and viable society is one that is itself made up of stable and 
viable institutional components. However, in order to maintain their own stability, 
institutions will inevitably effect instability upon the institutions around them (Beer, 1995, 
p.229). In order to achieve stability at a higher level, a ‘metasystem’—or stable system of 
stable systems—must be in place to regulate the interaction of different parts. Institutions that 
are independent must be connected in such a way as to maintain a state of equilibrium. Beer 
formalised this multi-level stabilisation in his Viable System Model (VSM) which operates 
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on the principle that it can ignore—or ‘black box’—the internal operation of subsystems if 
mechanisms are in place to regulate interactions between them (Beer, 1995, p.228). As the 
model follows fixed cybernetic laws that, in Beer’s view, “are invariant to the 
transformations of their fabric” (1995, p.425) he viewed the VSM as universally applicable to 
all viable systems.  
 
Split into five subsystems or levels, each part of the VSM took a role in regulating the system 
such that it was ultrastable, able to correct itself in response to all outside perturbations. The 
VSM is, then, an example of Keller Easterling’s medium design (Easterling, 2018) but, rather 
than increasing information flow as Easterling advocates, the VSM aims to make information 
manageable so that communication channels, receivers and transducers do not become 
overwhelmed and information does not become destabilising (Beer, 1985). For Beer all 
viable systems are “basically self-organizing” (Beer, 1985, p.30) which is to say that “the 
output they hold steady is their own organization” (Beer, 1974, p.77). Self-organisation is, as 
was noted in section 1.2.4, the organisation of a self. While viability can be determined from 
a system’s interaction with its environment, it results from its internal organisation. That the 
world around us is made up of self-organising, viable systems is seen as self-evident by Beer. 
If systems were not viable they would not continue to exist or it would be apparent that 
unstable systems were being continually put back together by some other viable system. Beer 
saw viability as “both necessary and sufficient as a criteria of effective management, and 
therefore cybernetics itself ” (1995, p.426).  
 
For Beer, self-organised viability was the basis for autonomy and, I will argue, also necessary 
for institutional forms that can serve as an alternative to the platform model. As argued 
previously, self-organisation is the underlying principle through which complex hegemony 
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operates. Characteristics and qualities that emerge from complex systems are embedded in 
the structures around which they self-organise. Self-organisation is not, however, enough to 
ensure viability or the autonomy that Beer’s VSM was based on. For this to happen, there 
must also be a process of ‘autopoiesis’. Drawing on what I identify as the chief source of 
Beer’s theory of autonomy and identity, the work of Humberto Maturana, I wish to argue that 
identity is the result of the recognition of something’s separation from its environment, with 
autopoiesis understood as self-recognition of that separation and identification with a stable, 
viable state.  
 
3.1.3 — Autopoiesis 
 
Autopoiesis means self-making and it was established by Maturana with his colleague 
Francisco Varela in a 1972 essay later published in English as Autopoiesis: the organisation 
of the living (1979). Autopoiesis concerns autonomy and aliveness, and it was Maturana's 
attempt to answer the question “what is common to all living systems that qualifies them as 
living?” (Maturana and Varela, 1979, p.74). The answer that Maturana and Varela gave is 
that they have an autopoietic organisation—with organisation understood as a fixed set of 
relations, opposed to structure as a variable set of material components—and that they are 
self-maintaining through a continuous process of self-making.  
 
Beer viewed autopoiesis and the VSM as ‘mutually enriching’ and saw autopoiesis, self-
production, as necessary to viability (Beer, 1981, p.338). The idea of viable systems 
outputting their own organisation is a direct transposing of the biologically focused 
autopoiesis into the language of management cybernetics (Beer, 1979a, p.66). Beer’s 
encounter with Maturana and the concept of autpoiesis was a result of the work he undertook 
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in for the short-lived democratic socialist government of Salvador Allende in the early 1970s. 
In 1971 Beer was contacted by Fernando Flores, an engineer working in the Chilean State 
Development Corporation that was overseeing the country’s nationalisation program, seeking 
advice on implementing cybernetic management at a national scale, titled Project Cybersyn 
(Medina, 2011, p.16). Beer responded with an offer to work directly for the Chilean 
government, implementing the VSM at the scale of the Chilean economy (Beer, 1981, p.338). 
During Beer’s time in Santiago between 1971 and 1973, he and Maturana became close 
friends, while Maturana worked with Varela to formalise the theory of autopoiesis develop in 
1969 during his time working in Chicago on the invitation of cybernetician Heinz von 
Foerster (Maturana and Varela, 1979, p.xvi). Beer made use of Maturana’s work in a report 
‘on Decybernation’ (1973) in an attempt to explain why the Chilean governmental 
bureaucracy was resistant to the changes he was proposing and later worked to have the 
translation of Maturana and Varela’s Autopoiesis published in an unrealised edited collection 
titled Challenge to the Paradigm (Hancock and Naughten, 1993).  
 
Maturana and Valera’s theorising of autopoiesis was, I would argue, one of the key 
influences on the development of the VSM after 1971. While the self-regulation of the 
homeostat is a fundamental idea in cybernetics—and the idea that such mechanisms might be 
the basis of life is inherent in Ashby’s Homeostat (Malapi-Nelson, 2017)—Beer saw 
autopoiesis as a “special kind of homeostasis” (Beer, 1981, p.338). Autopoiesis goes beyond 
homeostasis by positing self-organisation as the basis for self-reference and therefore self-
identification (Beer, 1979a, p.66). For Beer, autopoiesis becomes the way of locating the 
individual, viable and autonomous, within an inextricably interrelated system; a way for the 
self to recognise itself as distinct from its environment. This, I would argue, became 
necessary as a response to the criticisms Beer received for working for a socialist state and 
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charges of “‘Big Brother’ tactics” (Medina, 2011, p.173). Beer rejected the idea that “identity 
is a political inference” (Beer, 1979a, p.64) but rather a product of self-production. As N. 
Katrine Hayles notes “one of the principal effects of autopoiesis is to secure for a living 
system the crucial qualities of autonomy and individuality” (Hayles, 1999, p.142). 
Furthermore, if a system’s purpose is to maintain its own viability, for Beer it is also 
necessary to maintain its identity and autonomy (Beer, 1979a, pp.67–9).  
 
The continuous self-production of a viable system is what underwrites identity, both 
externally and to itself (Beer, 1985, p.9). To be viable, a system must stabilise itself, while 
necessarily destabilising—dumping entropy into (Williams, 2015a, p.25)—its environment. 
Viable systems are, however, also self-referential or logically closed in a way that allows for 
the maintenance of identity and the production of self-awareness (Beer, 1985, p.4). This is a 
key point of Maturana and Valera’s work that Beer draws upon in the ongoing development 
of the VSM. The idea of closure as the basis of identity can be seen to flow from Maturana’s 
insights into the closed nature of the nervous systems which, rather than responding to 
information, react through self-regulation to deformation caused by internal perturbations 
(Beer, 1979a, p.77; Hayles, 1999, p.136). To stabilise itself, a viable system must have an 
internal representation of its relaxed, stable state. It is therefore sensible to see the VSM as an 
example of Maturana and Varela’s influence in what N. Kathryn Hayles describes as the 
transition from the first wave of cybernetics to the second. While the first wave—for example 
Ashby’s homeostat—looked to engineer behaviours that mimicked biological processes, 
Beer’s work looked to engineer processes and environments, self-organising around systems 




The contestation around autopoiesis was, and continues to be, the question of what kinds of 
systems they are applicable to (Maturana, 2011, p.299). For Beer all viable systems are self-
producing—autopoietic by nature—and therefore, strictly speaking, biological with a 
“cohesive social institution” understood as an autopoietic system (Beer, 1979a, p.70). Neither 
Maturana nor Varela agreed with Beer, nor did they agree with each other. For Maturana a 
social system is the result of the stabilised relations of a number of autopoietic systems in the 
process of their autopoiesis, an interdependence of biological systems that is not itself 
biological (Maturana and Varela, 1979, p.xxvi). Varela saw production of component parts, 
at a chemical level, as the key feature of autopoiesis (Varela et al., 1974). While a social-
system might be self-organising, that does not mean it is self-producing in the same way as 
an organism is.  
 
Beer’s conception is closer to the one developed by Felix Guattari, for whom “institutions 
and technical machines […] when one considers them in the context of the machinic 
assemblages they constitute with human beings […] become ipso facto autopoietic” 
(Guattari, 1995, p.40). An organisation composed of autopoietic humans can become 
autopoietic if it sustains itself, that is, if it is viable. These disputes, I would argue, revolve 
around the question of boundaries: where does the autopoiesis stop? For the biologists, it was 
necessary for it to stop at the edge of biology. For the management cybernetician, it can be 
found at any scale where systems self-organise. Guattari is more concerned with the removal 
of boundaries than their demarcation. For the purposes of this thesis, I will define autopoiesis 
as arising whenever a system is able to identify itself, that is to organise itself as a self with 
an identity, with the effect that it separates itself from its environment. At an institutional 
level, this can be understood as instituting itself. Key, however, is that this is a viable, 




3.1.4 — Self-identification  
 
Figure 2. Recursion, Beer (1985, p.116). System 4 contains a model of the whole system, recursively. 
 
Recursion plays a key role in how Maturana and Varela understand cognition. The recursion 
of an observer observing themselves in relation to—and separate from—their environment, 
and in turn, observing that observation, is what produces self-consciousness (Maturana and 
Varela, 1979, p.29). This idea is also taken up by Beer’s Viable System Model in the way 
that a viable system must have a model of itself (Beer, 1985, p.116). The distinction between 
Beer’s viability and Muturana and Varela’s autopoiesis could then be thought of as a 
difference between maintenance and production. A viable system can, by definition, maintain 
itself and in doing so demonstrates effective management. Viable systems, however, do not 
necessarily produce themselves in the same way that a truly autopoietic system does (Varela 
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et al., 1974). They are synthetic rather than organic, put together—at least initially—and, as 
we shall see, are not necessarily fully closed in the way that an autopoietic organism is. Their 
variety—cybernetics’ measure of complexity or possible states—leaks into the systems in 
which they are embedded allowing and requiring metasystems to make regulatory 
interventions.  
 
I would argue, however, that the identity of a system can be understood as autopoietic 
because it does produce itself in situations where a system is able to recursively observe itself 
as being separate from other systems and from its environment. Autopoietic identity is an 
emergent property of specific types of viable systems. While questions over which systems 
are self-identifying and which require separation from their environment by an external 
observer are central to criticisms of autopoiesis (Hayles, 1999, p.146), I believe it is possible 
to say that systems which observe the viability of their own organisation, and use that 
representation to stabilise themselves internally and in relation to their environment, produce 
their own identity and therefore their autonomy. A viable system will stabilise itself while 
destabilising its environment but an environment—or in Beer’s language a metasystem—can 
be engineered to stabilise relations between the components that share it. While an 
engineered metasystem might not be able to be understood as self-making in a strict sense, to 
be viable, it must continuously self-make the identification of the stable relations between its 
components: what Maturana would call its organisation; though not necessarily its structure: 
the components themselves (Maturana and Varela, 1979, p.xx).  
 
The identification, or identity of the organisation, emerges through the processes of 
stabilisation and, because the interaction of complex systems is not predictable, cannot be 
said to have existed prior to that action or external to it itself. For this reason, autopoiesis is a 
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useful tool when understanding the effects of the removal of the possibility of critical 
reflection by algocracy described in section 2.2.2. The collapse of the distinction between 
user and environment that I identify not only removes the opportunities for spontaneous 
action but also the reflection that would reveal a separation from the environment and 
therefore an identity separate from it necessary to stabilise relations. Identification of the 
separation between an entity and its environment is necessary for both individuals and 
organisations to act independently and maintain their viability. The autopoietic emergence of 
identity from a viable system that is vital for its viability is inherent in Beer’s VSM. As I will 
argue in the next section, however, it is ‘syntegration’, a protocol for generating recursive, 
stabilising self-identification, that is most valuable when thinking about an institutional form 
capable of offering an alternative to the platform. 
 
3.2 — Viable models and simulations 
 
Stafford Beer’s Team Syntegrity protocol was developed as a counter to the technocracy that 
he saw as arising from the application of science and technology to government, in part a 
response to the problems we encountered when trying to implement the Viable System Model 
in the management of the Chilean economy through Project Cybersyn. A protocol for a self-
organising, non-hierarchical meeting, Team Syntegrity was proposed as a process for decision 
making within the VSM. It is also able to function independently for “normative, directional, 
and strategic planning — and other creative decision processes” (Beer and Editors, 2000). 
This next section details the working of the VSM, before briefly discussing its operation in 
Chile, and Beer’s ideas of both the democratic potential and technocratic dangers of the 
increasing use of information and computer technology in governance. It will then detail the 
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Team Syntegrity process, arguing that it should be understood as a development away from 
the cybernetic modelling of the VSM, towards a form of government-by-simulation. 
 
3.2.1 — Systems 1–5 
 
A more detailed outline of the details of the Viable System Model is useful in allowing us to 
place the syntegration process within Beer’s wider philosophy. The model is composed of 
five subsystems. As has already been stated, the viable system is recursive, meaning that 
viable systems are themselves made up of viable systems. System One are the embedded 
viable systems that produced the system, much like the cells of an organism or the bees of a 
hive or, at the scale Beer commonly uses, the divisions of corporation (Beer, 1985, p.140). 
System Two monitors and coordinates the inevitable conflicts that arise between multiple 
independent System Ones. Though System Ones are themselves independently viable, they 
require a mechanism by which their interactions can reach a state of homeostatic balance 
through coordination of their independent regulation. As Beer states, System Two’s “function 
is not to command”—that is to make decisions—“but to damp oscillations” in a way that 
allows System One the time to balance itself (Beer, 1985, p.68). Beer’s example of a System 
Two is a school timetable which prevents the double-booking of classrooms or a publisher’s 
style guide (Beer, 1985, p.77). System Two is authoritative because it codifies decisions 
made elsewhere and is effective because it requires only regular, but not constant, 




Figure 3. The VSM, Beer (1985, p.136). 
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While System Two allows the functional autonomy of System One, System Three does exert 
authority, managing the activities of the independent Systems Ones largely by providing 
resources in return for specified actions or outputs. While System Three is concerned with the 
internal functioning of the organisation, System Four looks outwards, engaging with the 
environment that contains all of the embedded Systems Ones’ environmental niches or 
‘micro-environments’ (Beer, 1985, p.109). It allows managed adaptation to a changing 
external environment through research and planning but also holds a representational model 
of the whole system. Here, then, is the idea Beer brought from Maturana and Varela. This 
recursive self-image is key to the self-awareness of a viable system (Beer, 1985, p.116). For 
this research, the key part of the VSM is this loop of information that Beer calls the ‘Three-
Four Homeostat’, the balancing regulation between the internally and externally focused 
systems. As Beer says: “The Three-Four homeostat is the organ of ADAPTATION for the 
enterprise” (Beer, 1985, p.120). The relationship between the ‘inside and now’ of System 
Three and the ‘outside and then’ of System Four is crucial for viability and is seen by Beer as 
a frequent cause of organisational problems (Beer, 1979b, p.255). In a viable system Systems 
Three and Four are equal and “accountable to each other” and do not filter or restrict each 
other’s operation (Beer, 1979b, p.252). Beer states that the best way to maintain the 
necessary information flow between Systems Three and Four is to have them communicate 
continuously, or ‘in real-time’, through an operations room, which was famously built in 
Chile, or a management centre, which Beer envisaged as a management ‘clubhouse’ (Beer, 
1979b, p.258).  
 
At every stage of the viable system, variety that cannot be absorbed at one level must be 
absorbed at the level up. Things that are undecidable, or conflicts that are unresolvable, must 
be dealt with by a metasystem (Beer, 1981, p.402). The final component of the VSM is 
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System Five, which Beer defines as ‘ethos’, which acts as a ‘variety sponge’ able to monitor, 
absorb and regulate possible states of the system that can’t be dealt with by the interactions of 
Systems Three and Four. It supplies ultimate authority and provides ‘logical closure’, defined 
as a self-referential process (Beer, 1981, p.260). This System Five is what Beer calls ‘the 
boss’ though this is not necessarily a single, defined person14. System Five could be a number 
of people, so long as they are organised in a way that absorbs the variety that Systems Three 
and Four cannot absorb themselves, making decisions that cannot be made by lower systems. 
System Three is in control of what the organisation actually does, the actual production that 
constitutes it, while System Four is what creates the understanding of the organisations role 
in a wider and longer-term context. System Five monitors the loop of information exchange 
between Systems Three and Four, ensuring the homeostatic maintenance of balance by 
closing any unresolvable conflicts.  
 
Though the Viable System Model does not seek to dispense with hierarchy completely, 
(Beer, 1985, p.91), it is a ‘bottom-up’ model of organisation that places primary importance 
on the production rather than the control of a system (Beer, 1981, p.254). Beer emphasises 
that while Systems Three-Four-Five (management) are logically superior to Systems One-
Two-Three (production) they are not more important. They are, however, able to make 
decisions that it is not possible to make at lower levels because of their access to information 
organised at a high level and, in this way, can be understood of as a platform, with the 
System Ones as users.  
 
 
14 When Beer showed the VSM to president Salvador Allende, expecting him to identify himself as System 
Five, Allende instead recognised it as ‘the people’ (Medina, 2011, p.75). 
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Allowing the self-organisation of parts in System One reduces the need for hierarchical 
control. Beer defines authoritarianism as the distribution of regulatory variety between direct 
command and other forms of systemic regulation (Beer, 1985, p.101), in effect this asks 
whether the purpose or identity of a system flows upwards from the purposes and identities of 
its component parts, or whether it is decided and enforced by centralised commands. Beer 
states that there is an inevitable compromise between purpose from above and purpose from 
below but that the democratic or authoritarian nature of a system can be determined by which 
takes precedence (Beer, 1985, p.100).  
 
All sub-systems are vital to the viability of the system and to the maintenance of its identity. 
A system’s identity is what it does, what happens at the level of System One. However, what 
it does is only recognised, by itself as itself, by the closure provided by System Five. The 
embedded viable systems should, by definition, be able to function independently, while the 
control systems should not (Beer, 1981, p.338). A self-preserving bureaucracy is detrimental 
to the variety of the system as a whole, as it is the adaptability of control systems that allow 
for systemic stability. What the hierarchical or vertical components of a system do is 
maintain the identity of the system both internally and to the outside world. Embedded 
components need not be aware of their participation in the higher level system. As Hayles 
describes, independent parts only require unification when parts come into conflict, with 
consciousness emerging “as an epiphenomenon whose role it is to tell a coherent story about 
what is happening” even though that story is unlikely to be true (Hayles, 1999, p.157). For 
Beer, this System Five consciousness is necessary for the maintenance of viability through its 




Questions of exactly how these relations, coherences and identities get formed are, then, of 
clear ethical and political importance when considering the application of Beer’s ideas to the 
development of an institutional form that offers an alternative to the platform. The next 
section will look in more detail at Beer’s proposals for an cybernetic approach designed to 
minimise authoritarianism and maximise freedom. I will argue that in doing this the Team 
Syntegrity protocol also maximises credibility, creativity and subjectivisation that are denied 
by the centralised, authoritarian platform model and administered through algocracy.  
 
3.2.2 — Against authoritarianism 
 
If the fundamental purpose of a viable system is its own survival, then any system that’s 
purpose is purely the survival of a higher level system, and not its own survival, would cease 
to be independently viable. To use Maturana’s terms, it would be allopoietic rather than 
autopoietic, having “as the product of their functioning something different from themselves” 
(Maturana and Varela, 1979, p.80). An authoritarian system subsumes all components to its 
own survival, undermining or erasing the identities of its component parts, while a system 
that gives no purpose to its components does not have its own higher level identity. Beer 
sought to maximise individual freedom through designing stable systems. He does, however, 
make a point of acknowledging that individual freedom is always constrained by the systems 
in which they exist. The increased efficiency of social control that his ideas aim towards 
threaten freedom but a properly designed system can mitigate this threat. Inefficiency, which 
leads to unstable and failing social institutions, is also identified by Beer as a threat to the 




Beer's vision of a viable system as a “blend of central and peripheral command” is based on 
his vision of the human nervous system. For Beer, there is a balancing point between 
centralisation and decentralisation that allows for viability (Beer, 1995, p.428). His work in 
Chile attempted to devolve power as much as possible while still maintaining forms of 
control that would keep the system viable as a whole. For Beer, this meant not only 
“furnishing them and their governments with new channels of communication” but also “a 
new kind of educational system and a new kind of publishing system” (Beer, 1974, p.65). 
Beer’s vision of the applicability of cybernetics to national and international government, 
rather than just business and industry, led to allegations not simply of technocracy, but also 
that his ideas were in the service of totalitarianism. Cybernetics, as the “the science of control 
and communication” (Beer, 1974, p.13) or even as the science of “effective organisation”, 
(Beer, 1995, p.425), was seen as a threat to individual freedom (Medina, 2011, p.173). Beer 
insisted that this was a misunderstanding of what control meant within cybernetics, where it 
is understood as the systems of regulation that maintain stability (Beer, 1974, p.88), noting 
that it was “perhaps more alarming that private concerns are able to build systems of this 
type, without anyone's even knowing about their existence, than that democratically elected 
governments should build them in open view and with legal safeguards” (Beer, 1974, p.34).  
 
As Eden Medina notes in Cybernetic Revolutionaries (2011), her comprehensive history of 
Project Cybersyn, while the technical innovations of Beer’s project were put to use—most 
notably the use of a telex machines to share information, helping to overcome the blockades 
during the October 1972 truck driver’s strike (Medina, 2011, p.149)—his attempts at 
devolving decision making to lower levels of nationalised industry were less successful. Beer 
expressed fears that, while the reorganisation of existing technical infrastructure was 
successful in achieving certain technocratic aims, the goal of effecting a change in the 
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organisation of the economy and society was undermined by a lack of political, and it would 
seem cybernetic, commitment. The ‘professional’ staff that made up the team working on 
Project Cybersyn were happy to be working on tools for more effective, technocratic 
management, but were less successful in implementing those tools in a way that allowed for 
the self-management that system-viability required (Medina, 2011, pp.194–5). This, I would 
argue, is an example of a failures caused by systemic change being imposed from the outside, 
rather than self-organising around a material infrastructure and protocol. As was discussed in 
section 1.3.3, the embedding of organisation forms in infrastructure and protocol is key to a 
complex hegemony. External re-organisation is also, of course, more authoritarian by Beer’s 
metric than self-organisation even if, as I have argued is the case for platforms, control based 
on embedded qualities and characteristics does not necessarily maximise freedom.  
 
What is needed for an institutional form that offers an alternative to the platform and 
algocracy is exactly that it is bottom up self-organising, built from already viable System 
Ones that are themselves built of viable components. This approach, inherent in Beers own 
theory, makes clear why the reorganisation of a country’s economy was undermined by this 
contradiction. It does, however, suggest a much more optimistic attitude to large-scale 
institutional change. Changes to organisation must first happen at the smallest scale, 
establishing autonomous and viable organisations, and then the systems that allow them to 
interact in an environment engineered to avoid mutually destabilisation. The next section will 
look in more detail at Team Syntegrity, arguing that it is precisely this process that allows 




3.2.3 — Team Syntegrity 
 
The iconic operations room of Project Cybersyn aimed to provide a location for the rapid 
transfer of high quality information between those concerned with the internal operation of an 
organisation—System Three—and those concerned with its external and future 
relationships—System Four. This ‘Three-Four homeostasis’ that kept internal and external 
concerns in balance was drawn on Beer’s VSM diagram as two thick black arrows. The 
operations room, as Beer envisaged it, was not simply a space for managers or government 
ministers, but also where workers could be included in the decision making process (Medina, 
2011, p.179).  
 
Figure 4. Systems 3-4-5, Beer (1985, p.129). Note the black lines of homeostatic balance between 3 
and 4 and red lines of the System 5 auditing this process. 
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Beer’s attempt to define, refine and generalise the flow of information of the Three-Four 
homeostat of the operations room came in the development of Team Syntegrity (Beer and 
Editors, 2000). Beer had been exploring non-hierarchical organisational structures since the 
1950s (Beer, 1994a, p.4) and he began work on Team Syntegrity in the 1990s as a way to 
balance the tensions between the internal, present focused, and external, future focused 
components of the VSM. Team Syntegrity is a protocol for non-hierarchical discussion that 
seeks to formalise the efficiency of informal discussion with the aim of shared interpretations 
of information, group cohesion and democratic decision making. The protocol organises a 
group of 30 participants into overlapping groups and roles in a configuration inspired by 
Richard Buckminster Fuller’s geometry, leading to logical closure that can be connected to 
Maturana’s conception of the closed nervous system. Team Syntegrity is, at its core, a 
complex protocol for a meeting, one which allows non-hierarchical discussion, unconstrained 
by pre-existing power relations, specialisms and categorisations as possible. Importantly, it is 
a meeting without an agenda for, as Beer argues, “if a meeting sets out with agenda, it has 
structured the whole outcome in advance” (Beer, 1994, p.8).15  
 
Beer saw shared interpretation of data—with the act of interpretation transforming data into 
information—as the key to creating purposeful individuals and, as a result, group cohesion. 
While working in Chile, Beer proposed this as a cybernetic model of class-consciousness in 
which a lack of information, or the active disruption of a shared interpretation, prevents class 
solidarity. He saw, however, the revolutionary potential of ‘infosets’ that is, groups that form 
a shared purpose around a shared interpretation of information (Beer, 1994, p.10). Beer’s 
 
15 The protocol for a Team Syntegrity starts by generating its own agenda. This process, which Beer terms the 
‘problem jostle’ was used by Beer at the 1979 meeting of the Society for General Systems Research. 
Participatory agenda setting is a common technique used in the ‘unconference’ developed by Sara Winge, which 
draws on the Open Space methods developed around the same time as Beer’s method by Harrison Owen 
(O’Reilly, 2018)—both of which aimed to stimulate informal exchanges of ideas that were usually relegated to 
the fringes of formal meetings and conferences (Leonard, 2008) 
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attempt to translate the Marxism of the Allende government into cybernetic terms led him in 
a similar direction to the post-Marxist anti-essentialism of Laclau and Mouffe discussed in 
Chapter 1, where a group can be identified by their ‘informational characteristics’ rather than 
material conditions. Exploitation of one group by another, which Beer saw as based on a 
deprivation of information leading to deprivation of the choice of selection that comes from 
receiving information, can be understood as similar to Mouffe’s argument that collective 
identity comes from being able to choose “between real alternatives” (Mouffe, 1999, p.756).16 
 
Beer’s aim was to create a group dynamic that conformed to Richard Buckminster Fuller’s 
theory of tensional integrity exemplified by the tensegral icosahedron, balancing compressive 
forces of a group dynamic, which might bring about consensus, with tensions that will 
generate discussion.17 Beer saw the tensile integrity, or cohesion, of the group as engendering 
a form of logical closure that can be understood as similar to the closure of the nervous 
system as described by Maturana (1979). Information can perturb the closed system, and that 
perturbation will elicit a response, but there are no inputs or outputs, nothing enters or exits 
the system. Beer describes his choice of the size and shape of the Syntegrity group as being 
based on experience rather than derived from theory and the limitations this sets as arbitrary 
(Beer, 1994a, p.15). Team Syntegrity arranges 30 participants into 12 groups of five, with 
each participant a member of two groups and a critic of a further two. These limitations 
reduce the variety of the system—its number of possible states—to what Beer deemed a 
 
16 This is what we would today understand as identity politics, a term coined by Black feminists in the 1970s to 
describe political solidarity that results from shared experiences other than capitalist exploitation (Combahee 
River Collective, 1983). I would argue that, in second-wave cybernetics, the equivalence of lived experience 
and information becomes evident. 
17 It should be noted that Team Syntegrity’s icosahedron might have been inspired by Buckminster Fuller’s, but 
it is not in fact an example of tensegrity as Beer suggests (Beer, 1994, p.13). Its stability is a result of every edge 
having both compressive and tensile strength, keeping the triangular faces ridged. True Tensegrity requires each 
strut to provide either compressive or tensile forces (Tomkins, 2008). Beers icosahedron requires 30 external 




manageable level (Beer, 1994, p.17) and the regular structure of the icosahedron removes any 
privileged position of centrality with regard to information with no participant more central 
or peripheral than any other.   
 
The protocol outlined by Beer in Beyond Dispute (1994) details how the 30 participants and 
four facilitators should collect possible topics of discussion in the format of statements that 
must be contestable such that their inverse is also valid18. Topics are then reduced, first by 
discussion and consolidation, and then by a system of dot-voting to establish 12 topics which 
are arranged as nodes on the icosahedron known as the ‘problem jostle’. Participants must 
then choose which two topics they want to discuss, within the limitations that a group may 
only have five members, and the two topics must be adjacent on the icosahedron, a phase 
called the ‘topic auction’. This can be done either through a process of negotiation or, as in 
later iterations of Team Syntegrity, through a process delegated to an algorithm that searches 
for the mathematically optimal arrangement based on a further round of voting (Hancock, 
1994). Once the group has been arranged, a series of group meetings takes place. The shape 
of the group allows two meetings to take place simultaneously, with five members and five 
critics participating in each. Members discuss for 30 minutes, followed by 10 minutes in 
which critics can respond, with the aim of producing a final statement. Six of these 40 minute 
sessions allow each group to meet once. This four hour meeting process is repeated at least 
three times, each time aiming to produce an improved final statement. This aims to create 
what Beer calls ‘reverberations’ where the direct and indirect contact between groups and 
participants create shared interpretations and understandings, and therefore a coherent group 
identity, even when there is no direct contact between participants (Beer, 1994a, p.14). 
 
18 “Test for detecting motherhood statements: negate the statement, which must still be debatable. 'God exists' 
becomes 'There is no God': keep it in (men have died over less). 'We should do all within our power, and take 




Team Syntegrity is a method for allowing high quality information exchange between a fixed 
group of equal participants that allows discussions to be rapidly advanced. Decisions among 
a non-hierarchical group must be based on agreement and this is emphasised by Beer’s 
description of the process where participants should sign statements made by groups that they 
endorse. I would suggest, however, that the network of members and critics that the protocol 
constructs is less about consensus—for example critics don’t have to agree with a groups 
decision—and more about preventing one group's action from destabilising the other. Like 
with the VSM, the purpose is to dampen oscillations. The synergy that Team Syntegrtiy aims 
for is less about having everyone in agreement and more about having all decisions 
compatible with each other. Limiting discussion of a topic to five participants and five critical 
observers in effect creates a tiny, temporary ‘epistemic community’ of the kind that O’Dwyer 
sees as being designed out of algocracy and which, as argued in section 2.1.2, are a key 
characteristic required of an alternative institutional form to the platform. These groups, then, 
are micro-elites, able to make decisions due to superior access to information about their 
given topic but doing so transparently, in full view of an equal number of critical observers. 
The highly informed yet transparent character of this process is what gives the outcome 
legitimacy, making decisions credible.  
 
 




While the Viable System Model is, of course, a model19—useful for diagnosing problems in 
the flow of information within a system and designing the amplifiers, attenuators and 
channels of variety that Beer saw as vital to viability—I wish to make the case that Team 
Syntegrity moves beyond this to operate not simply as a model but as a simulation. For Beer, 
the model is separate from the system that it represents. This specifically allows for 
experimentation with the model that will not affect the system itself, with conclusions drawn 
from manipulation of the model then applied to the system (Beer, 1995, pp.87–8). Beer’s 
VSM, and the Cyberstride software developed for its implementation in Chile, was intended 
as a tool to test possible changes to inputs and outputs of the system it modelled. I wish to 
argue, however, that Team Syntegrity displays similar characteristics to platforms and 
algocracy in that it operates by simulation. Team Syntegrity does not simply precede but 
generates the system it describes, with the properties of democratic information exchange that 
emerge from it embedded into its design. The abstract geometry of the protocol constructs a 
reality in its image; the virtual generating the actual. As such, it is less that the shape of the 
icosahedron represents the network of connection between participants, rather the 
icosahedron is formed from those connections, structuring reality in much the same way as 
the algocratic platforms already examined. A different protocol, with a different geometry, 
would produce a different network and different outcomes. It is the inseparability of abstract 
process and concrete results that means Team Syntegrity operates as a simulation and this, as 
we shall see in the final chapters of this thesis, is what gives it the potential to structure a 
different kind of institution.  
 
In the next chapter I will argue two things. Firstly, that beyond being a component of a viable 
system, the Team Syntegrity protocol and modifications of it have the potential to structure a 
 
19 The VSM diagram was permanently on display in the Project Cybersyn operations room. 
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system that is itself viable—in that it can self-organise to persistently produce its own 
identity—and secondly, that Beer’s Team Syntegrity protocol has the properties that allow it 





Chapter 4 — Syntegration in practice 
  
Team Syntegrity has been used in a number of contexts since Beer published the protocol in 
1995—most notably by management consultant companies Malik Management in 
Switzerland and Syntegrity in Canada—and has been developed and adapted for a number of 
purposes, from consultancy to conferences (Metaphorum 2019, 2019) to performance 
(Community in Progress II: Syntegrity, 2015) to fashion collaboration (Izeogu, 2018), with 
variations in process, group-size and duration. In this chapter I will argue that the Team 
Syntegrity protocol can be used to construct a viable system as described by Stafford Beer’s 
VSM, but one in which its hierarchical functions do not require hierarchical roles. The 
implication of this is that syntegration is not limited in its application to fixed, time-limited 
meetings—as was Beer’s intention for Team Syntegrity’s role within the VSM—but can 
function as the structure for ongoing, viable institutions and organisation. It can therefore be 
the basis for an alternative institutional form to the platform, breaking with the platform-user 
relation and an algocratic regime of opacity, visibility, prediction and categorisation, and 
instead embedding characteristics of credibility, creativity, and subjectivisation. If the 
purpose—the ‘what it does’—of a system can self-organise around the purpose, intentions, 
needs and desires of the participants—allowing them to recognise the system’s purpose as 
their own—the result will be a non-authoritarian, bottom-up relation between an institution 
and the people that comprise it. 
  
Following this I will look at an implementation of the Team Syntegrity protocol facilitated by 
Malik Management for the political website openDemocracy in June 2017, analysing 
participant responses for evidence that syntegration embeds characteristics around which an 
alternative institutional form can self-organise. Next, I will describe four experimental uses 
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of aspects of Team Syntegrity—which I will refer to generally as ‘syntegrations’—in art 
institutional and art educational context, conducted by myself between 2015 and 2019, 
aiming to go beyond the discursive decision making for which Team Syntegrity was intended, 
towards institution building and collaborative artistic practice. 
  
4.1 — Viable syntegrations 
  
The assessment of and experimentation with Team Syntegrity detailed in this chapter 
demonstrate a number of characteristics central to the argument of this thesis. While direct 
comparisons between the process of syntegration and the characteristics of the platform 
detailed in Chapter 1 and algocracy detailed in Chapter 2 will be made in the conclusion, I 
wish to first discuss in more detail the relationship of syntegration to Beer’s VSM outlined in 
Chapter 3. Central to this will be the question of whether a group organised through the Team 
Syntegrity protocol can itself be understood as a viable system or whether it should rather be 
seen, in the way that Beer suggested, as merely a component part of a viable system, 
regulating the balance between the externally, future-focused and internally, present-focused 
parts of a viable organisation. This means either agreeing with Beer’s view that hierarchical 
components are necessary for a viable system or, drawing on Laurence Rassel’s ideas 
(Rassel, 2018), seeing the Team Syntegrity protocol as allowing the separation of hierarchical 
roles from their hierarchical functions. 
  
The VSM, as already stated, is based upon the human nervous system. It has functionally 
autonomous organs in System One, connected by a spinal command system and other 
regulatory systems (System Two) to a ‘brain’ consisting of System Three. This then co-
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ordinates internal activities by providing resource inputs in return for agreed outputs for 
System Four, which co-ordinates the systems responses to external, environmental changes. 
System Five provides ‘logical closure’, a sense of identity, and can intervene directly and 
with authority to resolve problems or conflicts that lower systems do not have the variety—
that is complexity or, rather, latitude for action—to deal with themselves. Beer saw Team 
Syntegrity as suitable for managing the inevitable conflicts that would arise between the 
“outside-and-then” and the “inside-and-now” of Systems Three and Four (Beer, 1985, p.111) 
because it allowed constant, rich information flow of the type that, in Easterling’s view, can 
help to reduce conflict (Easterling, 2018, p.16). In order to assess whether the Team 
Syntegrity protocol is sufficient to make it a viable system in itself, however, it must be 
shown if it also possesses the other properties and functions that make up the VSM and its 
five sub-systems.  
 
System One of the VSM is the independent organs, departments or functions of the system as 
a whole. The 12 groups in a syntegration—tasked with developing separate statements or, in 
some of my own practice-based research, separate artistic outcomes—can be clearly mapped 
onto the VSM’s System One. Each could exist independently and each contributes to the 
overall functioning and purpose of the whole. System Two of the VSM, which regulates and 
co-ordinates the interactions of System One, can be found in the protocol itself, the timetable 
of set meeting lengths and timings, ensuring that no participant needs to be in two places at 
once. System Two, however, has other regulatory functions beyond timetabling. Beer 
describes it as the “anti-oscillatory device for System One” (Beer, 1985, p.66), reducing the 
destabilisation between components so that the viable system can more easily reach a stable 
state. This, then, is the role performed by Team Syntegrity’s critics. The five critics that 
observe, intervening where necessary, and participate in a group discussion or working have 
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knowledge of the other groups necessary to prevent actions that would bring two groups into 
conflict. Like System Two, the critics role is “not to command, but to damp oscillations” 
(Beer, 1985, p.68) reducing the variety that would proliferate in completely independent 
systems, making them unable to be connected as a coherent whole. In the VSM, System Two 
is vertical, following rules agreed at the higher level of the organisation. As will be evidenced 
from the analysis of the openDemocracy syntegration, the methods of how to be a critic were 
not pre-defined or given as part of the protocol, but rather learned by participants as of the 
process of criticising and being criticised. These learned behaviours were then able to be 
distributed themselves across the system, dispensing with the need to have System Two set 
by ‘senior management’ as in the hierarchy of the VSM. 
  
Alongside System Two, the VSM includes five other vertical axis with which activities of the 
organisation are co-ordinated. The agreed inputs and outputs, or budgeting, between 
management and System One, the authoritative commands that hierarchical management can 
make, the connections that happen autonomously between component parts through both 
their functioning and their overlapping connections in the environment plus the ‘audit 
function’ that Beer calls ‘System Three*’ which can allow periodic, direct observation and 
intervention by management in inner workings on the component systems (Beer, 1985, p.84). 
Less important than whether these specific separate roles exist in Team Syntegrity—Beer saw 
the VSM as a sufficient model for all viable systems including, implicitly, biological ones—
is whether their function can be identified. Key here is Beer’s assertion, following the law of 
requisite variety, that the variety of the six vertical channels must match and absorb the 
variety generated by System One. Syntegration, in order to be viable, must be able to self-
manage its own variety. For this, the geometric balancing of the Team Syntegrity protocol is 
key. Participants’ multiple roles, not just as critics but also as members of one other group, do 
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not just ensure that information is efficiently distributed across the system, it also means that 
channels connecting parts are the participants themselves. There is no chance that a channel 
can be overwhelmed or unable to ‘transduce’ the information from one group to another. 
Because of the equal distribution of information, intended to prevent the emergence of a 
single System Three role that can observe, command or intervene in every System One sub-
group, the function of absorbing variety must be distributed to every participant. Groups are 
equally matched on a 1:1 scale by critics, but they are also matched by the participants' 
membership of other groups. 
  
The ‘Three-Four-Five’ part of a viable system is seen by Beer as logically superior to, rather 
than more important than, the system ‘One-Two-Three’ just described. It is a metasystem, 
managing things are undecidable at the lower level because connections and interactions are 
not visible or comprehensible. Explicitly eliminating a logically superior position in the 
system for any individual, the question becomes whether Team Syntegrity is able to produce 
its own metasystem as a group. In my view, this is precisely the goal of syntegration, the 
synergy that ‘reverberates’ around the network, made possible by the non-hierarchical 
closure of the three-dimensional shape in which the network is structured (Beer, 1994a, p.14). 
The capacity for a metasystem, or higher-order organisation, to emerge from the 
interconnection of the lower-order systems is dependent on the recursive nature of the VSM. 
System One—in the case of Team Syntegrity the 12 groups discussing and developing 
statements—must themselves be independent, viable systems, performing all the functions 
thus far described. These subgroups are, of course, made up of people, inherently viable in 
themselves. The subgroups all have connections to the environment, the context in which 
their discussion is taking place. The network structure of a syntegration allows these 
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separated environmental connections—themselves drawn from the connections of each 
participant—to be aggregated into a whole that produces System Four.  
 
In the VSM, System Four contains the model of the system in relation to its environment that 
allows for critical self-reflection. In Team Syntegrity this model cannot be contained in one 
place because no position in the network allows a full, external view. Instead, the model must 
be distributed across the network, again operating at a 1:1 scale, with exactly the result 
described in section 3.2.4, the model becomes a simulation, where actions in the system and 
actions in its representation are not separable. This, I will argue later in this chapter, was 
evident in my own experiments working the group Reading and Thinging. Through the 
process of discussion and critical reflection, a more coherent sense of the groups institutional 
and social context—previously fragmented and held by specific individuals— emerged, 
evening out some of the power imbalances that had existed, almost unnoticed, in the group 
before.  
  
System Five emerges with the group identity that is, in some ways, the whole purpose of the 
syntegration process. Beer describes how the authoritarian character of a system can be 
determined by the extent to which the purpose of the system is determined top-down, by 
System Five, or bottom-up, by System One. Team Syntegrity—envisioned as a perfect 
democracy—must therefore aim to be entirely bottom-up. The group's purpose must come 
from the topics chosen and defined by the subgroups, with the purpose not pre-defined or 
guided, but emerging through a process of autopoiesis. It is the recognition of this purpose as 
being one’s own purpose that allows for the emergence of group identity. As I will argue 
towards the end of this chapter, the final, collective performance of the collaborative project 
 126 
 
How to build a platform expressed a common purpose that was recognised by participants as 
being their own, both individually and as a group, with ownership being held in common. 
  
  
4.2 — openDemocracy syntegration 
  
The openDemocracy syntegration that took place in Barcelona, Spain over four days in June 
2017, addressed the question “In the context of several major interconnected global crises, 
how can civil society help to renew our democracies to rise to the challenge?” (Team 
Syntegrity, 2017) The event brought together thirty participants made up of academics, 
elected politicians, poets, theatre-makers and community organisers from across Europe, as 
well as New Zealand, Canada and Chile, who discussed topics ranging across religion, the 
environment, education, communication and parenting (Bechler and Sakalis, 2017). In this 
section, I will examine the openDemocracy event, in order to identify the processes and 
mechanisms that suggest Team Syntegrity to provided the basis for an institutional form. To 
do this I will draw on extensive published documentation of the event: an observer’s report 
produced following the event (Milesi, 2017); an organiser’s diary written during it (Bechler, 
2017); thirteen filmed interviews with participants during the event and four reflective essays 
published after (Pedro-Carañana, 2017; Purdy, 2017; Wiśniewska, 2017; Ishkanian, 2018). 
  
This appraisal firstly looks at the responses of participants, observers and organisers to the 
operation of the Team Syntegrity protocol, showing that it was seen as particularly relevant to 
a society shaped by technologically mediated communication. It will then assess whether it is 
an effective process for learning the skills needed to successfully participate, arguing that 
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these skills are also needed for a viable institutional form that can serve as an alternative to 
the platform. Finally, it will detail aspects of the process that are less obviously foregrounded 
in the existing literature on the use of Team Syntegrity—namely its affective dimension—and 








 4.2.1 — Effectiveness 
  
There were overwhelmingly positive responses by participants to the Team Syntegrity 
process and the outcomes that the meeting produced. Joan Pedro-Carañana regards the 
protocol as allowing for “constructive and efficient dialogue and decision-making”. He 
describes the process as foregrounding “the principles of cooperation, mutual trust and 
support, free sharing and empathy” but also competition “that allowed us to question, criticise 
and contrast ideas” within and between groups, an demonstration of the ‘compressive’ and 
‘tensile’ forces that Beer describes. The structure of the group membership made it possible 
“to integrate bilateral learnings”, moving ideas from one group to another (Pedro-Carañana, 
2017). Rather than ensuring “agreement, decision-making and implementation” Cecilia 
Milesi sees the process as having “stimulated the joint creation of invisible and incremental 
results” and considers that the observed openness of participants to changing their positions 
could have been encouraged “by the fact that there was no agenda or pre-conceived 
objectives imposed upon them”. For her, the “methodological freedom was central to 
avoiding resistance, decreasing confrontation and multiplying the opportunities for 
innovation” (Milesi, 2017). David Stefanoski praises the way the structure “let the 
participants create the process” with facilitators only regulating time and technical matters 
(Stefanoski 1, 2017). Milesi suggests that the hands-off facilitation, while initially 
disorientating for participants, resulted in a shared responsibility for processes and 
empowered participants and groups to set their own rules about how discussions and 
communication can be organised. This, she felt, made groups more assertive, a view that 
organiser Rosemary Bechler and participant Rebecca Fitzgerald agree with (Bechler, 2017; 
Milesi, 2017; Fitzgerald 1, 2017). For Kate Farrell and Magdalena Malińska, the process 
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helped people to think collectively about things that are impossible to think through 
individually (Farrell 1, 2017; Magda 1, 2017). 
  
Bechler’s reflections on the process suggest that participants in the 2017 syntegration seemed 
more individualistic and “less used to collective decision-making” than was her experience 
when working with the protocol in the 1990s. Milesi sees value in creating the space and time 
for participants to practice self-organising, which she understands as working against the 
situation where lives as “monitored, censored, controlled, surveilled, manipulated, structured, 
serialised and thoroughly determined” by external and ‘distant’ institutions (Milesi, 2017). 
Farrell notes how often the internet came up in discussions and how the internet is changing 
people's relationships to the public and their understanding of the public and political 
subjectivity (Farrell 1, 2017). For this reason, Milesi sees the process as "a tool, among many 
others, helpful to reinvigorate citizens’ ability to maintain rich, necessary and difficult 
conversations” in opposition to “technology-mediated participation and/or off-line 
mobilisations with limited objectives”. She sees balancing objective based activity and higher 
levels of general engagement as important to re-invigorating democracies and organisation, 
suggesting that “people have become more alert to their need for rapid and comprehensive 
meaning formation, but much less sure that it is possible, and correspondingly more delighted 
to welcome every bit of evidence to the contrary, and moreover to celebrate their own 
contribution to this effect”. The result was that “everyone enjoyed sharing responsibility for 
the joint outputs and everyone felt a powerful co-creator of the final outputs and lessons 
gained together” (Milesi, 2017). I would argue that these responses show evidence that the 
syntegration acts as a process of group learning and self-organisation which allows for 
collective and subjective meaning-making and the emergence of a group purpose that flows 
from, and is organised by, the participants themselves, rather than from top-down, 
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authoritarian control. This is exactly what Rouvroy identifies as missing from the 
technologically-mediated interactions of the platform detailed in section 2.2.1. 
  
Bechler notes the importance of the first stage of discussions in which the topics are defined 
because “Getting people used to the hard work of formulating a subject for discussion is a 
useful precursor to the skills involved in formulating their conclusions at each subsequent 
stage” (Bechler, 2017). Describing it as an "experiential-learning protocol” Milesi sees it as a 
way to teach and learn “collaborative leadership skills” (Milesi, 2017). Malińska notes how 
leadership emerges from the groups in different times and different ways (Magda 1, 2017). 
David Stefanoski recounts how discussions developed from ‘speeches’ to ‘conversation’ 
which allowed for more to be achieved, and sees this as proof of participants gaining 
knowledge as the process proceeds (Stefanoski 1, 2017). Pedro-Carañana sees the dialogue 
that the process allows for as not about persuasion but rather about giving everyone the tools 
and opportunities to express themselves. He notes that listening is “something we’re not 
really trained to do” but that instead it was a skill that improved through the process with the 
help of facilitators (Pedro 1, 2017). Milesi also observed critics learning to be critics, which 
she characterises as “taking care of the conversation" rather than participating in it. Bechler 
and Allenna Leonard both noted that the critics were unsure of their role at the beginning of 
the session but Bechler recounts that Leonard suggested a cautious approach to directing 
participants, in order to allow for precisely this learning process (Bechler, 2017).  
 
Participant reflections show they experience Team Syntegrity as a process of learning the 
skills that are needed to make that process successful. This is further evidence for its 
embedded characteristics around which the process self-organises and suggests it would be 
valuable for a bottom-up process of institution building. Ishkanian wonders if it would be 
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possible to “sustain the discussions, connections, and momentum” beyond such organised 
events and conferences and asks how we can have “co-produced, collaborative projects or 
meeting points and connections in our real/daily lives” (Ishkanian, 2018) making the case for 
the need for exactly the kind of persistent institution this research aims to develop. Evidence 
that this is possible comes from the participants’ reflections. For Milesi "the methodology 
was an exercise in learning what democracy may look like if we focus on caring for groups’ 
and peoples’ needs, using basic dialogical skills as the pre-condition to creating a people-
centred political project" (Milesi, 2017) while for Pedro-Carañana the result was “a real 
demonstration that other forms of life and sociability are not only desirable but also possible” 
(Pedro-Carañana, 2017). 
  
4.2.2 — Criticisms 
  
There were a number of criticisms of the use of an automated, algorithmic process of 
assigning group membership. Milesi questions the use of the algorithm to make decisions 
about group formation and instead suggests using random allocation to “ensure the creation 
of groups which promote mutual learning and collaborative thinking” (Milesi, 2017). While 
there might be some time efficiency in the delegation of the sorting to technology20, it seems 
to run counter to the power of Team Syntegrity as a tool for learning how to self-organise. 
Milesi’s suggestion of a random allocation, though itself a form of algocratic organisation, 
has the benefit of being fully transparent. Bechler notes that the algorithmic allocations 
should have been better supervised by the organisers, correcting problems early on that could 
 
20 While analysis by Josephine Hancock suggests improved satisfaction from the use of the algorithm she 
designed to allocate members to groups (Hancock, 1994), the impossibility of a direct comparison with different 
methods on the same group makes this difficult to evidence without very large datasets. 
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have prevented a number of participant frustrations. While Bechler’s suggestion—‘human 
on-the-loop’ oversight of the automated process as described in section 2.1.2—could correct 
the observed problems, the discursive process of grouping participants outlined by Beer in 
the early chapters of Beyond Dispute (1994a), called the ‘topic auction’, might in fact be 
more appropriate if syntegrity is viewed as a learning process rather than an out being 
outcome-focused. 
  
Criticisms were also made that the process encouraged too broad a range of topics (Birgitta 1, 
2017; Stefanoski 1, 2017; Valenta 1, 2017; Weatherhead 1, 2017). While Morris praised the 
range of topics, backgrounds, knowledge and experiences in the group, he questions how 
deep it was possible to get into these broadly defined topics in the limited time available 
(Morris 1, 2017) while Richard Bartlett was critical of the protocol’s demand for a 
“premature convergence” (Bartlett 1, 2017). I would argue that participants’ criticism of the 
predetermined time-limit is further evidence for Team Syntegrity’s suitability for structuring 
an ongoing, institutional process rather than simply a fixed-duration event. Valenta also felt 
there was a tension between the democratic nature of the discussions and the undemocratic 
way that the rules of the protocol were not up for discussion, particularly as there were no 
mechanisms for criticisms of the process to be worked into the process itself. This incited 
resistance in some of the participants whose “commitment to democracy” was the reason for 
them being there (Valenta 1, 2017). Alongside this, she felt it was important to preserve the 
downtimes between discussions and that simply allowing discussions to eat into participants 
off-time world not improve the process. 
  
Several participants noted the narrow range of the participants’ backgrounds (Milesi, 2017; 
Farrell 1, 2017; Pedro 1, 2017), with overly abstract discussion and an emphasis on written 
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outcome excluding participants with less experience of formal written English. For Milesi, it 
was important that “groups were not divided by ‘expertise’ in one topic or the other” and no-
one was categorised by their knowledge or experience. She noted that different approaches 
were taken to dealing with these experience gaps, from finding common ground, to working 
to understand the particularities of these differences building “the capacity to exchange ideas 
and commitments beyond differences allows for an inter-group/ideas exchange that re-
humanizes and values ‘multiple others’” (Milesi, 2017). This, I would suggest, is evidence 
that for the Team Syntegrity process to be successful, it must build epistemic communities 
through a process of inclusion of different types of knowledge and experience, actively 
working against the categorisation and segmentation that algocracy and the platform 
promote. These inclusive epistemic communities are then capable of conferring legitimacy on 
the decisions that result from the process (Bartlett 1, 2017; Ullah 1, 2017). However, as 
argued in section 1.2.4, legitimate decisions only become credible when combined with the 
power to act. Protocol alone is also not enough to eliminate pre-existing structural 
inequalities, a point already made by critics of Habermasian discursive democracy (Fraser, 
1990; Mouffe, 1999; Dean, 2003). Other ways of preventing relationships of domination 
from emerging need to be employed in ways that are specific to the situation and 
circumstances of the participants, whether that be language barriers, care responsibilities or 
prior experience in the methods that the group is working with. 
  
4.2.3 — Lessons 
 
A key idea that emerges from participant feedback is the emotional and affective forms of 
communication that Team Syntregrity encourages and requires. White sees the process 
allowing participants to connect in a human, emotional and values-based way (White 1, 
 134 
 
2017). Pedro-Carañana sees the process as allowing participants to use both rational and 
affective faculties (Pedro-Carañana, 2017). Weatherhead notes that it is not just an 
intellectual process but that participants were “trying to feel our way to a solution”. For Aya 
Haidar, the process invited people to communicate intimate and personal information (Haidar 
1, 2017) and Milesi sees the process as opening “an important space for sharing personal 
stories”. While there will be greater discussion in the concluding chapter about the 
emergence of group identity through the syntegration process, the affective component of the 
Team Syntegrity—allowing participants to connect emotionally as well as intellectually—is, I 
would argue, a key part of its capacity for subjectivisation. 
  
Valenta notes that off-time between discussions was not adequately protected in the 
Barcelona event (Valenta 1, 2017). Having a proportion of the group not active in discussion 
at any one time allows other important roles, for example childcare, to be shared. This 
happened in the Barcelona event, though it was spontaneous self-organisation, rather than 
planning, which allowed this to happen (Haidar 1, 2017). I would argue that thinking about 
different capacities to be fully and actively engaged for more than three days is necessary to 
allow the process to be more inclusive. This analysis of the openDemocracy syntegration, and 
participant responses to it, leads to the question of whether it would be possible to make the 
process itself more reflexive, so that there protocol itself is up for discussion, without the 
momentum and efficiency of the protocol being lost. Moments during the process to stop, 
reflect and intervene in the predefined and automated aspects of syntegrity might solve some 
of the problems identified by Bechler that lead to the greatest participant dissatisfaction. 
Milesi suggests building opportunities to reflect on the process and compares it to similar 
processes to encourage the further use of some of the techniques (Milesi, 2017). There is, 
however, a potential for these reflexive moments to undermine one of Team Syntegrity’s key 
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strengths, the prevention of anyone taking up a central position. If the rules can be changed 
during the process, then the chances of more traditional power dynamics, the expression of 
gender, class, language or seniority, to influence the process in ways that are prevented, or at 
least discouraged, by the structure of the small groups and the guidance of critics. 
  
I would argue that the openDemocracy Barcelona syntegration shows clear evidence that the 
Team Syntegrity protocol embeds characteristics around which the process self-organises 
which allow the emergence of epistemic communities that can generate legitimacy, and that 
this process of self-organisation is experienced by participants as a creative process. This 
creativity, both intellectual and emotional, is key to its capacity for subjectivisation and, as 
will be discussed in more detail in the final part of this thesis, the emergence of identity that 
is necessary for representativeness. These characteristics, I argue, mean that the Team 
Syntegrity protocol has the potential to inform the development of an institutional form that 
could replace the platform in institutions of contemporary art. The use of the strict Team 
Syntegrity protocol, particularly its time limit and certain aspects of its proctological fixity, 
mean that it is not necessarily sufficient to this task. The practice-based experiments with 
aspects of the Team Syntegrity protocol undertaken as part of this research will be discussed 
in the next section, arguing that through institutional practice, the legitimacy and 
representativeness that emerges from the syntegration process can be transformed, through 





4.3 — Experimental practice    
  
While the analysis of the openDemocracy syntegration showed its potential for the 
legitimation of decisions and subjectivising creativity, collaborative art-making will be argue 
to be key to the kind of common world-building that forms the basis for institution which 
allows legitimate decisions to be transformed into credible actions. Over the course of this 
practice based research, four of my own experiments in the use of aspects of the Team 
Syntegrity protocol were made between 2016 and 2019, in different contexts and at different 
scales, emphasising different aspects of Beer’s original process. The first and last 
experiments took place within existing groups. The first was a discussion group—Reading 
and Thinging—of which I was a member from late 2015 until early 2017 based at FACT, 
Liverpool and initiated by FACT PhD researchers, Alex Pearl and Sam Skinner, and 
FACTLab residents, Thiago Hersan and Radamés Ajna (Reading & Thinging #8, 2016). The 
syntegration took place in the context of a series of monthly meetings where a changing 
group of participants organised around a reading and an accompanying activity. The final 
experiment was on the invitation of the alternative artists’ education and studio project 
Conditions, Croydon—founded by artist and educator Matthew Noel-Tod and artist David 
Panos (Conditions, 2019)—to run a two-day workshop for their members in early 2019. The 
two other experiments were in the context of initiating new groups. The first, and largest, 
project that took place as part of this research was a residency within Šaloun, the Studio of 
the Visiting Artist at the Academy of Fine Arts (AVU), Prague, working with 14 fine art 
students for an initial period of four months in Spring 2017 on the project How to build a 
platform. The second was as a launch event for FavourBank, developed by myself and artist 
Lou-Atessa Marcellin, as part of the Broadcast series of her research project Diaspores. In 
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this section I will look at the Team Syntegrity protocol’s practicality as a tool for institution 
building and artistic collaboration.  
  
4.3.1 — Reading and Thinging: On Syntegrity and FavourBank: Meeting0 
 
 
Figure 6. Building a group structure model, Reading & Thinging #8 (2016). Liverpool, 2016. 
 
Reading and Thinging had been running for 12 months when I initiated the 8th session, On 
Syntegrity, in December 2016. The group was not fixed, but there were several regular 
attendees, including myself and the group’s founders. The group’s meetings all took place 
within FACT but the group itself had an ambiguous relationship to the institution, and while 
the group's meetings were open, they were never part of FACT’s public activities and were 
not publicly promoted but publicised through word of mouth. The group drew from the 
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community of artists, technologists and researchers that formed around FACT’s institutional 
activity but was not itself part of the institution (OLF’s R&T + Ob_ & Ob_, 2015). The 
group’s focus on collaborative learning and interdisciplinary exchange made it ideal for an 
initial experiment with the Team Syntegrity protocol. While I took a lead role in the meeting, 
leading the group through the protocol as outlined in Beyond Dispute (Beer, 1994a), as my 
first experiment with Team Syntegrity, I was not in an authoritative position or in possession 
of superior knowledge. This was, therefore, a collaborative learning exercise with the whole 
group. The group size and time constraints did not, of course, allow for a full running of the 
protocol. 
  
The session started, as do standard Team Syntegrity meetings, with the building of an 
icosahedron (Bechler, 2017). Unlike the method used by Beer, and continued by Malik 
Management in commercial applications of Team Syntegrity, I proposed that the group make 
a single, large structure rather than individual, smaller ones. This making was a key part of 
bringing Team Syntegrity to the Reading and Thinging format, with the collective making 
prompting the group to communicate and think together about practical as well as intellectual 
problems. As one participant noted, there is a felt dimension to our relationship with 
geometry that is often overlooked (Reading & Thinging #8 (recording), 2016) and so the 
building may also help prepare participants for a more emotionally engaged discussion as 
well. Reading and Thinging, which in some ways had struggled to see itself prior to its final 
meeting, ended the syntegrition session with a much better self-understanding and shared 
feeling for what it was: an ongoing, multivocal, critical and supportive conversation on a 
shifting set of related topics. This was true across each of its 10 meetings throughout its year-
long duration, and the crystallisation of this—using the Team Syntegrity protocol in the final 
meeting—served as a model of the group in which it recognised itself, an idealised form of 
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open, non-hierarchical discussion. While follow-up conversations were very positive about 
the continuation of the project and at least one more use of the protocol in a public setting, 
the factors that made the group possible—participants from across the UK being able to 
regularly meet in Liverpool—came to an end in 2017. On Syntegrity was the eighth and final 
meeting of the group with several attempts to reconvene being unsuccessful. While the Team 
Syntegrity protocol successfully functioned to give the group a representation of itself that it 
recognised, it is important to note both the contingent and material constraints on self-
organising that a protocol alone cannot overcome. 
 
The second experiment with the Team Syntegrity protocol was as part of a half-day event that 
aimed to initiate a peer-to-peer skillshare and timebanking network called FavourBank. 
While the idea had been conceptualised by myself with artist Lou-Atessa Marcellin, the 
Meeting0 event held in September 2017 was an opportunity to share the ideas that 
underpinned FavourBank as well as broaden the inputs into the design and practical 
operations of the project. The event was roughly split between a workshop21 and 
implementation of the Team Syntegrity protocol. The decision to have an introductory 
workshop was made in order to comply with Elinor Ostrom’s conception of real agreement as 
requiring both shared understanding and mutual trust (Ostrom and Hess, 2000). 
  
 
21 The workshop introducing ideas of the commons and shared resource drawn from the ideas Elinor Ostrom 
(1990), gift-giving and power relations through the ideas of David Graeber (2011) and game theory through 





Figure 7. FavourBank: Meeting0 presentation, Favour Bank - diaspore (2017). London, 2017. 
 
The second part followed a similar process to the use of Team Syntegrity with the Reading & 
Thinging group. A full sized icosahedron was constructed, then a smaller one made to match 
the shape of the attendant group. Again, the small number of participants and limited time 
meant the protocol had to be adapted. Seven participants made for an awkward group shape. 
Notably, in order to increase the amount of time for discussion, and so that two groups could 
meet simultaneously, critical roles were not allocated. Instead, groups followed their 
discussions with a short summary of its contents to the whole group. While this allowed for 
information sharing, having participants who were observing but not participating in a 
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discussion meant feedback could not be nearly as rich, and was only able to engage with 
outcomes, not the process. Still, the structure of the discussion, where every participant is a 
member of two subgroups, did allow for rich information to be shared around the participants 
and, due to the in-depth introduction, there was a clear, shared purpose—elaborating and 
specifying key aspects of how FavourBank could operate.  
 
The event was, however, open and publicly advertised and was not connected to an existing 
community, which at the time did not exist around Marcellin’s Diaspores project. Though 
most of the participants had been invited, the Team Syntegrity protocol was being relied upon 
to do many things in a very short amount of time. While some of the participants knew each 
other prior to the meeting, none was familiar with the project. Participants were being asked 
to provide practical proposals for specific design problems for FavourBank while at the same 
time building a shared sense of investment in the outcomes. As the review of 
openDemocracy’s Barcelona syntegrity event above shows, investment, at least in the process 
itself, is vital to success. While the groups were asked to define the specific areas of 
discussion during the problem jostle, the first half of the session meant the topics discussed 
were overprescribed and the freedom of participants to set their own agenda—a vital part of 
Team Syntegrity—was restricted. To use Beer’s own language, in this instance the protocol 
for being used on the wrong side of the equation, with participants being asked to find 
solutions rather than define the problems. In this sense it was a misuse of Team Syntegrity. 
With Reading and Thinging the protocol allowed the existing group to reflect on its own 
workings and, to some extent, solidify its identity, its use with FavourBank did not allow 





Though the use of the process was helpful to me to clarify some of my own ideas, both about 
FavourBank and the utility of the Team Syntegrity protocol, the tightly defined parameters 
meant it was an ungenerous process which did not let participants to take ownership of the 
process or the outcomes. It is unsurprising, then, that none of the participants felt compelled 
to continue engagement with the project which, due to other priorities of myself and 
Marcellin, has yet to be developed any further. The Team Syntegrity protocol was being used 
for organising but not self-organising, undermining what I would argue is the most powerful 
aspect of the process. The algocratic aspects of the process—rules which organise how 
people interact—dominated, meaning that the structures that emerged were not viable, 
instead needing to be put together from the outside. Participation could not be action in 
Arendt’s sense of an act of leadership with others and common authorship of outcomes. The 
next experimental syntegration, taking place over a much longer period, allowed 
opportunities for the distribution of leadership, and therefore authorship and ownership, to be 
distributed. 
 
4.3.2 — How to build a platform 
  
The largest and longest-term experiment in the use of the Team Syntegrity protocol was the 
basis for a semester-long collaborative project I led in Šaloun, The Studio of the Visiting 
AVU, Prague in spring 2017 titled How to build a platform. Working with 14 students on a 
twice weekly basis, the Team Syntegrity structure was used to plan and execute six student-
led collaborative projects. Students from three BA and MA level art schools in the Czech 
Republic, as well as international exchange students from the UK, Australia and China, 
applied to take part following at initial open call and public introductory presentation where 
the themes of collaboration and the politics of platforms were outlined, as well as the ideas 
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about alternative institutional forms based on the Platform Cooperative model (Scholz and 
Schneider, 2017). The initial stated aims of the project were the building of a platform for the 
making and showing of collaborative artwork which didn’t simply follow existing, online 
platform models but instead co-devised a new model through conversation and 
experimentation. This project was an experiment with the use of the Team Syntegrity protocol 
not as a way to structure discussion but as a way to structure artistic collaboration. The 
project was to be implemented throughout the entire 18 week project, rather than at just a 
one, two or even three-day meetings. As such, it was an experiment in the use of Team 
Syntegrity as an organisational, curatorial and institutional model.  
 
Figure 8. Icosahedron at Šaloun, Džadoň et al. (2020). Prague, 2017. 
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Mindful of the need to distribute not just information but also the functions required to make 
project viable, I hoped to be able to do what Laurence Rassel—director of école de recherche 
graphique, Brussels—drawing on Jean Oury’s institutional psychotherapy, describes as the 
separation of ‘role’ and ‘function’ (Rassel, 2018). The role of the studio leader was mine but 
the leader’s function could be distributed using the Team Syntegrity protocol, allowing for 
action by participants that was not present in the FavourBank syntegration. 
  
The Team Syntegrity protocol was used at the very first meeting of the group to very quickly 
establish six topics and arrange members in six overlapping sub-groups. At this point it was 
noted by participants that this was a very effective and rapid process, following which there 
would be a high degree of understanding of and commitment to the process, and satisfaction 
with the group assignments. While these topics were collectively devised and agreed upon, 
this was in a context clearly defined by my introduction and call to participation. Participants 
used the protocol to independently produce the six topics, but from the start there was a 
coherence built into the process through defined boundaries and self-selection of participants, 
rather than coherence being solely a product of the protocol. Unlike with FavourBank, 
however, the goal and context I had established—to build a platform—was open enough that 
the group were able to interpret and define it themselves. Over the following 18 weeks, 
meeting roughly a day and a half a week, the six groups worked to develop projects that 
would act as platforms for the making and showing of their work.  
 
As was to be expected, there was a large variation within the group of levels of commitment 
and experience of collaborative and cooperative working. This extensive, long-duration and 
largely unsupervised use of the Team Syntegrity was difficult. Groups of four or five found it 
hard to independently arrange times to meet and finding a time in which additional critics 
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could also attend proved too challenging. As a result, much of the information sharing 
happened in whole group meetings chaired by myself, which limited the possibility of 
substantive critical feedback that a better implementation of the Team Syntegrity protocol 
allows. As noted earlier, critics who have observed a discussion, rather than just the summary 
of its results, can give far richer and more informed feedback. As my discussion of the 
openDemocarcy syntegration shows, critics, when used properly, feedback on process as 
much as outcomes. Therefore, the pastoral role, guiding the social dynamics and intervening 
at points where things looked likely to break down, was retained centrally by me far more 
than I had hoped for. In this way, my leadership role and function took on an authoritarian 
characteristic as defined by Beer, with regulation coming from a central command rather than 
self-organisation.  
 
There were, however, strong and rich informational links due to the key structural feature of 
the Team Syntegrity protocol; each participant is a member of two groups—the five members 
of a group are each a member of one of the five other groups—and therefore each group 
should know exactly what each other is doing without the need for centralised co-ordination. 
These links were far from perfect, with absences and uneven commitments, but were 
successful, I believe, in ensuring that two projects didn’t become incompatible, either by 
being too different or too similar. Here it can be seen that the effect of the protocol in co-
ordinating action so that the activity of different groups is not destabilising, rather than 
information exchange leading to consensus as Beer’s framing of the process suggests. 
  
The project culminated in a public exhibition titled Beyond Dispute, through which each 
group’s work was refined into a single, hour-long performance enacted three times over one 
week in June 2017. Each group created a number of five minute actions that were then shared 
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and swapped between all the participants. The performance was presented alongside video, 
audio and sculptural works that the groups had produced. This final process of producing a 
public presentation was fast and happened with a very good level of agreement, in part 
because its platform structure allowed each participant the opportunity to exhibit what was 
important to them within the exhibition and performance framework. This was also, however, 
where I took the most direct, authorial control. As I wrote in the text to accompany the 
archival online presentation that was published the following year22, the pressure to take on a 
leadership role is built into many of the existing structures, with the arché, and hierarchy, 
exerting a strong pull. Some decisions, such as the title of the exhibition, were taken by me 
alone because time was short and the group had not been able to agree. As stated already, the 
parameters of the project were already highly constrained, both by my framing and by the 
institution that the project sat within, a state university with legal responsibilities including 
the requirement to give students grades at the end of each semester. It should be remembered, 
however, that this was not an experiment that aimed to teach or rather, provide opportunities 
to learn how to be democratic in the way that was emphasised in the discussion of the 
openDemocarcy syntegration, nor was it an experiment in the use of the Team Syntegrity 
protocol to make decisions and reach agreement. It was an experiment that aimed to 
investigate how its use could structure the making of art. While this necessitates the use and 
development of some similar discursive skills, the making and showing of art, even 
collaboratively, is not discussion. Collaborative art practice can, and perhaps should, hold 
tensions unresolved and meanings still contested. This is its key strength and not the 
weakness that it might be in a purely discursive context.  
 
 
22 See Vol. 2, Experiment 2. 
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Two aspects of the Team Syntegrity protocol need to be emphasised here. One is that it 
provides a structure not for leaderlessness—anarchy—but distributed leadership. To maintain 
the tension that keeps the structure strong, each group, each participant, should be pulling, or 
leading, in a different direction. The result of this, however, needs to be a sense of common 
investment and ownership or a project that does not just have the potential to be, but actually 
is, led by everybody into becoming a thing that is for everybody. How to build a platform 
was an experiment with using the Team Syntegrity protocol to learn how to distribute 
leadership, or rather, to learn how to lead together. The success of the experiment can 
therefore be assessed by how much ownership or authorship participants took over the 
outcomes. While authorship over the project as a whole remained mine, at least at the 
institutional level, the structure of the project allowed participants to lead and own individual 
and collective aspects that fed into the final, co-authored result.  
 
The aspect of the protocol which allows multiple opportunities for leadership is much more 
clear when it is used to structure action and not just discussion. I would argue that this means 
creative projects like How to build a platform are much more relevant to questions of 
institution-building than a purely discursive implementation of the Team Syntegrity protocol. 
Institutions require leadership and in an alternative institutional form this must be, as much as 
possible, distributed and not centralised. While the platform model of an institution discussed 
in section 1.3.2 does allow multiple projects with different leaders, platforms necessarily put 
limits on this through their capacity to enclose and exclude. As I have already argued, what 
syntegration provides is a way of coordinating multiple projects without relying on 
centralised, authoritarian decision making. While, on reflection, far more of the functions of 
leadership, such as assessment, could have been shared, this would have required a project 
design that put much greater emphasis on the institution building rather than creative outputs. 
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The final experiment, which took place in early 2019, gave me the opportunity to do exactly 
this. 
  
4.3.3 — Conditions 
  
The final experiment with the Team Syntegrity protocol took place in over two days in 
February 2019 following an invitation to run a workshop for Conditions—an artist-led studio 
programme in Croydon, England—involving the six of the studio artists and one of the artist-
founders. This iteration attempted to test, and get detailed feedback on, the use of the 
protocol for structuring both discussion and artistic collaboration and its potential as the basis 
for an institutional form. It was an attempt to refine the process I had developed using 
conclusions drawn from previous experiments and a detailed study of the openDemocarcy 
syntegration. Working with an existing group, which had formed through an open call and 
selection process six months prior to the workshop, made this a good opportunity to look at 
some practical organisation questions specific to the group itself, an approach that was 
proposed to and accepted by the programme coordinator. My key question in this experiment 
was therefore how the Team Syntegrity protocol could be used, over both shorter and longer 
terms, to structure both artistic practice and the running of an institution that could support 
that practice. The Conditions programme was itself not based on collaboration, with artists-
members each pursuing independent artistic practices alongside seminar sessions led by 
visiting artists of the type I was invited to run, though they had previously collaborated on 
exhibition projects. Being external to this group—rather than either a member of it or an 
instigator as I had been in previous experiments—put me in the position of being an expert 
on the process that participants were being asked to use but not knowledgeable about or 
invested in the content of the discussion and collaboration. This external position, purely in 
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Figure 9. Images from @jhpdf John Hill’s recent workshop with Conditions, Conditions on Instagram 
(2019). Croydon, 2019.  
 
Observation of the Team Syntegrity process suggests that the first round of discussion is often 
where the common terms are defined, the second round where details of disagreement are 
explored and the third round where the need for an outcome forces creative solutions that 
overcome these disagreements (Bechler, 2017). The time constraints of the conditions 
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syntegration, allowing for only two rounds, meant that groups tended to reach the stage of 
disagreement, but not overcome it, something that was acknowledged in the feedback 
sessions at the end. This was especially the case when groups were approaching more 
theoretical problems where they struggled to come to a shared definition, or questions about 
arts value that are inherently unanswerable and that are often central to artistic practice, 
which each of the participants pursued separately. I had underestimated quite how skilled the 
group would be in discussion and how comfortable they would be with each other, the 
product, I would assume, of their previous art educations and several months of structured 
and unstructured contact through the studio programme. As such, this was less of a learning 
experience in discussion for participants than I had expected and the group should have 
perhaps been guided to more practical topics, rather than the largely abstract ones that were 
chosen, though I was reluctant to do this after the experience with the FavourBank 
experiment. Topics were not required to be in the form of ‘contestable claims’—those for 
which an opposite position exists and is arguable (Beer, 1994a, p.23)—but emphasis could 
have been placed on finding real world examples with and against which positions can be 
tested. This is especially important if the protocol is being put to use as part of a longer-term 
process with a view to artistic or institutional practice. Another innovation in this discussion 
was the timetabling of an opportunity to feed back on and alter the protocol itself, again 
suggested at the openDemocracy syntegration. In this case the group suggested that one of 
the critics in each group should take on the more defined role of notetaker. This role would 
be played by the facilitators in a full scale and fully resourced Syntegration, which were 
absent here. The group was, however, not aware of this and this was an innovation that came 
from them. Drawing facilitators from the groups itself is, I believe, a very valuable addition 





The cross-pollination of ideas occurred frequently throughout the making session on the 
second day, aspects of which were likely a result of the format of collaboration and 
presentation, such as a prevalence of interactivity and participation. My observation was that 
groups who had managed to agree more often throughout day one also worked better together 
during day two. However, because each participant was engaged in two groups, being in one 
group that experienced difficulties did not undermine the whole process, and by the end of 
the second round of collaborative making each group had produced something and it felt like 
a natural conclusion rather than a premature curtailment of an ongoing process. While it is 
perhaps the case that the artistic making moves more rapidly to an outcome than discussion, 
it should be emphasised that making was a continuation of two rounds of discussion the 
previous day and was not starting afresh. 
  
4.4 — Group identity and subjectivisation 
  
The case study and experimentation in this chapter show that Team Syntegrity has embedded 
characteristics that allow it to structure not just democratic, non-hierarchical discussion, but 
also viable institutions that conform to Stafford Beer’s VSM. Furthermore, the type of 
institution that emerges from syntegration is resistant to the centralising dynamics of the 
platform and the effects of algocracy detailed in Chapter 2. Group self-identification, a key 
part of the VSM’s System Four, is aided by having a readily available and easily 
comprehensible model of the group structure in the icosahedron, or whatever shape the group 
takes. During How to build a platform the physical model of the group-shape constructed in 
the first session was referred to as a diagram of the relationships between groups and 
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participants, and came to be a symbol of the group itself. The model is addressed to the group 
and the group comes to recognise itself in that model. The process also works to produce 
identity in another way. Identification with the group, and as a member of the group, comes 
from shared goals and outcomes, whether in discussion or art practice, but also through 
affective processes. These then multiply across the network to produce synergy, a sense of 
whole-group identity and whole-group feeling. While in Conditions, the group already had a 
strong sense of identity and did not necessarily recognise itself in the model that was built 
during the workshop—though there was strong identification with some of the co-produced 
artworks which were themselves models of sorts—Reading and Thinging ended the 
syntegrition session with a much better sense of its identity. This identity was felt, in part, 
through the ‘emotional dimension of geometry’ that one participant described, rather than a 
clearly articulated or defined purpose. 
  
While the Team Syntegrity protocol does impact on who can directly address who within the 
network it creates—making only some kinds of connections and interactions impossible—
unlike algocracy it does not redirect address in the way described in section 2.1.5. Instead the 
ptotocol facilitates statements or actions by sub-groups being addressed to the group as a 
whole, who may or may not recognise it as part of the synergy of the whole group’s emergent 
identity. While the groups and roles that participants choose or are assigned are their 
environment for the duration of the process, with very limited control over them once they 
are set, the initial stages of the Team Syntegrity protocol—the problem jostle and topic 
auction—are precisely opportunities for participants to make and respond to indirect 
addresses and therefore provide the opportunities for both leadership and subjectivisation that 
algocracy denies. As has been seen, particularly in How to build a platform but also in the 
openDemocracy syntegration, the process encourages a sense of identification with these 
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groups. In this way the Team Syntegrity protocol can be seen as not just producing epistemic 
communities of experts but micro-publics, both at the level of the subgroups and at the level 
of the whole group. While these groups are able to produce norms, and the process allows for 
norms to proliferate across the network, it could also be thought of as the ‘world-making’ that 
Warner describes as being the task of subaltern counterpublics. While, in section 1.2.4, I 
criticised Warner’s approach as being too based in language and too reliant on the idea of a 
universal public sphere, to which subaltern public act as counter, I would argue that 
syntegration offers an opportunity for world building beyond simply norms or identities but 
at the level of institutions.  
 
While I think it is clear from the studies, experiments and arguments so far made that the 
Team Syntegrity protocol does have the potential to act as a model for a sustainable, non-
hierarchical institution building which self-organises around embedded characteristics of the 
process, I feel it is necessary to put this potential into a broader institutional context. The 
examples and experiments analysed have each been enacted within specific settings that 
made them both possible whilst also limiting their potential. This was true in the case of 
Reading & Thinging, which was functionally independent but still reliant on FACT both as a 
physical meeting place, an attractor around which the network of participants emerged and in 
some ways as an legitimator of the group’s activities, lending the group some authority and 
some trust that made it easier, or less risky, for participants to join a discussion. However, the 
group’s self-recognition, as opposed to more formal recognition from its host institution, 





How to build a platform was a fixed-term project that existed as a temporary addition to the 
existing system of the Academy of Fine Arts, Prague. As such, demands and conditions were 
placed on the project that determined its possible outcomes. While the Team Syntegrity 
protocol provided a non-hierarchical framework of interaction for the students, there 
remained a hierarchy in their relationship to me as an invited, and paid, educator. While there 
are, of course, benefits to this division—students are able to concentrate on making work 
rather than administering their programme of study—the power dynamic of student-teacher 
that was introduced from the institution, as well as the set, one-semester time limit, did place 
constraints on what was possible. While Laurence Rassel’s ideas on the separation of role and 
function is again useful—and I regret reverting to the institutional default of giving students 
grades and feedback, rather than distributing this task and having them grade and evaluate 
each other—she makes clear that there are limits, often set by law, to how much roles and 
function can be seperated (Rassel, 2018). As I state in the text that accompanied the online 
presentation of Šaloun’s outcome, the temporary transfer of the power to lead is not enough. 
Only by creating a situation that results in “not knowing whether they will allow you to have 







Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
5.1 — Syntegrations and Platforms 
  
Chapter 1 showed that the power of platforms as an organisational form results from the 
combination of several related properties. A platform’s modularity means it can easily grow 
and the network effect means that this growth can cause exponential increases in the 
platform's utility such that “the more people who use them, the more useful they are to more 
people” (Tufekci, 2017, p.20). The platform’s intensification of sharing between its users 
leads to the phenomenon that Alex Williams identifies as ‘generative entrenchment’. It 
becomes increasingly costly to leave a platform owing to the fact that the surplus value 
created by sharing is inseparable from the platform on which it is shared. As a result, 
reputation—the evaluation of future actions based on past usage or behaviour—becomes non-
transferably tied to the platform that holds the record of that behaviour. Chapter 1 showed 
that these platform-like properties are not only apparent in web platforms but also in 
institutions of contemporary art that have adopted platform logic. I conclude that a platform’s 
power resides in its ability to authorise, both in the sense of attributing authorship (Szreder, 
2013) and the power to grant or deny access to or permissions within the platform. This is 
why many see in the platform a return to older forms of absolutist sovereignty (Hu, 2015; 
Zuboff, 2015; Bratton, 2016).  
 
Sharing is central to the production of platform surplus and relies on a logic of 
financialisation, requiring an ongoing relationship between platform and user. This platform-
user relation can be understood as a debt relation—utility and the surplus it generates lent to 
the user, secured against the anticipated future value of their behaviour—with the 
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decentralisation of risk to the user and the centralisation of return to the platform. This 
bidirectional move—controlling what is centralised and what is decentralised—is, I conclude, 
key to the operation of power within a networked and financialised system. While the 
platform can be beneficial to users by facilitating sharing and granting access to the networks 
in which the shared material can be evaluated and reputations built, it strips power from the 
user through centralised decision-making. The purpose of a platform—which Beer would 
define as “what the system does” (Beer, 1985, p.102)—is defined by the platform, not the 
user, rendering the platform-user relation authoritarian. Attempts by users to re-purpose and 
platform, becomes misuse (Lialina, 2012; Wright, 2013), resulting in the user being excluded. 
  
The argument of this thesis is that while the Team Syntegrity protocol can harness some of 
the same properties that makes the platform so effective, it possesses embedded 
characteristics that prevent the debt-like dynamic of financialised sharing and the 
authoritarianism that arising from a platform’s exclusive authority over authorisation and the 
definition of purpose. From experience of using the Team Syntegrity protocol to structure 
collaboration, described in Chapter 4, I conclude that syntegration does display a certain 
platform logic, bringing multiple different projects into mutually supportive relationships. 
Like a platform, the Team Syntegrity protocol facilitates sharing, connecting people so that 
the power and value of individual knowledge, thinking and feeling can be put to work with 
shared outcomes. Further, it has the capacity to organise this sharing into higher-order 
formations—the metasystem that emerges during the process—creating a surplus which, as 
with a platform, can be shared with all participants. The Team Syntegrity protocol is also 
platform-like in its modularity. It employs standard forms—fixed group sizes, with specified 
roles, meeting for set amounts of time—that are able to operate in a way that is content 
agnostic, an open form that can be filled by whatever material the users of the process wish. 
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It would be possible, in theory, to swap a group from one syntegration into another, provided 
the groups were of the same size, and indeed a switching of participants between days one 
and two of the Conditions syntegration was easily accommodated. 
  
There are, however, key differences between the structure and types of relationships that the 
Team Syntegrity protocol allows for and the platform-user relation that appear in the platform 
models of online and offline organisation that have been analysed in the previous chapters. 
Most important is that the Team Syntegrity protocol works against the regimes of opacity and 
visibility, prediction and categorisation made possible by the platform’s centralising 
dynamics. By denying a single position from which all information is available—instead 
using a mesh of multiple, indirect connections—Team Syntegrity denies a privileged position 
within the network of relationships it structures. No participant is able to effectively operate 
as a gatekeeper because information can be communicated along multiple paths. Team 
Syntegrity’s defence against centralisation is also aided by the assignment of multiple roles to 
each participant. By requiring participants to operate as both discussants, critics and 
observers—and additionally as facilitators in the protocol developed by the participants 
during the Conditions syntegration—all privileges, such as the right to speak or reply, are 
equally distributed and held only temporarily, so cannot entrench themselves in one person. 
These roles, their visibility and their functions are embedded in the protocol and emerge from 
its use rather than, as in the algocratic or bureaucratic institution, having to be authorised 
centrally. I conclude that emergence of these roles from the protocol’s operation means that 
they are both legitimated by the process itself and secure against being used as a reward for 





5.2 — Network effects 
  
The question of whether the network effect applies to the Team Syntegrity protocol is an 
interesting one, and Beer’s original conception of it as ideally a 30-person meeting, suggests 
it might not. The Team Syntegrity protocol is, compared to an online platform, much more 
closed. It is not designed to be open to and able to absorb everything, instead setting strict 
limits on the number of participants and the amount of information it can process. While 
larger Syntegrations are certainly possible—both Beer (1993) and Malik (Malik 
SuperSyntegration (MSS), 2018) have described processes in which multiple syntegrations 
can be linked together—it might not be the case that more participants leads to greater value 
or utility for the individual, as is the case with the network effect. Interconnections between 
syntegrations would seem more likely to have the stabilising effect that Beer sees as key to 
societal stability but not, I conclude, the exponential increase in connectedness and utility that 
are seen in communication networks like the internet. Team Syntegrity’s protocol explicitly 
limits the number of direct connections that can be made, favouring intensive over extensive 
interactions. This is also the case when assessing whether the Team Syntegrity protocol 
displays generative entrenchment. While evidence from the openDemocarcy syntegration and 
How to build a platform shows that the process facilitates learning—how to act 
democratically and how to work collaboratively—very effectively, this learning can be 
understood to be kept by the participants, not the platform, and is transferable to other 
projects, institutions and situations. Reputation is not a criteria for participation and, because 
action by individual participants is not visible to the whole group, individualised reputation 
becomes less important than the group’s collective output. The preservation of autonomy at 
the lowest level means that it is cost-free to leave a syntegration, one of the most important 
qualities for avoiding the traps of platform logic. The ownership of outcome or products of 
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the process may be collective—and the clearly defined roles that the Team Syntergrity 
protocol gives participants reduces the likelihood that individual members will be ascribed 
authorship of collective work—but access to them is not mediated through the syntegration 
process. Due to the recursive properties of syntegrity as a viable system, each component 
remains independently viable, or autonomous, and the autonomy of components is 
maximised at all times. Any one group could leave one syntegration to act independently or, 
because of modularity, join another. 
 
5.3 — Opacity and visibility 
  
The opacity of algocracy’s decision-making—producing only outcomes with no access to the 
reason or reasoning behind then—is one of the ways that the power imbalance is created in 
the platform-user relation. Team Syntegrity is, I conclude, a much more transparent process. 
The protocol for a syntegration is clear and comprehensible. As I have argued, transparent 
processes for arranging participants into their groups are available and preferable to the 
potentially more efficient and effective algorithmic method used in the commercial 
application of the Team Syntegrity protocol. Decision-making within subgroups is visible and 
contestable. This is one way in which the connections made by the critic role are vital, no 
group can make a decision that is not fully visible to at least one member of most or all other 
groups23. There is, however, some opacity designed into the Team Syntegrity protocol. Not 
every participant has direct access to every group's decision-making. This is important for 
two reasons. Firstly, it reduces the quantity of information that each participant is expected to 
receive and process and secondly, it prevents the VSM’s System Three role of direct audit 
 
23 In a 30-person syntegration it is all other groups bar one. 
 160 
 
and intervention being concentrated in one person, forcing the role and function to be 
distributed. This, I conclude, is also the case for how visibility functions in a syntegration. 
While, as with algocratic systems, visibility of participants to each other is mediated by 
protocol, it is not flexible in a way that allows visibility to be used as a reward or punishment. 
What a group chooses to make most visible of their discussions or outcomes will affect the 
environment and therefore the potential actions of other groups, but this is not a centralised 
decision and cannot be centrally co-ordinated. The openness of discussion and decision-
making, with the clearly defined but equitable roles of group members and critics, allows for 
democratic processes to be observed, trialled and learned by participants through the multiple 
rounds of meeting that the protocol structures. The way syntegration employs transparency 
and equitable distribution of information, without making all aspects fully visible to 
everyone, not only disrupts the centralising tendencies of the platform but also serves to 
legitimate decisions made through the creation of transparent, epistemic communities. 
  
5.4 — Predictability creativity, categorisation and identity 
  
As has been argued, algocracy, when compared to other forms of governance, creates a 
different relationship between identity and norms. Beer suggests that Team Syntegrity can be 
used for establishing norms (Beer and Editors, 2000) while Rouvroy (2018) sees algocracy as 
able to govern without them. The Team Syntegrity protocol enables and encourages self-
identification at both the level of the participant and of the group. Section 2.2.2 argued that 
identity resulted from a process of relations with others. While Beer may be correct that the 
types of discussions and relations syntegration encourages can develop norms which might, 
as the title of his book suggests, place certain things ‘beyond dispute’, a syntegration’s non-
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hierarchical configuration is intended to de-emphasise external, pre-existing norms, 
generating and legitimating new ones through the relations it structures. Importantly, this is a 
recursive process, with identity formation happening at the level of the whole group, sub-
groups and individual participants. The direct, unmediated and affective relations that the 
intensive connections of syntegration makes possible are what gives it the capacity to 
produce self-identification at the level of the participant, with the network forming a 
metasystem that allows critical reflection on the self in relation to others. 
  
The Team Syntegrity protocol is intended to stimulate unexpected interactions and 
unpredictable outcomes and, as Beer often emphasises, maximise human freedom. 
Membership of two subgroups multiplies the opportunities for participants to take on 
leadership roles, while preventing any one person from assuming leadership of the whole 
group. Constraints are imposed not to limit what can happen but to ensure the equality of 
access to information that Beer saw as vital to Team Syntegrity’s democratic nature. These 
constraints also prevent, as much as possible, pre-existing forms of organising—namely 
hierarchies, whether they be of expertise, class or gender—from asserting themselves and 
limiting the potentials of participants to interact. Resistance to hierarchies is a key way in 
which syntegration promotes the creativity which is suppressed in the regime of predictability 
that algorcracy administers and the limits the platform puts on behaviour with its ability to 
filter, hide and exclude. As the experiments conducted for this research have shown, 
creativity and the ownership of its outcomes are key to building viable, sustainable 
institutions that are able to operate autonomously from surrounding institutions. I conclude 
that creativity is embedded into the process and emerges through the enactment of leadership 
that syntegration requires, with unexpected action, understood through Arendt, being key to 






5.5 — Syntegration as institutional form 
  
Team Syntegrity, I have argued, creates a very specific kind of platform which counters many 
of the properties of platforms that this research has identified. It is self-organising and 
bottom-up, built from autonomous component parts guided by the embedded characteristics 
of the protocol, rather than the components built upon and dependent on the platform. These 
components are, however, still enhanced by what emerges from their connection: a 
unification of purpose and sense of identity that creates mutual support between autonomous 
parts. Credibility, understood as the ability to “make promises and be believed” (Ascher, 
2016), is also distributed by the Team Syntegrity protocol when it is used to structure 
collaborative action as well as collaborative decision-making, allowing its emergent 
legitimacy to be combined with the ability to act. The power to make with others something 
that is new, lasting and public was, for Hannah Arendt, the key expression of arché, 
leadership or power-to (Balibar, 2007). To be free we have to be able to make things for 
ourselves and for each other in politically organised “common public space” in which people 
can speak and act (Arendt, 1961, p.148). This is precisely the reason, I conclude, that 
institutions of contemporary art are especially suited to re-imagining and re-organising 
through syntegration. For syntergration to move beyond a discussion and decision-making 
requires an environment that can be acted in and upon, where promises can be enacted as 
changes in the common world of things. The self-organisation that syntegration structures 
enhances the capacity for each component to act, and to lead, through supportive and critical 
(compressive and tensile) relations. In the fullest implementation of syntegration as the basis 
for institution building within this research—the work done with 14 artists over the four 
month of How to build a platform—this is what happened. The Team Syntegrity protocol was 
used to structure a collaboration where we made things ourselves, for ourselves, with each 
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other and for each other. While I retained the role of leader, the leadership function was 
distributed to the subgroups so that each was able to lead their own, independent activity that 
was then integrated into a coherent whole for public presentation. Though the organisation 
was temporary and no longer exists, the products of that time do, as artworks, archive and 
documentation, but also as the relationships that persist and knowledge that was made and 
shared in the process. 
  
While the power and effectiveness of the Team Syntegrity protocol for both discussion and 
collaborative making is evidenced by the experiments that form the basis for this thesis, the 
question remains of whether it is useful as an organisational tool for institutions that can also 
resist both older forms of bureaucracy and newer forms of centralisation and extraction found 
in the platform and the types of control employed by algocracy. One of the properties that 
recommends the Team Syntegrity protocol as a basis for sustained as well as temporary 
organising is the modularity that has already been described, which can be understood 
through Maturana’s distinction between organisation and structure, detailed in section 3.1.4. 
As well the modularity of groups, there is also a modularity of individuals. In a thirty-person 
syntegration, a person has four clearly defined roles: a member of two groups and a critic of 
two others. When considering the long-term sustainability of using a syntegration structure, 
allowances have to be made for members leaving and needing to be replaced, as happened in 
the Conditions workshop. As roles are clearly defined and the small groups allow for very 
good information sharing, the replacement of a single member should not cause destabilising 
disruption to the organisation, even though the structure has changed. Equally, because of the 
multiple links the protocol creates between groups, giving a high degree of redundancy for 
information exchange, temporary or sustained absences of a single member do not cause 
insurmountable disruptions to information flow as indirect links persist. The non-hierarchical 
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organisation that evenly distributes constructive and critical roles with an emphasis on 
information sharing and mutually reinforcing support—the tensile and compressive forces 
that Beer took from Buckminster Fuller—are, I conclude, an important basis on which a 
sustainable or viable institution can self-organise. 
  
Their remains the question of who gets to decide on participation and therefore how an 
institutional form based on syntegration deals with representation. This, in Beer’s language, 
is a metasystemic question, undecidable at the level of the syntegration itself. Unlike the 
platform or the ideal public sphere, a syntegration is and must be a closed system. While 
openDemocracy used invited participants, the experiments I undertook as part of this research 
relied on open calls. While open calls are clearly a form of indirect address, they should be 
understood as having a potential reach already somewhat defined by organisational, 
infrastructural and linguistic limits. The Conditions, Reading and Thinging and How to build 
a platform syntegrations were open calls within existing groups or institutional settings, with 
more or less formal criteria for inclusion. FavourBank suffered from the call being far too 
open, with too few people identifying with the project strongly enough to commit themselves 
to the process. As we have seen in the discussion of platforms, there is a huge power in being 
able to define the boundary of a group or constituency. Group identity and self-representation 
are, however, emergent from the syntegration process due to its embedded characteristics. 
Questions of how a group should define its environment or wider community are, therefore, 
precisely the type of meta-question that the group should be able to deal with successfully. If 
a viable institution’s purpose is its own maintenance, then in order to be viable it must deal 
with problems of connection to, support between and representation of its environment. The 
setting of the boundary between a system and its environment is the role of the observer, 
precisely the critical self-reflection that I have argued emerges from syntegration and results 
 166 
 
in group identity and subjectivisation. As a result the syntegration process can reset its 
boundaries, becoming more open or more closed to its environment, through the act of 
critical reflection on its identity and viability.  
  
Viewing syntegration as the basis for a new institutional form indicates an answer to the 
question of how micro- or counter-publics relate to a wider public sphere. While a 
syntegration is a logically closed system, understanding its subgroups as System One of the 
VSM, with their own independent relations to the external environment, means that the 
norms, identities and ‘worlds’ that a syntegration generates are always in multiple 
connections to other individuals and organisations. These connections are not just discursive, 
but are objects, actions and transformations of matter, energy and information, public things 
that, like Arendt’s table described in section 2.2.2, connect and separate, affecting the world 
not just through discourse but also materially. Following Jodi Dean’s insight that conflict 
over the configuration of networks is “at the same time a conflict over the configuration of 
the world” (2002, p.168) we must see that the types of relations that an institutional 
syntegration enters into with its environment are equally as important as those it enters into 
internally. I conclude that the closed, self-referential and identity-generating relations internal 
to the syntegration allow more autonomous and less authoritarian relations with the other 
individuals and organisations in the external environment. With successful syntegration, the 
micro-niches of each subgroup become a shared, common environment for the whole group 
as a result of the shared interpretation of information at the level of syntegration’s 
metasystem, as well as an enhanced ability to act on an in that environment.  It is this 
autopoietic emergence of a common relation to and separation from the environment that 
prevent components’ absorption into allopoietic—or exploitative—relations with other 




It is important to remember, however, the distinction made in the third chapter between the 
viable system which can maintain itself and true autopoiesis which must be self-making from 
first principles. This thesis has argued that while Team Syntegrity has the potential to 
structure self-organisation that harness some of the power of platforms without replicating 
the authoritarianism of algocracy’s platform-user relation: remaining legitimately democratic 
at the lowest level; maximising creativity and freedom; credible in its ability to act and 
facilitating critical identity formation. It is difficult to do this, however, without working 
within existing material and institutional frameworks. A new kind of viable, self-organising 
and non-hierarchical institution is necessary, desirable and possible, if supported with the 
kind of resources that institutions can provide—space, time, money and expertise—but also 
access to existing networks and reputation that makes calls for participation successful. That 
these existing institutions are increasingly governed by platform logic causes a clear tension. 
Beer’s call “to set up experimental institutions, deliberately antithetic to the existing ones-and 
with their full support” (Beer, 1974, p.97) then seems like the necessary way forward. I 
conclude that in order to make systemic, or metasystemic change, these new institutional 
forms must first be implemented at the lowest level. The systemic change of the institutions 
of contemporary art must begin with changes at the level of the production of art itself, 
employing processes and structures that maximise creative freedom, have credible capacities 
for action and where identities emerge through the formation of common environments. 
Viable autonomy at the lowest level of an institution allows it to resist extractive or 
exploitative relations from logically superior structures. Platform-like systems of control—
which require centralised authorisation and boundary setting dependent on asymmetrical 
visibility, predictability and external categorisation—are ineffective on syntegrations due to 
the way that opacity, unpredictable creativity and emergent subjectivity are facilitated by the 
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protocol, while the necessary internal control functions are distributed across the system. In 
order to accommodate syntegration as a protocol of production—the ‘what it does’ of the 
institution—higher level institutional structures must adapt to facilitate decentralised co-
ordination rather than centralised control, with purpose and identity flowing upwards through 
the institution from the lowest level.  
 
5.6 — Questions and further research 
 
This research has, I believe, shown that syntegrity is a highly effective method for structuring 
artistic collaboration that allows participants to have control over how its outcomes are 
authorised and whether and how those outcomes are made public. It has also argued that the 
syntegration process has the potential to affect change in the systems and organisations that it 
exists in and interacts with. The question of which conditions are necessary to make this 
possible requires further consideration, and this project was constrained in many ways by the 
paucity of opportunities for its hypotheses to be tested. As argued above, institutional support 
of a very specific kind is necessary to initiated this process. A truly autopoietic 
syntegration—one that can organise itself without needing to be ‘put together’ by an existing 
organisation—may be ideal, but much more work would need to be done to establish if it is 
possible. Institutional support allows for, at the very least, the initial assembly of participants 
through the transmission of an open call. The key question for future research is about the 
kinds of relationship between the institution and the syntegration that allow for both its 
independent existence from the institution and a continued influence on it. In my experience 
of initiating syntegrations, both within and beyond the experiments that form part of this 
project, the easiest context in which to initiate a syntegration is within higher education. 
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Academies are, however, incredibly resistant to systemic change from below. Much more 
research into how syntegration can structure teaching—or rather learning together—would be 
very fruitful, but it would need to be much more aware than I was in this research about the 
limitations of this context and the necessity to negotiate conflicts between a syntegration and 
the academy that do not undermine the principles of syntegrity. Institutions of contemporary 
art, especially smaller ones, are in my experience much more flexible in how they are 
organised and operate, however long-term, large-scale, high-commitment projects with 
entirely unspecified outcomes—as syntegration requires—are high risk prospects for 
institutions. For these reasons, Conditions might be the ideal context for syntegration to take 
place, sitting as it does between an educational and art institution. I remain an associate of the 
programme and hope to continue to work with them in the future.  
 
While this research has argued that syntegration is resistant to platformisation, it is interesting 
to consider how it could be a direct replacement for online digital platforms of the type 
discussed and critiqued in this thesis. What aspects of syntegration could be delegated to the 
algorithm and how could its principles be embedded into networks and their protocols? 
Further, how could this be done in a way that was functional—and better than existing 
alternatives—rather than simply aesthetic or proof of concept? Decentralisation is currently 
an vibrant area of artistic as well as technological research that I hope that this project is both 








Figure 1. A rough sketch of the model of any viable system, Beer (1985, p.3). Note that the 
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recursively. 102 
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